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Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C. 
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (435) 259-7321 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, 
husband and wife, 
Complaint 
& Jury Demand 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CivilNo. ^f07- / / £ 
Mark E. Arnold, Duane R. Barney, Peter 
Lanto, Eric A, Rasmussen, Gregory A. Page Judge Anderson 
& Norman M. Larson. 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, for causes of action against the defendants, allege as 
follows: 
Parties 
1. Plaintiffs are long term residents of Moab, Grand County, Utah, 
2. Defendants were, at all relevant times, residents of the State of Utah and 
transacting business in Grand County. 
c - ? * 1S98 
EY _ , 
Jurisdiction & Venue 
3. This case involves transactions concerning a proposed development of real 
property located in Grand County, Utah. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-3-4. 
4. Venue in Grand County is proper pursuant to U.C.A. §78-13-1 & -78-13-7. 
Facts Common to AH Causes of Action 
5. Plaintiffs were the owners of real property on North Highway 191 in Grand 
County, Utah. (The "Norman property" or the subject property) 
6. Plaintiffs own and operate a water park on adjacent to the subject property. 
7. In 1995, the Normans were approached by defendants with a proposal to develop 
a Holiday Inn Franchise on the subject property. 
8. Defendants claimed to have experience and expertise in such developments, as 
well as the ability to obtain financing for the project. 
9. On or about March 15, 1995, several of the parties executed a "Moab Land 
Development Joint Venture Agreement," a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
10. In addition to the plaintiffs, the Joint Venture Agreement was signed by 
defendants Duane Barney, Peter Lanto and Eric Rasmussen. 
11. Although bound by the Joint Venture Agreement, upon information and belief, 
defendant Rasmussen is the brother-in-law of Gregory Page who thereafter acted in the place of 
Rasmussen. At all relevant times, defendant Page has held himself out to plaintiffs and others as 
a member of the Joint Venture. 
12. Upon information and belief, Gregory Page may have filed for bankruptcy in the 
intervening period. The status of that Bankruptcy and its effect on the claims set forth herein is 
unknown. 
13. Pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement, the Normans contributed 8.33 acres of 
property in Grand County. The contributions of Barney, Lanto and Rasmussen (Page) was to be 
"Expertise and Consideration." 
14. The defendant joint venturers and their successors (Page for Rasmussen and 
Arnold for Lanto) contributed nothing to the joint venture. 
15. Shortly after the execution of the Joint Venture Agreement, defendants Barney, 
Page and Lanto traveled to Moab and convinced the plaintiffs to pledge their property in order to 
obtain a loan of $40,000 which was needed to secure the right to acquire a Holiday Inn 
Franchise. 
16. Defendants instead provided a Trust Deed on the plaintiffs' property secured by a 
Promissory Note in the amount of $160,000. See, Exhibits 2 & 3, dated June 27,1995. 
17. The $160,000 came from Ann and Norman Young who were brought into the 
transaction by defendant attorney Mark Arnold. Upon information and belief the Youngs are 
friends and clients of defendant Arnold. 
18. In addition to the plaintiffs, the Promissory Note was initially executed by 
defendants Barney, Lanto and Gregory Page. The Note included a signature line for defendant 
Larson who executed it sometime later. 
19. Completely unknown and undisclosed to the plaintiffs was the nature and extent 
of the other defendants' association with defendant Norman Larson. 
20. Upon information and belief, defendants had previously associated with Larson 
with regard to the Moab Holiday Inn project. 
21. In fact, defendant Larson had previously obtained the right to secure a Holiday 
Inn Franchise for the Moab project and he held personally. Larson paid $40,000 for the right to 
develop the franchise through his company Western Empire Financial Advisors on June 16, 
1995. 
22. After deceptively obtaining the $160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property, 
defendants, contrary to the Joint Venture Agreement, and without the knowledge or consent of 
the plaintiffs, immediately turned the money over to defendant Larson. 
23. Upon information and belief, defendant Larson was brought into the transaction 
by his friend and attorney Mark Arnold. 
24. Upon information and belief, defendant Larson immediately paid himself $16,000 
for "loan fees" which he did absolutely nothing to earn. 
25. Larson next paid himself $40,000 for the Holiday Inn Franchise Fee, however, he 
did not transfer the Franchise interest to the plaintiffs or the Joint Venture. 
26. Over the next several months, Larson and/or other defendants expended the entire 
$160,000, none of which was spent on purposes beneficial to the Joint venture. ($26,792.80 was 
paid to the Youngs as interest on the note secured by plaintiffs' property.) 
27. Plaintiffs were not made aware of, nor did they approve any of the foregoing 
expenditures. 
28. According to the Joint Venture Agreement, defendants Barney, Rasmussen (Page) 
and Lanto (Arnold) were to provide "expertise and consideration." None of the defendants 
provided anything to the Joint Venture. 
29. Upon information and belief, on or about October 31, 1995, defendant Lanto was 
given $8,500, and on or about February 12, 1996, Greg Page was given $5,000 from the 
$160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property. 
30. Since there had been no progress whatever on securing the Holiday Inn Franchise 
or to otherwise "develop, manage and maintain" the subject property, plaintiffs, beginning in 
1996, and continuously thereafter demanded the return of their property. 
31. On April 10, 1996, defendant Page, on letterhead of Senior Finance & Capitol 
Company sent defendant Larson a letter that disclosed the following: 
a. Defendant Larson was brought into the project to "secure financing" 
(without plaintiffs' knowledge or consent); 
b. The loan encumbering plaintiffs' property was in default and then had a 
balance in excess of $178,000 including interest; 
c. Defendant Larson had become a "Partner," again without plaintiffs' 
knowledge or consent; 
d. The entire $160,000 had be "entrusted to Larson's care," again without 
plaintiffs' knowledge or consent; and 
e. Defendant Arnold had also become a Partner. 
See, Exhibit 4. 
32. Thereafter, plaintiffs demanded a meeting to determine the status of the Joint 
Venture. 
33. On May 1, 1996, a meeting was held in the office of defendant Arnold. Present 
were Diane Norman, Robert Norman, Jr., Michael Hughes, Mark Arnold, Duane Barney & Greg 
Page. At that meeting defendants disclosed the following, all of which had occurred without the 
knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs: 
a. Mark Arnold had purchased the position of Peter Lanto for $8,500; 
b. Norman Larson had somehow become "President" of the venture; 
c. Defendant Larson had transferred $50,000 of the funds to "people in 
Phoenix" for unknown purposes; 
d. All of the $160,000 borrowed against plaintiffs' property was gone, and 
defendants could not explain where; 
e. Defendant Larson was also the client of defendant Arnold; 
f. Defendant Barney was a convicted felon and had previously been in 
trouble for parole violations; 
g. The note with the Youngs was in default. 
34. At the same meeting defendant Arnold stated that the Youngs were his clients and 
would not foreclose. 
35. At the same meeting defendant Arnold stated in effect, "I know who the people in 
Phoenix are, Fve talked to them on the phone, Fve dealt with them. I can get the money back, 
but I have to do it delicately." 
36. No Franchise was ever obtained from Holiday Inn. 
37. Nothing was ever done to develop, maintain or manage plaintiffs' property. 
38. None of the $160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property was ever returned. 
39. In December, 1996, defendant Arnold procured Jim Winkler to assume the 
position of the Youngs on the Trust Deed Note. 
40. Thereafter, Mr. Winkler obtained 7.33 acres of plaintiffs' property which was 
secured by the Trust Deed Note, and deducted the amount owing on the Note from the purchase 
price, an amount in excess of $200,000. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Joint Venture Agreement) 
41. Paragraphs 1 -40 are incorporated by reference herein. 
42. At all relevant times, the Membership of the Joint Venture consisted of the 
plaintiffs, Duane Barney, Eric Rasmussen, Greg Page, Peter Lanto, Mark Arnold and Norman 
Larson. 
43. Defendants breached the Joint Venture Agreement in the following, but not 
limited to the following ways: 
a. By failing to secure the Holiday Inn Franchise; 
b. By failing to otherwise develop, manage and maintain the property that the 
plaintiffs had contributed to the Joint venture; 
c. By failing to contribute consideration, expertise or anything else to the 
Joint Venture; 
d. By using plaintiffs' property to secure $160,000 which was then used by 
defendants for purposes unrelated to the Joint Venture without the knowledge or consent of the 
plaintiffs; 
e. By allowing other members (Page, Arnold & Larson) into the Joint 
Venture contrary to its provisions, and thereby allowing them to exercise authority over Joint 
Venture assets. 
44. As a direct and proximate result of defendants conduct as set forth above, 
plaintiffs have suffered damages in excess of $200,000, the amount of which will be the subject 
of proof at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Default of Trust Deed Note) 
45. Paragraphs 1-44 are incorporated herein by reference. 
46. On or about June 27, 1995, the Joint Venture obtained $160,000, secured by 8.33 
acres of property in Grand County, Utah owned by the plaintiffs. 
47. The proceeds were secured by a Trust Deed and Note signed by the plaintiffs and 
defendants Barney, Lanto, Page and Larson. 
48. As set forth above, defendant Arnold purchased and/or acquired the position of 
defendant Lanto. 
49. The note was thereafter in almost continuous default. 
50. In order to avoid foreclosure on the property, plaintiffs eventually sold the subject 
property to a successor-in-interest on the Note, the purchase price of which was reduced by over 
$200,000 that was then owing on the Note. 
51. The note, by its terms provides for joint and several liability in the event of 
default, and recovery of the costs of collection including attorneys' fees. 
52. Consequently, defendants Barney, Lanto, Page, Rasmussen, Larson and Arnold 
are each jointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs for default of the Note in an amount not less 
than $200,000, plus the costs of collection thereon including attorneys' fees. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Punitive Damages) 
53. Paragraphs 1-52 are incorporated herein by reference. 
54. Defendant Arnold has stated that he was previously involved both as counsel for, 
and in business with defendants Barney, Page and Larson. 
55. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly and intentionally set out to take 
advantage of them and use their property to secure funds which defendants would then use for 
their own purposes. 
56. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose 
defendant Barney's status as a convicted felon involving other business scams, as well as the 
involvement of defendant Larson who was expected to drain off the money secured by plaintiffs' 
property for purposes unrelated to the development of plaintiffs' property. 
57. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew and intended that money obtained against 
plaintiffs' property would be used for purposes other than to develop, manage and maintain that 
property. 
58. Plaintiffs allege that in the course of conduct set forth above, that defendants 
knowingly and intentionally lied to them and misrepresented themselves, their conduct and their 
intentions, thereby causing plaintiffs to suffer economic losses in an amount to be proved at trial, 
not less than $200,000. 
59. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages against each 
defendant in such amounts as are proved to the satisfaction of the jury. 
JURY DEMAND 
60. Plaintiffs hereby requests that the causes of action set forth herein be tried to a 
jury. The fee required for this request has been paid at the time of the filing of this Complaint. 
Wherefore, plaintiffs demand Judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally in 
such amounts as are proved at trial, but not less than $200,000 on the first and second causes of 
action, punitive damages as may be assessed by the jury, the costs of this action including 
attorneys' fees and such other and further relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances. 
Dated this l±^_ day of . V ^ / ^ A ^ , 1998. 
<h ^ 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
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All sums received from the Capita! Contributions f\r\i\ from 
any distributions from Investments shall he deposited in the 
bank account of ihe Joint Venture. Checks may be drawn and 
signed by the Administrative Aqont. 
B.2 Not a Partnership. 
This Agreempnt shall not be deemed to create a partnprship. 
0,5 Jjpyern IIIC-J t a_w^  
This Agreempnt sha l l be governed by 'be 1 u s of N IP iUa le of 
U t a h . 
8,4 Ent 3 re Ayreement . 
This Agreement embodies the en I 1 r e agreement among t lie 
parties with respect to the Joint Venture. All (trior 
Aqreement, representations, and statement' ire merged into 
this Agreement. 
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 TR U S T 1)1 I D 
W i t h As>''! iuntrp»* »d J V M K 
THIS'MM'ST Ul -ED. made this 7-7 day of ^/jij' ( - \. _< F>J/:] _ between R< )BERT R. NORMAN 
and A. DIANE NORMAN, a*; l imlois , who ntc located in Moab'l HMII, AMERK AN ] .P.GAL T i l ! J7. L.C., as Trustee, 
and A N N Y O U N ( ; and N( )RMAN YOUNG, as Beneficiary. '''• *fj * "'ifyl.'f '.> v /> o l^- . 
5 -^  ' > * " - > « . " • • % 
WITNESSETH: The Tnr.lor Conveys and Warrants »<» Tinker in lru<-.t with power of sale, the following 
described property, situated in Grand County, State of Utah: 
BEGINNING AT A ( (>RNER O N T ! IENORT1 1ERLY RICH I OF-WAY (>F U.S. HIGHWAY 191, 
SAID CORNER HEARS NORTH 3Se53' EAST 803.7 FEET FROM THE. SOUTH 1/t CORNER 
S E C r i O N 2(\ TOWNSHIP 25 SOUTH, RANGE 21 EAST, SALT FAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, 
A N D PROCEEDING I HENCE WITH SAID RIGHT-OF-WAY NORTH 47°40' WEST 6<?7.<> FEET 
TO A CORNER, IIIENCE NORTH 0°05f EAST 223.1 I :EE I "TO A CORNER, THf :NCE SOUTH 
89° 54* FAST 717 3 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 9*15' EAST >r,.r, FEET, THENCE, SOU III 38* 18' 
WEST^/O.MT.EFTO T H E POINT OF BEGINNI^^^ 
LESS. CORNERS ARE MONUMENTED A S S H O W N ON THE A1TACIIED PLAT. BEARINGS 
A R E BASED ON THE NORTHERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY OF U.S. HIGHWAY F>| (BEARING 
FROM ORIGINAL SURVEY = NORTH 4V<\iV WEST) 
Together with all building, fixtures and improvements theieon and all water rights, rights of way, casements, 
lis, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or 
rcaflcr used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and 
.hority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR T H E PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even 
B herewith, in the^r jncijinlMini of $ | ^ ( [ ( ) p m made by Trustor, payable to the o r d r of Beneficiary at the times, in 
manner and with interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the 
formancc of each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
rafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting 
they arc secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under 
ursunnt to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided. I -^ •' _ . , / 
PROTECT T H E SECURITY O F THIS TRUST D E E D , TRUSTOR AGREES: %
 % Y i ^ C ' 
T o keep said property in good condition and repair, not remove or demolish any building thereon, to complete 
store promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed 
on; to comply with all lows, covenants and restrictions affecting, said property; not to commit or permit waster 
thereof; not to commit, suffer or permit any act upon c ir l i i o ?<• m \ in! t »JI of la ' , to do all other acts which from 
the character or use of said property may be reason.ibl/ w c H \ < he rp'- n'ic enumerations hcicin not excluding the 
general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any pait thereof i. brin" obtain 'I for the purpose of financing construction 
of improvements on said property, Trustor further agrees-
(a) To commence construction promptly ;»nd to pursue same with reasonable diligence to 
completion in accordance with plans and specifications « lOsfactorv t<» Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspc< t said properly at all Junes during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit, signed bv Haicfina' . setting forth facts showing a default by 
Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorized \o accept as true and conclusive all facts and statements therein, 
and to act thereon hereunder. 
2. T o provide and maintain insurance, of siuh l\pc or fvpes and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on 
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or pla< cd on said property. Such insurance shall be carried in 
companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary. In event 
of loss, Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make p'oof of los, and each insurance company 
concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payn.cnt for such loss directly to Beneficiary instead of to Trustor 
and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, mav be applied by Beneficiary, at its option, to 
reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair nf the property damaged. 
3. T o deliver to, pay for and maintain with Bciicfn iai v until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, 
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of fill*1 or policies of title insurance and any 
extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. T o appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also appear 
in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's 
fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
5. T o pay at least 10 days before delinquency all (axes and assessments affecting said property, including 
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in 
connection with said property; to pay, when due, all encumbrances, charges and liens with interest, on said property or 
any part thereof, which at anytime appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, fees, and expenses of this Trust. 
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor 
from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as cither may deem necessary 
to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said property for such purposes; 
commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights of powers 
of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgement 
of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever 
amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and 
pay his reasonable fees. 
7. T o pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with 
interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten percent ( l ( )" f ) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall 
be secured hereby. 
O ' ) J 
IT IS MUTUALLY ACRR-I) THAT: 
8. Should said property or any port thereof be talen 01 'l;iin;i<"-(l |>y reason of ;my public improvement or 
condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any of her manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to 
ill compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and s'edl be entitled at its option to commence, appear 
n and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or in m:i!;r any compromise or sett lenient, in connection 
vith such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and proceeds, including the 
proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said pmprtiy, arc hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, 
ftcr deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply \hr came on any indebtedness secured hereby. 
Yuslor agrees to execute such further assignments of any compensation, awards, damages, and rights of action and 
roceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At any time and from time to time upon written lemic*! of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and 
cscntation of this Trust Deed an the note for endorsement (in case of bill reconveyance, for cancellation and retention), 
thout affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee may (a) consent 
the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting an casement or creating any restriction thereon; 
I join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or charge thereof; (d) rcconvey, 
Jiout warranty, all or any part of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be described as "the person or 
rsons entitled thereto'', and the recitals therein of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. 
istor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all 
Is, issues, royalties, and profits of the property afTcctcd by this Trust Deed and of any personal property located 
xon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured her by or in the performance of any 
xment hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, and profits earned prior to 
lult as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, Trustor's right to collect any such moneys 
I cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking, possession of the property affected hereby, to 
xt all rents, royalties, issues and profits. Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time 
)Ilccl such moneys shall not in any manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or 
Dnstrucd to IK, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, 
I subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person, 
tnt, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as 
receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, upon and take 
SSion of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or cost*; and expenses of operation and collection, 
ling reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may 
nine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said propertwlhc collection of such rents, issues, and profits, 
proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking, or damage of said 
ty, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default 
tder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
13. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a 
of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent 
3 
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14. Time is oi Mi-.* C ' C i i r c i ieieol . l."p<-n d'-.l.vs: ; • < ; u .: : m tl;<. .; ivuient of a:iv indeb tedness secured 
hereby or in (lie perform^!* c of any agreement he reunder , .si' ' " i i ' - ; se '-nj-d h e r 1 ' . / r.h.d! immediately become due and 
payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such del .-mil, Uem-in i.-^ y urr- execute or cnusc Trustee to execute 
a written notice of default and of election to cause r-iid proper! v io be sol ! to satis'y the obligations hereof, and Trustee 
shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said prnpejiv or some part or parcel thereof is situated. 
Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all document':, evidencing expenditures secured hereby. 
15. After the lapse of such lime as may then be rcipmed by law following the recordation of said notice of 
default, and notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand on 
Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, cither as a whole 
or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the 
order in which such propeity, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, .shall be sold), at public auction to the highest 
bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United Slat's at the time of sale. The person conducting the 
sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until it shall be completed and, in every 
case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the time and place last 
appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice 
of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver 
to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The 
recitals in the Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof o\' the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including 
Beneficiary, amy bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale of payment of (1) the costs and expenses 
of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2) cost of any 
evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Tmstcc's Deed: (3) all sums expended 
under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 100% per annum from date of expenditures; (4) all other 
sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, 
in its discretions, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clcik of the county in which the sale took 
place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Heneliciary shall have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the 
foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and 
expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixes by the court. 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time 
the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee 
named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof 
shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, administers, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder arc joint and several. The 
term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust 
Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number 
includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made public record 
as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto pending sale under any other Trust Deed or of 
any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according, to the laws of the. Stale of Utah. 
4 
-^^^:;t::;^i:s^:^, < » « • ! . ; ' . ' ! ; . ' i m l •*« <'•'>• n o t i c e o f <,;t jc 
vS!f'.n,iiyrc of Trustor 
—^r^i^o^^ 
T E OP UTAH 
JNTY OF 
) 
)ss. 
) 
On ( ruy/ / - day of V / / , , , ^ , 19 / x T " , pcrsonnh'v appeared before mc ROBERT R. NORMAN 
A. DIANE NORMAN, the signcr(s) of ihc above instrument, who duly ncknowlcdr.cd to mc thai ROBERT R. 
LMAN and A. DIANE NORMAN executed the same. 
Commission Expires: /,J ~ /,J - J O Notary Public , _ 
Residing a t v ?/'/ <?s •// ^ft 1 ^ -
NOTAHV PUHU: 1 
HELEN G. DAViS j 
796 McCormlctc OWd. 
Motb. Ut«h 6453? 
My Comm4t8ion Expiree , 
D»o*fnb«# 12, 1997 
S T A T E O F U T A H j 
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EXHIBIT 3 
NOTE SECURED BY DEEP Of TRUS^ 
DO NOTE DESTROY THIS NOTE: Khen paid, <his notn, with Trust Deed 
securing same, must be surrendered to Trustee for Cancellation, 
before reconveyance will be made. 
$160,000.00 Moab, Utah 
Juno£ Uh , 1995 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned jointly and severally 
promise to pay to the order of ANN YOUNG "and NORMAN YOUNG the 
amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND AND 00/100 DOLLARS 
($160,000,00), together with interest from date at the rate of 
EIGHTEEN PERCEUT (18%) per annum on the unpaid principal, said 
principal and interest payable as follows: 
Payment in full, including interest and principal, 
to be made to Ann Young and Norman Young on or 
before September 27, 1995. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installment of 
principal and interest or any part thereof, or in the performance 
.of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, 
the holder hereof, at its option and without notice or demand, may 
declare the entire principal balance and accruod interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the 
payment of principal or interest, either with or without suit, the 
undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and 
expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof 
severally waive presentment for payment, demand and notice of 
iishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent of any and all 
extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be 
jranted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other 
provisions of this note, and to LIK? r»\i<^:^ -[ L JlilV S^'MIiM. f -
•./ ' part thereof, with or without subr;t i Lu!. ; en . 
This note is secured by a Trust; Deed o£ evcui date herewith 
HOliER'A1 K. NORMAN 
' A. IHANE NORMAH 
pUA/JE R. BARURi^,^ 
PETER 0 . LANTO / 
'Jh?b±?/ J y^k ^ 
^ GREGORY/ A:-' PAGE 
y50WWN M. LARS 
NOTE SECURED BY DEED OF TRUST 
MOAB HOLIDAY INN 2 
P. 3 0-f- S 
EXHIBIT 4 
SF2C LO. Fi-U'ir ' i i . " : : ;24 ftpr. 10 1996 07:32PM PI 
C $r. finance & cfipilnl co • po box 1762? • salt ! ikn Htv " »«- « 111 r • pfi ,%ril 466-7600 • fax 801-466-4224 
Apli l 10, 1996 
Mr. Norm Larson 
Western Empire Advisors 
7109 So. Highland Drive, suite 201 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84121 
R£: Moab and Jeiemy Ranch, Utah Hotel Piojects 
Dear Norm, 
When we brought the above mentioned projects to you a \ear ago, to provide financing, 
you told us you could secure the financing needed to complete the projects. In addition, 
you said you would provide any additional capital needed to secure the financing in 
exchange for a share of die ownership. As of this date you have been unable to provide 
the financing, and the land in Moab, Utah is now encumbered with a $178,000 loan. 
After conferring with the other partners, we have decided to terminate our agreement with 
you to find financing for these projects immediately. In regards to your share of the 
partnership, you can cither take over the debt on the land and release it of all 
encumbrances, thus complying with our agreement that you would provide all additional 
capital. Or you can decide to give up your share of the developments, and pay back the 
fees you were paid on the loan and the fees paid out to your sources. You have 48 hours 
until 4:00 PM Friday April 12, 199610 officially notify us in writing as to your decision 
along with the outstanding funds. 
Regardless of the decision you make about our partnei ship, we expect to receive by the 
same time and date mentioned above the remaining balance of the funds entrusted to your 
care with interest and copies of all checks draw) on the funds along with copies of the 
bank statements showing the appropriate interest earned en these funds. 
FRC 
Mpr. 10
 1 9 3 6 p 7 . 3 3 p r . ) 
Sincere!)-. 
gory- AVPage 
Bob Norm/in 
Duane Bamev 
Mark Arnold' 
Tab 2 
Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C. 
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab,Utah 84532 
Telephone: (435) 259-7321 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr.5 & Diane Norman, j 
husband and wife, 
First Amended Complaint 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
I Civil No. 9807-116 
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson. j 
Judge Anderson 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby submit the following First Amended 
Complaint wih an additional cause of action against Mark E. Arnold. Plaintiffs have previously 
requested a jury and paid the required fee. 
Parties 
1. Plaintiffs are long term residents of Moab, Grand County, Utah, 
2. Defendants were, at all relevant times, residents of the State of Utah and 
transacting business in Grand County. 
Grand C-v *<.<' 
^ NOV 0 % tCSS 
C U W. OP Tfcfc COURT 
pv 
Deputy 
Jurisdiction & Venue 
3. This case involves transactions concerning a proposed development of real 
property located in Grand County, Utah. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-3-4. 
4. Venue in Grand County is proper pursuant to U.C.A. §78-13-1 & -78-13-7. 
Facts Common to AH Causes of Action 
5. Plaintiffs were the owners of real property on North Highway 191 in Grand 
County, Utah. (The "Norman property" or the subject property) 
6. Plaintiffs own and operate a water park on adjacent to the subject property. 
7. In 1995, the Normans were approached by defendants with a proposal to develop 
a Holiday Inn Franchise on the subject property. 
8. Defendants claimed to have experience and expertise in such developments, as 
well as the ability to obtain financing for the project. 
9. On or about March 15, 1995, several of the parties executed a "Moab Land 
Development Joint Venture Agreement," a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
10. In addition to the plaintiffs, the Joint Venture Agreement was signed by 
defendants Duane Barney, Peter Lanto and Eric Rasmussen. 
11. Although bound by the Joint Venture Agreement, upon information and belief, 
defendant Rasmussen is the brother-in-law of Gregory Page who thereafter acted in the place of 
Rasmussen. At all relevant times, defendant Page has held himself out to plaintiffs and others as 
a member of the Joint Venture. 
12. Upon information and belief, Gregory Page may have filed for bankruptcy in the 
intervening period. The status of that Bankruptcy and its effect on the claims set forth herein is 
unknown. 
13. Pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement, the Normans contributed 8.33 acres of 
property in Grand County. The contributions of Barney, Lanto and Rasmussen (Page) was to be 
"Expertise and Consideration." 
14. The defendant joint venturers and their successors (Page for Rasmussen and 
Arnold for Lanto) contributed nothing to the joint venture. 
15. Shortly after the execution of the Joint Venture Agreement, defendants Barney, 
Page and Lanto traveled to Moab and convinced the plaintiffs to pledge their property in order to 
obtain a loan of $40,000 which was needed to secure the right to acquire a Holiday Inn 
Franchise. 
16. Defendants instead provided a Trust Deed on the plaintiffs' property secured by a 
Promissory Note in the amount of $160,000. See, Exhibits 2 & 3, dated June 27, 1995. 
17. The $160,000 came from Ann and Norman Young who were brought into the 
transaction by defendant attorney Mark Arnold. Upon information and belief the Youngs are 
friends and clients of defendant Arnold. 
18. In addition to the plaintiffs, the Promissory Note was initially executed by 
defendants Barney, Lanto and Gregory Page. The Note included a signature line for defendant 
Larson who executed it sometime later. 
19. Completely unknown and undisclosed to the plaintiffs was the nature and extent 
of the other defendants' association with defendant Norman Larson. 
20. Upon information and belief, defendants had previously associated with Larson 
with regard to the Moab Holiday Inn project. 
21. In fact, defendant Larson had previously obtained the right to secure a Holiday 
Inn Franchise for the Moab project and he held personally. Larson paid $40,000 for the right to 
develop the franchise through his company Western Empire Financial Advisors on June 16, 
1995. 
22. After deceptively obtaining the $160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property, 
defendants, contrary to the Joint Venture Agreement, and without the knowledge or consent of 
the plaintiffs, immediately turned the money over to defendant Larson. 
23. Upon information and belief, defendant Larson was brought into the transaction 
by his friend and attorney Mark Arnold. 
24. Upon information and belief, defendant Larson immediately paid himself $16,000 
for "loan fees" which he did absolutely nothing to earn. 
25. Larson next paid himself $40,000 for the Holiday Inn Franchise Fee, however, he 
did not transfer the Franchise interest to the plaintiffs or the Joint Venture. 
26. Over the next several months, Larson and/or other defendants expended the entire 
$160,000, none of which was spent on purposes beneficial to the Joint venture. ($26,792.80 was 
paid to the Youngs as interest on the note secured by plaintiffs' property.) 
27. Plaintiffs were not made aware of, nor did they approve any of the foregoing 
expenditures. 
28. According to the Joint Venture Agreement, defendants Barney, Rasmussen (Page) 
and Lanto (Arnold) were to provide "expertise and consideration." None of the defendants 
provided anything to the Joint Venture. 
29. Upon information and belief, on or about October 31, 1995, defendant Lanto was 
given $8,500, and on or about February 12, 1996, Greg Page was given $5,000 from the 
$160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property. 
30. Since there had been no progress whatever on securing the Holiday Inn Franchise 
or to otherwise "develop, manage and maintain" the subject property, plaintiffs, beginning in 
1996, and continuously thereafter demanded the return of their property. 
31. On April 10, 1996, defendant Page, on letterhead of Senior Finance & Capitol 
Company sent defendant Larson a letter that disclosed the following: 
a. Defendant Larson was brought into the project to "secure financing" 
(without plaintiffs' knowledge or consent); 
b. The loan encumbering plaintiffs' property was in default and then had a 
balance in excess of $178,000 including interest; 
c. Defendant Larson had become a "Partner," again without plaintiffs' 
knowledge or consent; 
d. The entire $160,000 had be "entrusted to Larson's care," again without 
plaintiffs' knowledge or consent; and 
e. Defendant Arnold had also become a Partner. 
See, Exhibit 4. 
32. Thereafter, plaintiffs demanded a meeting to determine the status of the Joint 
Venture. 
33. On May 1, 1996, a meeting was held in the office of defendant Arnold. Present 
were Diane Norman, Robert Norman, Jr., Michael Hughes, Mark Arnold, Duane Barney & Greg 
Page. At that meeting defendants disclosed the following, all of which had occurred without the 
knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs: 
a. Mark Arnold had purchased the position of Peter Lanto for $8,500; 
b. Norman Larson had somehow become "President" of the venture; 
c. Defendant Larson had transferred $50,000 of the funds to "people in 
Phoenix" for unknown purposes; 
d. All of the $160,000 borrowed against plaintiffs' property was gone, and 
defendants could not explain where; 
e. Defendant Larson was also the client of defendant Arnold; 
f. Defendant Barney was a convicted felon and had previously been in 
trouble for parole violations; 
g. The note with the Youngs was in default. 
34. At the same meeting defendant Arnold stated that the Youngs were his clients and 
would not foreclose. 
35. At the same meeting defendant Arnold stated in effect, "I know who the people in 
Phoenix are, Fve talked to them on the phone, I've dealt with them. I can get the money back, 
but I have to do it delicately." 
36. No Franchise was ever obtained from Holiday Inn. 
37. Nothing was ever done to develop, maintain or manage plaintiffs' property. 
38. None of the $160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property was ever returned. 
39. In December, 1996, defendant Arnold procured Jim Winkler to assume the 
position of the Youngs on the Trust Deed Note. 
40. Thereafter, Mr. Winkler obtained 7.33 acres of plaintiffs' property which was 
secured by the Trust Deed Note, and deducted the amount owing on the Note from the purchase 
price, an amount in excess of $200,000. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Joint Venture Agreement) 
41. Paragraphs 1-40 are incorporated by reference herein. 
42. At all relevant times, the Membership of the Joint Venture consisted of the 
plaintiffs, Duane Barney, Eric Rasmussen, Greg Page, Peter Lanto, Mark Arnold and Norman 
Larson. 
43. Defendants breached the Joint Venture Agreement in the following, but not 
limited to the following ways: 
a. By failing to secure the Holiday Inn Franchise; 
b. By failing to otherwise develop, manage and maintain the property that the 
plaintiffs had contributed to the Joint venture; 
c By failing to contribute consideration, expertise or anything else to the 
Joint Venture, 
d By using plaintiffs' property to secure $160,000 which was then used by 
defendants for purposes unrelated to the Joint Venture without the knowledge or consent of the 
plaintiffs, 
e By allowing other members (Page, Arnold & Larson) into the Joint 
Venture contrary to its provisions, and thereby allowing them to exercise authority over Joint 
Venture assets 
44 As a direct and proximate result of defendants conduct as set forth above, 
plaintiffs have suffered damages in excess of $200,000, the amount of which will be the subject 
of proof at trial 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Default of Trust Deed Note) 
45 Paragraphs 1-44 are incorporated herein by reference 
46 On or about June 27, 1995, the Joint Venture obtained $160,000, secured by 8 33 
acres of property in Grand County, Utah owned by the plaintiffs 
47. The proceeds were secured by a Trust Deed and Note signed by the plaintiffs and 
defendants Barney, Lanto, Page and Larson 
48 As set forth above, defendant Arnold purchased and/or acquired the position of 
defendant Lanto 
49. The note was thereafter in almost continuous default 
50. In order to avoid foreclosure on the property, plaintiffs eventually sold the subject 
property to a successor-in-interest on the Note, the purchase price of which was reduced by over 
$200,000 that was then owing on the Note. 
51. The note, by its terms provides for joint and several liability in the event of 
default, and recovery of the costs of collection including attorneys' fees. 
52. Consequently, defendants Barney, Lanto, Page, Rasmussen, Larson and Arnold 
are each jointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs for default of the Note in an amount not less 
than $200,000, plus the costs of collection thereon including attorneys' fees. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach Of Fiduciary Duty vs. Defendant Arnold) 
53. At all times herein defendant Mark Arnold was a duly licensed attorney and 
member of the Utah State Bar. 
54. In the Fall of 1994, defendant Arnold commenced an attorney-client relationship 
with co-defendant Larson which continued throughout the period relevant to this lawsuit. 
55. In the Spring of 1995, defendant Arnold commenced an attorney-client 
relationship with an entity known as 4-D Development. 4-D Development was comprised of 
Greg Page, Duane Barney and Pete Lanto. 
56. At about the same time defendant Arnold commenced an attorney-client 
relationship with Robert and Diane Norman and lasting through 1996, concerning the Moab 
development. 
57. Defendant Larson was brought into the group to obtain financing from outside 
sources for Holiday Inn projects in Moab and Park City, with promises of an equity position plus 
fees if the funding were obtained. 
58. Neither Arnold, Larson, 4-D Development or its members were willing or able to 
put up any money to advance the projects. 
59. On or about June 17, 1995, Defendants Arnold and Larson approached Ann 
Young, another client of defendant Arnold and "negotiated" a loan of $160,000. 
60. The terms of the note were $160,000 at 90 days at 18% interest, secured by 8.33 
acres of prime commercial property owned by the Normans. 
61. The loan was virtually risk free. 
62. The loan proceeds were deposited in a trust account controlled by defendant 
Arnold, and then immediately transferred to defendant Larson without the knowledge or consent 
of the plaintiffs. 
63. By their negotiations, defendants Larson and Arnold allowed Ann Young $3,200 
from the loan proceeds for "points" and split $16,000 among themselves for "loan fees." These 
amounts were paid on or about June 21, 1995. 
64. Both the interest rate and points and fees were grossly excessive and represent 
self-dealing among defendant Arnold and his clients, contrary to the plaintiffs' interests. 
65. At the same time, defendant Arnold had commenced an attorney-client 
relationship with 4-D Development and others concerning another Holiday Inn in Park City. 
66. On June 21, 1995, defendant Larson gave defendant Arnold another $10,000 for 
an earnest money deposit on land in Park City for that development. 
67. Plaintiffs had no knowledge or interest in the Park City project, and did not 
consent to this expenditure of the loan proceeds. 
68. With regard to the Young loan, defendant Arnold prepared or caused to be 
prepared a Trust Deed and Note regarding the encumbrance of plaintiffs' property. 
69. As previously stated, plaintiffs were pressured to execute these documents under 
false pretenses. The documents were not executed and recorded until June 27, 1995, after 
approximately $70,000 of the loan proceeds had already been disbursed. 
70. On October 27, 1995, defendants Arnold and his client Larson (through his 
company Western Empire Advisors, Inc.) purchased the interest of Pete Lanto in the venture for 
$8,500. (See exhibit designated "NL72" attached.) The purchase price was negotiated by 
defendant Arnold even though Lanto had contributed nothing to the venture. 
71. Plaintiffs had no knowledge of and did not consent to this transaction. 
72. By its express terms the document makes defendant Arnold personally liable 
under the Trust Deed and Note on the Young loan. 
73. By March, 1996, the entire loan proceeds of $160,000 had been expended without 
any productive result. All expenditures had been made by defendant Larson in consultation with 
his attorney-partner defendant Arnold. 
74. Included in these expenditures was a wire of $50,000 to an Arizona financial 
entity which was supposed to provide funding for the Moab project. 
75 When the funding did not materialize, defendants Arnold and Larson went to 
Anzona to "conduct an investigation " They came away believing the money had basically been 
stolen 
76 As counsel for the joint venture, defendant Arnold promised he would retrieve the 
money, and made the same promise to the plaintiffs in a face-to-face meeting He subsequently 
made no effort to do so 
77 In August, 1996, defendant Arnold brought in another client, Mr Jim Winkler to 
assume the Youngs position on the Trust Deed and Note 
78 Defendant Arnold thereafter (acting as counsel for the plaintiffs) secured an 
extension of the Holiday Inn Franchise He thereafter made the Franchise available to Mr 
Winkler without so much as offering the opportunity to acquire it to the plaintiffs 
79 This and other conduct throughout his representation of and business relationship 
with the plaintiffs constituted a severe conflict of interest intended to benefit himself and other 
clients at the expense of the plaintiffs 
80. An attorney acting for, or purporting to act for a client owes a very high duty to 
look after and protect his clients' interests The duty is both personal and fiduciary in nature 
81. By his conduct set forth above and other non-enumerated acts defendant Arnold 
breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs 
82. As a direct and proximate result of his breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs 
suffered loss and damage in excess of $200,000 
83. This liability is separate from and in addition to defendant Arnold's liability under 
the Trust Deed and Note. 
Wherefore, plaintiffs seek Judgment on this cause of action against defendant Arnold for 
such damages as proved at trial, not less than $200,000, for the costs of this action including 
reasonable attorneys' fees, and for such other damages, relief or sanctions as may be appropriate 
in the circumstances. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Punitive Damages) 
84. Paragraphs 1-83 are incorporated herein by reference. 
85. Defendant Arnold has stated that he was previously involved both as counsel for, 
and in business with defendants Barney, Page and Larson. 
86. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly and intentionally set out to take 
advantage of them and use their property to secure funds which defendants would then use for 
their own purposes. 
87. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose 
defendant Barney's status as a convicted felon involving other business scams, as well as the 
involvement of defendant Larson who was expected to drain off the money secured by plaintiffs' 
property for purposes unrelated to the development of plaintiffs5 property. 
88. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew and intended that money obtained against 
plaintiffs' property would be used for purposes other than to develop, manage and maintain that 
property. 
89. Plaintiffs allege that in the course of conduct set forth above, that defendants 
knowingly and intentionally lied to them and misrepresented themselves, their conduct and their 
intentions, thereby causing plaintiffs to suffer economic losses in an amount to be proved at trial, 
not less than $200,000. 
90. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages against each 
defendant in such amounts as are proved to the satisfaction of the jury. 
JURY DEMAND 
91. Plaintiffs hereby requests that the causes of action set forth herein be tried to a 
jury. The fee required for this request has been paid at the time of the filing of this Complaint. 
Wherefore, plaintiffs demand Judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally in 
such amounts as are proved at trial, but not less than $200,000 on the first and second causes of 
action, punitive damages as may be assessed by the jury, the costs of this action including 
attorneys' fees and such other and further relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances. 
Dated this ^ _ day of /l/wibtsi- , 199* 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
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copy of plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint was mailed, postage prepaid to: 
Mr. Craig Howe 
Attorney for Norman Larson 
201 South main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2215 
Mark Arnold 
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IN THE SEVENTH Jl JDICI 41 DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
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ROBERT NORM:AN, SR., & DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
PENDANT ARNOLD'S MOTION 
TIAL SUMMARY J UDGMENT 
REC, L FOR HEARING 
v!r R. Anderson 
Pursuani to Rule -1-501(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules ot ..., h ^ c d u i v , * ^kndan t Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") hereby moves this Court 
for an Order granting partial sumiiur i 
of plaintiffs Robert and Diane Norman's ("the Non Amended Complaint, such that final 
judgment in this action si lall. in additi : i 11 : < mi i] mai imul iii ui.il, AW mil iinlgiuciii as 
follows: 
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1. Arnold is not liable to the Normans for breach of contract 
as alleged in the Normans' First Cause of Action; 
2. Arnold is not liable to the Normans for breach of fiduciary 
duty as alleged in the Normans' Third Cause of Action; 
3. Arnold is not liable to the Normans for punitive damages as 
alleged in the Normans' Fourth Cause of Action. 
This motion is made upon the ground that there are no triable issues of material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to partial summary judgment on these three causes of action as a 
matter of law. This motion is based upon the memorandum of points and authorities, the 
statement of material undisputed facts, the affidavits and exhibits, all of which are concurrently 
filed and served herewith. 
Arnold respectfully requests hearing on this matter, to be scheduled for a date and time 
convenient for the Court. 
DATED this day of May, 2000. 
SNELL & W I L M E R L L P . 
£<^*<^<r 
MattKew L. Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
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James C. Haskins 
Haskins & Associates 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Matthew L.Lalli (#6105) 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
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MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
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Civil No.: 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
: ss. 
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Mark E. Arnold, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a real estate and land use lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Utah 
and a defendant in the above-entitled action. I am competent in every respect to make this 
affidavit, and do so on the basis of my personal knowledge. 
2. I am a partner at the law firm of Arnold & Wiggins, L.C. Neither my law firm 
nor I have ever provided legal services of any kind to Robert or Diane Norman individually. 
3. Neither my law firm nor I have ever received payment for legal services of any 
kind from Robert or Diane Norman individually. 
4. I am not a signatory to the March 15, 1995 joint venture agreement at issue in this 
action. 
5. I never sought nor received the consent of the joint venture partners to become a 
partner of the Moab Land Development joint venture. 
6. In 1995, Norman Larson introduced me to Greg Page and Duane Barney, who 
were partners in the Moab joint venture. Subsequently, I performed various tasks for the joint 
venture. 
7. I introduced the joint venture partners to Ann and Norman Young. The Youngs 
provided the joint venture with initial financing in the form of a short-term loan for $160,000, 
payable in 90 days, at 18 percent interest and with loan fees totaling 12 points. 
8. As collateral for the short-term financing, the Normans agreed to pledge the 8.33 
acres of property they had previously contributed to the joint venture, and signed a deed of trust 
on the property in the Young's favor. The loan proceeds were placed into a trust account owned 
by Larson, and only Larson had signature authority. 
SORENSA\SLC\l 29438 
2 
9. Larson obtained the Holiday Inn franchise and over the next year Page and Larson 
attempted to obtain financing, but were unsuccessful. I persuaded the Youngs to extend the 
promissory note several times. When Larson's financing efforts failed, I believed that 
foreclosure proceedings were imminent. 
10. In an effort to help the joint venture avoid foreclosure, I introduced the Normans 
to Jim Winkler, who purchased the property from them and paid off the Young note. 
T tr 
DATED this ^ _ day of May, 2000 
Mark E. Arnold 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to this £f_ day of May, 2000. 
NOTARY PUBLIC , 
KAREN A. BUTTON 
m East Broadway #900 
Salt Lake Cty Utah 84111 
Commission Exptres 
June 10 2000 
<iTATK O F U T A t j 
A ^ 6 _ ^ L - . A X ^ O / ^ O 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE 
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Plaintiffs, 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT ARNOLD'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Civil No.: 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") moves this Court for an order granting partial 
summary judgment on the First, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action in plaintiffs Robert and 
Diane Norman's (the "Normans") amended complaint. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This lawsuit arises out of a failed real estate joint venture formed in 1995 to develop a 
Holiday Inn motel in Moab, Utah. The members of the joint venture were Robert and Diane 
Norman, Duane Barney, Pete Lanto, and Greg Page.1 Each of these individuals had a particular 
role to play. The Normans were to donate the real property, Page was to arrange for financing, 
Lanto was to construct the Holiday Inn, and Barney was to oversee the operation and 
management of the Holiday Inn once construction was complete. Page hired Norman Larson to 
assist in obtaining financing. Larson in turn introduced the joint venture partners to Mark 
Arnold, who performed various tasks for the joint venture. 
The first step toward development was to obtain $40,000 to purchase the Holiday Inn 
Franchise and another larger sum of money to cover miscellaneous up-front costs and to use as 
seed money to obtain a construction loan. Since none of the joint venture partners had that kind 
of cash, and because they were in danger of losing the franchise to a competing bidder, Arnold 
introduced them to Ann and Norman Young for short-term financing. The Youngs agreed to 
make a short-term loan for $160,000, payable in 90 days, at 18 percent interest, and with loan 
fees totaling 12 points. The Normans, Page, Barney, Lanto, and Larson all signed the 
promissory note. The Normans agreed to pledge their property as collateral, and signed a deed 
of trust in the Young's favor. The loan proceeds were placed into a trust account owned by 
Larson, and Larson was the only person with signature authority. 
1
 Greg Page's brother-in-law, Eric Rasmussen, signed the joint venture agreement on Page's behalf, 
although the Normans acknowledge that Page was the real joint venture partner. Am. Compl. H 11, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
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Larson obtained the Holiday Inn franchise and over the next year Page and Larson 
attempted to obtain financing, but to no avail. Although Arnold persuaded the Youngs to extend 
the promissory note several times, when Larson's financing efforts failed, foreclosure seemed 
imminent. In an effort to help the joint venture avoid foreclosure, Arnold introduced them to Jim 
Winkler, who purchased the property from the Normans and paid off the Young note. At the 
closing on Winkler's purchase, $212,000 of the sales proceeds was paid to the Youngs for 
release of their trust deed. 
On September 23, 1998, the Normans filed suit against Page, Barney, Lanto, Rasmussen, 
Larson, and Arnold for breach of the joint venture agreement and default on the promissory note 
and trust deed. On November 9, 1999, the Normans filed an amended complaint adding a new 
cause of action against Arnold for breach of fiduciary duty. The amended complaint takes the 
focus off of the joint venture partners and signatories on the promissory note, presumably 
because most of them are impecunious or bankrupt. The two outsiders, Larson and Arnold, now 
appear as the primary targets, no doubt, because they are perceived deep pockets. 
The Normans assert four causes of action against Arnold, claiming that he (1) breached 
the March 15, 1995 Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement (the "Agreement"); (2) 
is liable for default on the Young promissory note and trust deed as a successor to Lanto; (3) 
breached a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to the Normans; and (4) is liable for punitive 
damages. It is unfortunate that the promissory note to the Youngs went into default and the 
Normans lost money on the failed venture. Under the terms of the promissory note and the 
Agreement, that loss arguably should be divided among the parties who jointly and severally 
obligated themselves on the promissory note: Barney, Lanto, Page, Larson, Robert Norman, and 
2 
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Diane Norman. That joint and several liability on the defaulted note is the subject of the second 
cause of action, which is not part of this motion and is the only one that should survive for trial. 
As shown in more detail below, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on the first, 
third, and fourth causes of action because he was not a party to the Agreement nor was he a joint 
venture partner, and therefore could not be liable for breach of the Agreement. Arnold was not 
the Normans' lawyer, and therefore did not owe them a fiduciary duty. Finally, because the only 
conceivable claim against Arnold sounds in contract, the Normans are not entitled to punitive 
damages as a matter of law. 
II. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
A. Background. 
1. On March 15, 1995, the Normans, Barney, Lanto, and Rasmussen executed a 
document entitled "Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement" (the "Agreement.") A 
true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached as Exhibit 2. 
2. The members of "the group," the original joint venture partners, were Robert and 
Diane Norman, Duane Barney, Pete Lanto, and Greg Page. 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 24:17-25:8, 
true and correct excerpts from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 3. 
3. Each of these individuals had "a different role" to play. Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. 
Norman Dep. 34:20-23. The Normans were to donate the real property, Page was to "arrange for 
financing," Lanto was to construct the Holiday Inn, and Barney was to oversee the "operation 
and management" of the Holiday Inn once construction was complete. IdL at 34:20-36:1. 
2
 Unless otherwise indicated, the exhibits referred to in this memorandum are authenticated by the 
Normans' deposition testimony. Deposition excerpts authenticating the exhibits are located immediately 
behind each exhibit. 
3 
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4. Page hired Norman Larson to assist in obtaining financing. Larson in turn 
introduced the joint venture partners to Mark Arnold, who became the lawyer for the joint 
venture. Affidavit of Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold Aff."), a true and correct copy of which is filed 
concurrently herewith. 
5. The first step toward development was to obtain short-term financing to purchase 
"two things": the Holiday Inn Franchise for $40,000 and another larger sum of money to cover 
miscellaneous up-front costs and to use as seed money to obtain a construction loan. Ex. 3, D. 
Norman Dep. 59:24-60:5; see also 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 61:2-7, true and correct excerpts 
from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 4. Arnold introduced the joint venture partners to Ann 
and Norman Young, who would provide this short-term financing. Arnold Aff., f 7; Ex. 4, 
3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 32:13-19. 
6. The Youngs agreed to make a short-term loan for $160,000, payable in 90 days, at 
18 percent interest and with loan fees totaling 12 points. Arnold Aff, 1f 7. A true and correct 
copy of the promissory note is attached hereto as Exhibit 5. The Normans, Page, Barney, Lanto, 
and Larson all signed the promissory note. Ex. 5; see also Ex. 1, Am. Compl., K 18. 
7. The Normans agreed to pledge their property as collateral, and signed a deed of 
trust in the Youngs' favor. Arnold Aff., f 8. A true and correct copy of the deed of trust is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 6. The loan proceeds were placed into a trust account owned by 
Larson, and Larson was the only person with signature authority. IcL 
8. On October 27,1995, pursuant to a "Purchase Agreement," Lanto purported to 
sell his interest in the joint venture to Mark Arnold and Western Empire Advisors, a company 
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owned by Larson, for $8,500. Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 64:22-66:13. A true and correct 
copy of the purported purchase agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 7. 
9. Larson obtained the Holiday Inn franchise and over the next year Page and Larson 
attempted to obtain financing, but to no avail. 8/25/99 B. Norman Dep. 52:13-23, true and 
correct excerpts from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 8; Arnold Aff. f 9. Although Arnold 
persuaded the Youngs to extend the promissory note several times, when Larson's financing 
efforts failed, foreclosure seemed imminent. Arnold Aff. ^ 9; Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 
65:5-18. 
1.0. In an effort to help the joint venture avoid foreclosure, Arnold introduced them to 
Jim Winkler, who purchased the property from the Normans and paid off the Young note. Ex. 4, 
3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 71:14-73:4. At the closing on Winkler's purchase, $212,000 of the 
sales proceeds was paid to the Youngs for release of their trust deed. Ex. 8; 8/25/99 B. Norman 
Dep. 133:6-134:16; see, also 5/22/98 Winkler/Norman Settlement Statement, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 9. 
B. The Normans Did Not Consent to Arnold's Admission as a Partner. 
11. The Agreement provided that "[additional Joint Venturers may be added to the 
Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint Venturers." Ex. 2 
(emphasis added). 
12. Mr. Norman has twice testified that "[n]obody asked [him] about" Arnold 
becoming a member of the joint venture, and that he never consented to Arnold's admission: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] You never gave your consent for Mark 
Arnold to become an owner in the hotel part? 
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Arnold to become an owner in the hotel part? 
A: [By Mr. Norman] Nobody asked me about that. 
Q: Okay. So because nobody asked you, you therefore never 
consented, right? 
A: Right. 
Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 71:7-13. 
Q: [By Mr. Howe] Did you ever give your consent for any other 
individual to become a member of the joint venture? 
A: [By Mr. Norman]... . The answer is no. 
Ex. 8, 8/25/99 B. Norman Dep. 28:23-29:3. 
13. Diane Norman also testified that she never consented to Arnold becoming a joint 
venture partner. 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] . . . . Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold 
becoming a partner? 
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Never. 
Q: Okay. Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold purchasing 
Lanto's interest? 
A: Never. 
Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 95:13-18. 
C. Arnold Was Not the Normans' Lawyer. 
14. Both Bob and Diane Norman have repeatedly testified that Arnold was "the 
lawyer for the group," not for the Normans themselves: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] You believed that Arnold was just the 
lawyer for the entire group? 
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A: [By Mr. Norman] That's right That's the only contact I had . . 
Q: In the event that your interests became different from say Page 
or Barney, did you believe that Arnold would then represent your 
interests rather than Page or Barney's? 
A: No, I was just - as the group is the only thing. 
Q: Did you think about whether Mr. Arnold would look out for 
your interests rather than Page or Barney's in the event your 
interests became different from Page's and Barney's? 
A: I don't think it would be singled out - that I would be singled 
out as being shown any favor, it was strictly for the group, that's it. 
Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. at 10:12-15; 11:1-17; see also Ex. 4 at 24:20-23; 36:22-37:3. 
15. Diane Norman further testified that Arnold "never" represented the Normans 
individually: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] . . . . You've told me that you believe that 
Arnold was the lawyer for the group; right? 
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Uh-huh. 
Q: [Arnold] represented the group, and do you know if he 
represented Page, Barney, or Lanto individually? 
A: No, I don't. 
Q: And he did not represent you individually? 
A: Never. 
Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 24:17-20; 25:14-20. 
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16. In fact, the Normans' "principal contact" for information about the joint venture 
was Page, not Arnold: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Well, within the group, isn't it true that each 
member had different responsibilities? 
A: [By Mr. Norman] I assume that, but I - the main contacts I had 
was with Duane Barney and Greg Page, and primarily Greg Page 
was the principal individual that was giving me answers when he 
was available to give answers. 
Q: And wasn't Greg Page's primary responsibility to get financing 
for the project? 
A: I can't single him out as being the one that's responsible for the 
financing when the whole group was involved, they each had jobs 
to do, but Greg Page was my principal contact. 
Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. at 20:4-14. 
17. Similarly, the Normans testified that Page, or Page and Barney, were the joint 
venture partners solely responsible for communicating with Arnold about the joint venture's 
representation: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Was there one member of the group whose 
responsibility it was to interact with Mark Arnold? 
A: [By Mr. Norman] Greg Page I would say would be the lead 
individual that we would try to get ahold of. 
Q: Okay. 
A: And Duane Barney. 
Q: And during this period of the intended development, was it 
your understanding that Page and Barney were Mark Arnold's 
contacts with the group? 
A: That was my understanding. 
Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. at 23:14-24:1. 
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18. Diane Norman also had the "expectation" that Page and Barney would make and 
receive communications with Arnold on behalf of the joint venture. 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Did you expect that Page and Barney would be 
the ones who would communicate with the group's lawyer? 
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Yes, and with the financial people and 
whoever. 
Q : . . . . Was it your expectation that whatever legal work needed 
to be done, Page and Barney would communicate it to Arnold on 
behalf of the group? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And was it also your expectation that the communication 
would flow back the same way? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That is if Arnold is the group's lawyer and had information to 
communicate to the group, he would tell Page and Barney? 
A: Right. 
Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. at 37:16-38:10. 
19. Diane Norman further testified that it was reasonable for Arnold, as the group's 
attorney, to communicate with Page and Barney as representatives of the joint venture: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Well, and I think you just told me that it was 
your expectation that if the group's attorney wanted to 
communicate with the group, he would have done so through Page 
and Barney; right? 
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Yeah, he's not going to call all of us to say 
Q: Right. And you think that's reasonable? 
A: I think that's reasonable as a group attorney. 
Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. at 43:11-21. 
9 
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20. The Normans further testified that they spoke with two attorneys of their own, 
Mr. McConkey [sic] and Mr. Hughes, for advice and counsel in their individual behalf during the 
joint venture's existence. Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 37:4-39:3. When the Normans wanted 
representation "personally" during this time frame, they retained counsel of their own. 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Would you say that you hired Mr. McConkey to 
be your lawyer? 
A: [By Mr. Norman] Yes, sir. 
Q: And when you're talking about your lawyer, are you talking 
about Bob Norman personally or a lawyer for the group? 
A: No, personally, to find out why we weren't getting any answers 
from the group. 
Id at 39:1-8. 
III. ARGUMENT 
The judgment sought in a motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under this standard, as 
demonstrated below, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on the Normans' First, Third, and 
Fourth Causes of Action. 
A, Arnold Is Not Liable for Breach of the Joint Venture Agreement Because He 
Did Not Become a Joint Venture Partner As a Matter of Law. 
In the first cause of action, the Normans contend that Arnold breached the Agreement in 
a number of ways. As a predicate to establish liability for breach of the Agreement, however, the 
Normans first must prove that Arnold became a party to the Agreement and voluntarily assumed 
QORPMQA\ci n n o w i 
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the rights and obligations under the Agreement. See, e.g., Vasels v. LoGuidice. 740 P.2d 1375, 
1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (observing that mutual assent of parties to a contract is "essential" to 
create binding contract); Bunnell v. Bills. 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) ("[a] binding contract 
can only exist where there has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be 
bound by its terms.") The undisputed facts negate this fundamental element of the Normans' 
breach of contract claim, and conclusively demonstrate that Arnold was not a party to the 
Agreement and never became a partner in the joint venture. 
It is undisputed that Arnold never signed the Agreement or assented to its terms. The 
face of the Agreement itself demonstrates that Arnold is not a signatory. See Ex. 2. Neither is 
there any evidence that Arnold signed or assented to any amendment to the Agreement. Thus, 
there is no evidence on which the Normans can base a claim that Arnold expressly became a 
party to the Agreement. 
Even if Arnold had signed the Agreement or intended to become a partner in the joint 
venture, the undisputed facts further demonstrate that Arnold was not a partner as a matter of 
law. In Utah, "subject to any agreement between them . . . [n]o person can become a member of 
a partnership without the consent of all the partners." Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-15(7) (supp. 
1999); see also 59A Am Jur.2d §§109, PARTNERSHIP ("[N]o person can become a member of a 
partnership without the consent of all partners.") In Folsom v. Fernstrom, 134 P. 1021,1024 
(Utah 1913) the Utah Supreme Court upheld a verdict for the plaintiff finding that the defendant 
had not become a member of the plaintiffs failed real estate partnership because there was 
insufficient evidence that the plaintiff had consented to the defendant's admission to the 
partnership. In so doing, the supreme court observed that "[o]f course [defendant] could not 
11 
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become a member of the partnership without the consent of both [the plaintiff] and [the co-
defendant], the original members of the firm." Folsom, 134 P. at 1024. 
Here, the Agreement specifically provides that "[additional Joint Venturers may be 
added to the Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint 
Venturers." Ex. 2, Article 1.7 (emphasis added). Mr. Norman has twice testified that "[n]obody 
asked [him] about" Arnold becoming a member of the joint venture, and that he never consented 
to Arnold's admission. Def.'s Statement Undisputed Material Facts ^ 12. Likewise, Diane 
Norman testified that she "never" consented to Arnold's admission as a joint venture partner. Id. 
at f^ 13. In addition, the Normans' breach of contract claim itself specifically acknowledges that 
if Arnold became a joint venture partner, he did so "contrary to [the Joint Venture Agreement's] 
provisions." Ex. 1,^31(e), 43(e). 
It is undisputed that the Normans did not consent to Arnold becoming a joint venture 
partner. As a result, the Agreement and Utah Code § 48-1-15(7) provide that Arnold cannot 
claim membership in the joint venture, and cannot have any rights or obligations whatsoever 
under the Agreement. It is black-letter law that Arnold cannot breach a contract - the Agreement 
- to which he was never a party, for an obligation he never undertook. See, e.g., Soule v. 
Weatherbv, 118 P. 833, 834 (Utah 1911) ("[i]n the obligation assumed by the defendant is found 
his duty, and his failure to comply with the duty constitutes the breach"); Bunnell v. Bills, 368 
P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962). 
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As a result, the Normans' claim for breach of the Agreement against Arnold fails as a 
matter of law.3 
B. The Normans' Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Fails As a Matter of Law 
Because It is Undisputed that Arnold Was "Never" the Normans9 Lawyer. 
In the third cause of action, the Normans claim that Arnold owed and breached a 
fiduciary duty. The fiduciary duty the Normans claim Arnold breached is the duty of undivided 
loyalty. Specifically, they allege that Arnold is liable for having conflicts of interest or for 
engaging in self dealing by (1) negotiating a loan from the Youngs to the joint venture with 
terms favorable to the Youngs and himself (Ex. 1, Am. Compl. ffl[ 59-64); (2) allowing loan 
proceeds to be spent without the Normans' knowledge or consent (Ex. 1, Am. Compl. ffi[ 66-67; 
70-71; 73); and (3) introducing the Normans to another of his clients, Jim Winkler, for the 
purchase of the Normans' property. Ex. 1, Am. Compl. f^l[ 77-80. 
Of course, this claim that Arnold breached a fiduciary duty presupposes Arnold had such 
a duty in the first place. The Normans claim Arnold owned them a personal fiduciary duty 
because he was their personal lawyer. The Normans allege that "defendant Arnold commenced 
an attorney-client relationship with Robert and Diane Norman . . . . " Ex. 1, Am. Compl. ^ 56. 
3
 Although Arnold did not become a party to the Agreement or a partner in the joint venture under the 
undisputed facts and the law, there remains a question about whether Arnold and Western Empire 
Advisors, Larson's company, are obligated to indemnify Lanto for any liability he has under the $160,000 
promissory note. On October 27, 1995, Arnold and Larson signed a Purchase Agreement under which 
they purported to purchase Lanto's interest in the joint venture and purported to indemnify Lanto against 
his share of any liability under the promissory note. See Ex. 7. Whether Lanto has any liability under the 
promissory note that he could pass along to Arnold and Larson under the Purchase Agreement is the 
subject of the second cause of action, in which the Normans effectively seek contribution from the other 
signatories on the promissory note. Arnold has not moved for summary judgment on that cause of action, 
and any liability of Arnold, Larson, and the other signatories should be assessed and apportioned under 
that second cause of action. However, any potential liability of Arnold and Larson to Lanto under the 
second cause of action and the Purchase Agreement should not be confused with the Normans' first cause 
of action for Arnold's breach of the Agreement, to which he was never a party. 
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They further allege that Arnold, as "[a]n attorney acting for, or purporting to act for a client owes 
a very high duty to look after and protect his clients' interests. The duty is both personal and 
fiduciary in nature." Id. at ^ 80. 
Indeed, to recover for breach of fiduciary duty in an action against a lawyer, the first 
thing the purported client must prove is the existence of an attorney-client relationship. 
Kibatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). While it is 
true that a lawyer owes his clients a fiduciary duty, including a duty of undivided loyalty, it is not 
true that Arnold ever had an attorney-client relationship with the Normans. Therefore, Arnold 
never owed the Normans a fiduciary duty. 
That Arnold never acted as the Normans' lawyer and thus never owed the Normans a 
fiduciary duty is evident from the Normans' own testimony. Both of the Normans have 
repeatedly testified that (1) Arnold "never" acted as their lawyer (Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 
25:18-20); (2) he was at all times "the lawyer for the group," (Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 
10:12-25; 11:10-17; 36:22-37:3; Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 24:17-20); (3) that Arnold's 
representation of the joint venture was "strictly for the group, that's it" in the event any of the 
individual joint venture partner's interests diverged (Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 11:1-17); 
and that (4) when the Normans wanted representation "personally" during the existence of the 
joint venture, they retained counsel of their own. Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 39:1-8. See 
Undisputed Facts IflJ 14-20. Thus, the plaintiffs themselves have testified that Arnold was not 
their lawyer, and because there was no attorney-client relationship there was no fiduciary duty. 
See Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283,1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(enumerating elements of cause of action for legal malpractice breach of fiduciary duty). As a 
^nRPN^AWinno?^ i 
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result, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on the Normans' claim for breach of a fiduciary 
duty. 
As a lawyer, Arnold's only fiduciary duty was to his client, the joint venture, which is a 
"distinct and separate" legal entity from the individual joint venture partners. See Salt Lake 
Knee & Rehabilitation. Inc. v. Salt Lake Citv Knee & Sports Medicine. 909 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). Nor does the Normans' belief that Arnold acted as counsel for the joint venture 
provide them with standing to maintain a cause of action against him for breach of fiduciary 
duty. Instead, as with the representation of corporations, "a lawyer who represents a partnership 
does not thereby become counsel for or owe a duty to the partners." Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey 
M. Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24.8 (4th ed. 1996); Bieter Co. v. Blomguist 132 F.R.D. 220, 
224 (D. Minn. 1990) (law firm's representation of joint venture did not constitute representation 
of individual joint venturers). As Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 further states, "[a] 
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its 
duly retained constituents." (Emphasis added.) This rule is the same regardless of the 
organizational client's corporate form or of the relative importance of the constituent to the 
organizational client. 
Under analogous circumstances in Hopper v. Frank. 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994), a 
general partner of a partnership sued the partnership's law firm, but in his individual capacity. 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant law firm because plaintiffs 
status as general partner of the law firm's client did not establish an attorney-client relationship 
between the law firm and the general partner in his individual capacity. As a result, the court 
found that the plaintiff general partner lacked standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty. In so 
15 
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holding, the court observed that mere "broad and conclusory assertion^]" in the plaintiffs' 
affidavits stating that the [law] firm undertook an affirmative duty to represent plaintiffs 
separately from the partnership were insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 
the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Here, as in Hopper, the Normans "fail to meet 
the burden of showing, through specific and pertinent facts, the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the absence of an attorney-client relationship between [the law firm] and 
[the partners], as individuals . . . . " Id. at 98. 
In short, the Normans' claim for breach of fiduciary duty fails as a matter of law because 
they cannot demonstrate the first element of the cause of action, the existence of the attorney-
client relationship. Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). Because there was no attorney-client relationship, there was no fiduciary duty. 
Therefore, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on this cause of action. 
C. The Court Should Dismiss the Normans' Claim for Punitive Damages 
Because Punitive Damages Are Not Available Here As a Matter of Law. 
The Normans' fourth cause of action purports to set forth an independent claim for 
"Punitive Damages," alleging that "defendants knowingly and intentionally set out to take 
advantage of [the Normans] and use their property to secure funds which defendants would then 
use for their own purposes." Ex. 1, Am. Compl. ^ 86. The Normans and their attorney advance 
this theory, despite the absence of evidence that Arnold intended to or did take money for his 
own purposes, for the obvious purpose of gaining leverage in settlement discussions. As much 
as they would like to impose the threat of punitive damages, however, this simply is not a case 
for punitive damages. This case is about an investment in a joint venture that failed. Because 
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the Normans ended up taking the loss on the defaulted promissory note, they may be entitled to 
contribution from the other co-obligors on that promissory note. But that does not translate into 
a punitive damages claim against Arnold. 
As demonstrated above, the only claim the Normans may have against Arnold is for 
breach of contract - the "default of trust deed note" claim- set forth in their second cause of 
action. In Utah, however, as elsewhere, "punitive damages cannot be awarded for a breach of 
contract." Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R.. 683 P.2d 1042, 1049 (Utah 1984); 
Jorgensen v. John Clav and Co.. 660 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1983) ("The general rule is that 
punitive damages cannot be awarded for a breach of contract.") Moreover, a claim for punitive 
damages is not a cause of action in itself, but must be predicated on an independent tort. In Hal 
Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica. Inc.. 657 P.2d 743, 750 (Utah 1982), the Utah supreme court 
upheld the trial court's determination that "no factual basis" existed "support[ing] the allegations 
of other tortious conduct" against the defendants warranting an award of compensatory damages. 
As a result, "having found no independent tort," the supreme court saw "no basis for the award 
of punitive damages in this contract case" and "affirm[ed] the denial of punitive damages by the 
trial court" on that basis. Hal Taylor Assocs., 657 P.2d at 750. 
The Normans' complaint contains only one cause of action sounding in tort - the breach 
of fiduciary duty claim against Arnold. Thus, their claim for punitive damages necessarily is 
predicated on it. As shown above, however, it is undisputed that Arnold was never the Normans' 
personal lawyer, and as a result he owed them no fiduciary duty. Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 
4
 Of course, Arnold denies any liability for the Normans' second cause of action, which is contract claim 
for contribution on the promissory note. However, that cause of action is not the subject of this motion, 
and should be reserved for tnal. 
17 
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94 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, the Court should dismiss the Normans' claim for punitive damages 
because the independent tort on which it is based fails as a matter of law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this motion for summary judgment is to focus the court and the jury on 
the real issue for trial. That issue is whether Arnold and others are jointly and severally liable on 
the defaulted promissory note, and therefore should have to share in the Normans' loss 
associated with that default. The Normans are entitled to their day in court on that issue, but they 
are not entitled to assert claims for breach of the joint venture Agreement, for breach of fiduciary 
duty, and for punitive damages because Utah law and the undisputed facts demonstrate that 
Arnold was not a party to the Agreement, did not become a joint venture partner, was not the 
Normans' personal lawyer, and did not owe the Normans a fiduciary duty. Therefore, Arnold is 
entitled to summary judgment on the first, third, and fourth causes of action. 
DATED this £ O day of May, 2000. 
SNELL & W I L M E R L L P . 
MatSew L. Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
Mark E. Arnold & Norman 1VL Larson, 
Defendants. 
Response to Defendant Arnold 
Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Judge Anderson 
Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby respond to defendant Arnold's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. Defendant requests that the Court award Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs' 1st Cause of Action - Breach of Joint Venture Agreement, 3rd - Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty; and 4th - Claim For Punitive Damages. As will be demonstrated below, the Motion is so 
wholly without merit as to justify an award of plaintiffs' costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
filing this response. 
Summary of Plaintiffs9 Response 
With regard to defendant's breach of the joint venture claim, defendant Arnold contends 
that he should be granted summary judgment because he was not a Member of the Joint Venture. 
Arnold's position is controverted by the fact that he bought in to the venture when he purchased 
"any and all interest... in the Holiday Inn venture" from Pete Lanto. (Def. Exh. 7) That he did 
so without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs should not now work to his advantage as a 
defense. In any event, for all practical purposes, the terms and conditions of the Moab Land 
Development Joint Venture Agreement (Def. Exhibit 2) were never observed, and Mark Arnold, 
more than anyone, was responsible for the demise of that agreement. It is clear that the project 
was taken over by "the group'5 which included Page, Barney & Lanto (4-D Development), 
Arnold as counsel/partner, Larson in the financial role and the Normans. When the Normans 
learned that Arnold had become a member of the group, they assented and allowed him to 
continue in his dual capacity. 
Defendant seeks summary judgment of plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim on the 
contention that he was not the Normans' personal attorney. While that may be technically true, 
Arnold admits that he was counsel for "the group" which included the Normans. Arnold testified 
that he represented the parties "individually, as members of the group." Moreover, Arnold was 
aware that the Normans had very substantial personal interests at stake - were in fact were the 
only parties at risk in the venture, and states that, as counsel, he was trying to help them. In fact, 
his conduct as counsel was completely negligent, frought with conflict and directly adverse to 
the Normans' economic and personal interests. It is exactly the type of conduct that legal 
malpractice claims are designed to remedy. 
The Court should take into account that throughout the course of events the plaintiffs 
were not informed, lied to and taken advantage of. Their case has been fleshed out through 
discovery with new revelations continuing to be made. To the extent necessary the plaintiffs are 
entitled to a ruling that the pleadings be deemed amended to conform to the evidence. Given the 
dozens of questions of material fact that will arise from a great deal of evidence, the jury should 
be allowed to determine Arnold's liability on the relevant issues. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As an introduction to plaintiffs' response to defendant Arnold's Motion, the following 
basic time-time is offered: "NL" designates documents received in discovery by defendant 
Larson; "BN" designates documents submitted in discovery by the plaintiffs; 
Pre-1995 Greg Page, Peter Lanto and possibly others are already working on 
a Holiday Inn project to be located in Park City. 
January, 1995 The Normans meet Page, Duane Barney and Lanto for the first 
time. Discussions ensue regarding a possible Holiday Inn project in Moab. 
March 15, 1995 Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement is executed by 
the Normans, Rasmussen (Page), Barney and Lanto. (Def. Exhibit 2) 
April 27, 1995 Letter, Norman Larson to Page. Evidence that Larson is already 
looking around in Arizona for financing. (NL 57) 
April 28, 1995 Larson Service Agreement to provide financing is executed with 4-
D Development. The Normans are not members of 4-D Development. (NL 1-4) 
June 6, 1995 Letter from Larson to Bruce Holman (Trust Guarantee). Identifies 
Mark Arnold as "attorney for the project." (from Arnold discovery responses - attached) 
June 8, 1995 Letter from Holman to Larson (att'n Arnold), stating that they need 
to have $100,000 in Trust. (NL55) 
June 16, 1995 Letter from Larson to Holman stating that the joint venture had 
$100,000 on hand. (NL54) 
June 15-16, 1995 Larson obtains Holiday Inn Franchise for Moab. Fee owners of 
Normans' land is listed as 4-D Development. Larson signature on the Franchise Agreement is 
witnessed by Arnold. Larson $40,000 check for Franchise Fee is sent from Arnold's office. 
(NL 6, cover page only) 
June, 1995 Arnold negotiates 90-day, $160,000 loan from his client, Ann 
Young at 18% interest, and pledges the Norman property as collateral. 
June 17, 1995 $160,000 deposited in American Legal Title Trust Account by 
Arnold. (NL 53) 
June 19, 1995 $160,000 deposited in Larson's Western Empire Advisors account. 
Larson pays himself $40,000 for Holiday Inn Franchise fee. (NL 105) 
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June 19, 1995 Arnold and I.arson form Venture Properties II, L.C (attachment -
obtained by plaintiffs' counsel from State of Utah - not provided in discovery) 
June 20, 1995 WEA Check to Mark Arnold for $8,000. -Loan finders fee." 
(NL107) 
June 21, 1995 WEA Check to Norman Larson for $8,000. "Loan finders fee." 
(NL 109) 
WEA check to Ann Young for $3,200. "Loan points." (NL 111) 
WEA check to for $10,000 to Robert Morris & Ass. (attachment -
obtained by plaintiffs' counsel from Robert Morris- not provided in discovery) 
For earnest money on Park City property. (Larson paid himself back out of the loan proceeds on 
June 30, 1995) (NL115) 
At this point, Larson and Arnold had already spent $69,200 of the loan proceeds. 
June 27, 1995 Normans execute Trust Deed and Note prepared by .Arnold. 
(Def. Exhibits 4 & 6 - there are actually several copies the note with different dates, etc.) 
July 25, 1995 Letter, Arnold to David Schori (Robert Morris & Ass.) -
Requesting extension of Park City property closing, (from Arnold discovery responses -
attached) 
July 28, 1995 Robert Morris returns $10,000 earnest money check to Venture 
Properties, II, L.C. Check is endorsed by Arnold and Larson. (attachment - obtained by 
plaintiffs' counsel from Robert Morris- not provided in discovery) 
September 29, 1995 Larson wires $50,000 to Trust Guarantee in Arizona. (NL 119) 
October 4,1995 Letter, Arnold to Holman. "We have wired earnest money to you 
in the amount of $50,000." (from Arnold discovery responses - attached) 
October 20, 1995 Letter, Larson to Holman (Holman apparently wants the other 
$50,000) "Mark Arnold the attorney has been reluctant about releasing the other $50,000. " 
(NL 139) 
October 25, 1995 WEA check for $8,500 to buy out Lantos. (Larson subsequently 
reimbured WEA out of the Young loan proceeds on October 31,1995.) (NL 121) 
October 27, 1995 Fax, Arnold to Larson, including: 
Letter from Greg Page to Barney and Lanto dissolving 4-D; and 
Arnold's Purchase Agreement of Lantc's interest. (NL 70-72) 
October 31, 1995 Arnold prepares and notarizes General Power of Attorney from 
Duane Barney (going to prison) to Greg Page, (from Arnold discovery responses - attached) 
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November 3, 1995 Letter, Larson to Holman: "Mark Arnold, the attorney and myself 
vt /// come to Phoenix with a check when you can confirm a closing date for this (Moab) project 
and the purchase of the land in Park City. We are very anxious to proceed since we own an 
equity position in both projects and 1 have the franchise. " (NL 68) 
February 12, 1996 WEA check to Page for $5,000 from Young loan to reimburse 
Page for Larson's initial fee under the 4/28/95 Service Agreement. (NL 127) 
April 3, 1996 Larson's "Income and Expense Reconciliation" showing that all of 
the $ 160,000 from the Young loan is gone. (NL 91) 
Apnl 5, 1996 WEA check to Page for $2,000 from the Moab account. (NL 135) 
April 10, 1996 Letter, Page to Larson terminating Service Agreement and 
demanding reimbursement of loan proceeds, plus interest, cc. Arnold. (BN 61-62) 
May 1, 1996 Meeting in Arnold's Salt Lake office. Arnold states he purchased 
Lanto's interest, that the loan proceeds are unaccounted for; that $50,000 was sent to Arizona 
and "losf' - but that he (Arnold) can get it back. (BN 70-71) 
June 18, 1996 Letter, Arnold to Larson - establishes Arnold's involvement as a 
partner and joint liability. (BN 85-86) 
August 21, 1996 Young Trust Deed assigned to Arnold client Jim Winkler. 
(BN 92-93) 
November 21, 1996 Letter Arnold to Kent Johnson re: competing project immediately 
adjacent to Normans' property. (BN 95) 
May 22, 1998 Winkler purchases the subject property from Normans receiving a 
credit of $212,000 for the balance on the note assumed from the Youngs. (BN 99-100) 
These documents are attached chronologically and labeled "Timeline Documents. " 
H. RESPONSE TO UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
& ADDITONAL MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs do not dispute fact numbers 1-4,7-8, 10-13 & 20. 
2. Fact Nos. 14-19, merely provide a small portion of the Normans' deposition 
testimony. The testimony is accurately recorded but does not tell the whole story which will be 
illuminated herein. 
3. With regard to defendant's fact #5, the Normans have testified as follows: 
a. They were told that the Promissory Note would be $40,000 and was 
necessary to acquire the Holiday Inn Franchise. (Diane Norman depo. at 49-50, 59-64, 79-81.) 
b. They have testified that the Note they signed was for $40,000, not 
$160,000; Id 
c. The Promissory Note and Trust Deed were prepared by Mark Arnold's 
Office pursuant to his instructions; (Arnold depo. at 43-44) 
d. The note and trust deed were signed by the Normans on June 27, 1995. 
(See, defendants Exhibits 4 & 6) As of that date, Norman Larson had already acquired the 
Holiday Inn Franchise. This fact was known by defendant Arnold, as the $40,000 payment for 
the franchise was sent from his office on or about June 16, 1995. However, the true status of the 
Franchise and Larson's role was never disclosed to the Normans. (See, timeline and supporting 
documents) 
4. With regard to defendant's fact #6, defendant Arnold had secured the $160,000 
from his clients the Youngs, and had spent or authorized the expenditure of nearly $70,000 of the 
proceeds prior to the Normans' execution of the Trust Deed and Note. The plaintiffs were not 
advised of these facts. (See, timeline and supporting documents) 
5. With regard to defendant's fact #9, defendant Larson had acquired the Holiday 
Inn Franchise before the Normans signed the Young Promissory Deed and Note or were even 
aware of his existence. (See, timeline and supporting documents) 
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11(a) PLAINTIFFS5 ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The Testimony of Co-Defendant Norman Larson Raises Numerous Issues 
Of Material Fact Precluding Summary Judgment 
The testimony of Norman Larson raises questions of fact as to Arnold's involvement in 
the joint venture, and/or assumption of liability under the Trust Deed and Promissory Note, as 
well as his conduct as counsel which preclude Summary Judgment in favor of Arnold. Larson 
testified as follows: 
Q. What was your business relationship with Mr. Arnold on the Moab Holiday Inn 
project? 
A. Mr. Arnold was handling the legal affairs and other documentation. Larson 
depo. at 17. 
Q. Do you know what happened to (Lanto's) participation in the project? 
A. Yes. It was purchased by Mr. Arnold. Id. at 23. 
A. Mr. Arnold, being an attorney and representing the project, and myself, went to 
Phoenix Arizona (for due diligence on the lender that received $50,000) . . . we realized the 
funds weren't going to be forthcoming. I began a class action suit against National Acceptance 
Corp. and the principals to recover the $50,000 that we had given them. I was asked to leave the 
joint venture because I had not performed and I asked Mr. Arnold if I should pursue the class 
action and he said that he would handle that. Id. at 27. 
(Arnold) just reminded me that the reason we went to Phoenix was not to do due 
diligence on the company, we had done that otherwise, but to lay claim on the money and 
demand that we get it returned because it was supposed to sit in a trust account. 
Q. So they gave you a long story but gave you additional assurance that the money 
would come back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there any follow-up that you are aware of? 
A. I don't know. Right after that was when I was asked to leave the project, and Mr. 
Page and Mr. Arnold and Mr. Barney were to take whatever action was necessary to get the 
money back. Id. at 36-37. 
Q. Did you ever transfer the franchise to the joint venture or to any other party other 
than yourself? 
A. Yes I did. 
Q. When did you do that? 
A. It was in 1996 when I was requested to do so, so that they could keep the 
franchise, they being Mr. Page, Mr. Arnold and Mr. Barney. Id. at 42. 
Q. How did you come to talk with Mr. Arnold about (the Young loan)? 
A. Mr. Arnold was my attorney and he had indicated that he had clients that were 
willing to loan what they call hard money loan, high interest loans, fairly quickly. Id. at 44. 
Q. Do you know why you signed the note? 
A. Mr. Arnold asked me to sign the note as additional security for the Youngs. 
Q. And you were OK with becoming obligated on it? 
A. He was my attorney and I took his recommendation, or requirement. . . 
Q. I'm getting confused about Mr. Arnold's role in this transaction now. Are you 
saying now that he represented you in the Moab Holiday Express project? 
A. He played two roles. One was representing me and one was representing the 
project 
Q. And actually there was a third hat of Mr. Arnold because he purchased Mr. 
Lanto's share in the partnership, did he not? 
A. Actually the purchase was not consummated because the money to purchase Mr. 
Lanto's share came back to the partnership and he was credited whatever the cost was, $8,500 
through legal efforts. So that was the understanding that we had. 
Q. I don't understand that. 
(Arnold) was going to accumulate legal time and expenses to offset the $8,500 for 
Mr. Lanto 's equity position. 
Q. But nevertheless he acquired Mr. Lanto's position? 
A. I don't know if he acquired it or if it was an attempt to acquire it. I can't answer 
that. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
$160,000 
Q 
Was that discussed (with Arnold) earlier today? 
Yes. M a t 47-48. 
Loan fee is $16,000? 
Yes. 
What is that? 
For hard money loans, the accepted fee is 10%. Mr. Arnold and I provided 
in hard money capital into the project. We each got $8,000 in fees. 
And what did you do for those fees? 
Specifically, when I met with Mr. and Mrs. Young . . . I'm the one that presented 
the project to them for approval. Mr. Arnold and myself worked together in providing an 
equitable loan for the Youngs and also for the partnership, or the joint venture, whatever it was 
called, and for that I was paid $8,000 and Mr. Arnold was paid $8,000. 
Q. Do you know if that expense was approved by the joint venture? 
A. I don't know . . . Every check that was written was approved by the joint venture. 
So I don't think that this was not approved by the joint venture. 
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Q. Who wrote the checks9 
A. 1 did. But writing the checks and getting approval to write the checks are two 
different things. I wouldn't have written the checks had I not gotten approval from the joint 
venture. You asked me if I had gotten approval from the joint venture. I can't say specifically 
that I did. The fact that I wrote the checks indicates that, yes, I did get approval from the joint 
venture. 
Q. Is there any documentation of the approval? 
A. Not to my knowledge, unless Mr. Arnold has it. 
Q. How would that approval have been communicated to you? 
A. Verbally. 
Q. Were you required, since you had control of the funds, to contact anyone before 
you wrote the checks? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who did you contact? 
A. / would always go to Mr. Arnold. He was representing the joint venture. 
Q. Do you know of anyone else other than yourself and Mr. Arnold that were aware 
of the payment of these loan fees? 
A. No. Id at 54-58. 
Q. What was your deal if you were able to put together financing, what would you 
have received for that? 
A. Approximately 25% equity in the project. 
Q. And was there something in writing that was provided to you that said that? 
A. I don't recall. I don't have documentation to that effect. 
Q. Lets return to Exhibit 1 for a minute. It's the Moab Land Development Joint 
Venture Agreement.. . The page following the signature page is Schedule A which lists the joint 
venturers and their percentage of interest. . . so your testimony now is that if you had received 
financing this would have changed? 
A. I was told that the document would have changed had I provided financing. 
Q. Who told you that? 
A. Mr. Arnold, Mr. Barney and Mr. Page. Id. at 59-60. 
A. / worked almost completely with Mr. Arnold, and Mr. Arnold was working, had a 
direct relationship with those people. 
Q. Did Mr. Arnold represent them? 
A. The project or them personally? 
Q. Personally. 
A. I don't know. 
Q. The answer is sort of included in what you just said, but did you ever discuss any 
of these expenditures with Mr. Norman? 
A. No. I didn't discuss anything with Mr. Norman, other than our first meeting, and 
that was just an introduction. Id. at 63. 
9 
~ #sn 
Q. Who approved the two points ($3,200 to Ann Young)? 
A. Again, it would have had to have been approved by everyone or she wouldn't 
have been paid the 2%. She was Mr. Arnold's client and so Mr. Arnold negotiated directly with 
her. 
Q. When you say that it would have - I want to know what you actually know. You 
say it would have had to have been approved by everyone involved. That's what you would 
hope had happened? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know whether that happened? 
A. I don't know that that happened. I know that none of the checks would have been 
written without the approval of the other parties. To my knowledge, I have no documentation to 
that effect. 
Q. (T)he person you discussed these expenditures with was Mr. Arnold? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so are you saying that Mr. Arnold told you that everyone had approved of 
these (expenditures)? 
A. I don't recall. I didn't speak with Mr. Barney, I didn't speak with Mr. Page, and I 
didn't speak with Mr. Norman. 
Q. So you are making an assumption? 
A. / relied on Mr. Arnold... Id. at 64. 
Q. In performing (your) function - which was to obtain financing for a Holiday Inn -
were you working for or with the Moab Land Development Joint Venture, which was in 
existence in March, 1995, or were you working with 4-D Development? 
A. It's my understanding I was working for 4-D Development. I had no knowledge 
of the (Joint Venture Agreement) nor these people. 
Q. You had no knowledge of Robert Norman then? 
A. No. 
Q. Robert Norman is not involved with 4-D Development, is he? 
A. He's not. I don't think he's involved. I think those are the joint venture partners. 
But I haven't seen documentation to that effect. What you showed me was an exhibit of the 
Moab Land Development Joint Venture, and the first time I saw that is when the Complaint came 
in. I had no knowledge of this document or these people, until that time. Id. at 70-71 
Q. And this other project in Park City . . . Do you think Mr. Norman had any interest 
in that? 
A. Yes. It's my assumption that he was a fourth party in 4-D Development. 
Consequently he'd have an interest in that project. 
Q. That's your assumption? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have anything to back that up? 
A. No. 
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Q. Were the principals of the Park City project any different than the principals of 
the Moab project? 
A. Not to my recollection. 
Q. And you were told that the $160,000 you received could be used for either of 
these projects? 
A. I don't recall being told that. 
Q. But since you assume that all of these payments were approved, then somebody 
approved the $10,000 (earnest money on Park City property) payment? 
A. That's true. 
Q. What was Mr. Arnold's involvement in the Park City project? 
A. He assisted the joint venture - whatever it was called, in negotiating the 
land. Id. at 73-74. 
Q. Returning to Exhibit 6, Line #7, dated October 31, 1995 - Pete Lanto $8,500, 
what was that for? 
A. That was to release him from the partnership, or their 4-D Development company. 
That was the price that was negotiated by Mr. Arnold and Mr. Lanto. 
Q. What had Lanto contributed to the joint venture at that point? 
A. I can't answer that. I don't know. 
Q. Do you know of anything? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anyone tell you why Mr. Lanto was being paid to leave the joint venture? 
A. It was his request. 
Q. I can ask you for $20,000 right now too. Did anyone tell you why . . . they felt it 
was appropriate to pay Mr. Lanto to leave the partnership? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Do you recall talking to anyone specifically about writing this check. 
A. Specifically, Mr. Arnold... the check was to purchase his interest back in the 
Holiday Express project, for $8,500, his 25% interest, or whatever it was at the time. 
Q. Who had it after that? 
A. / think it went back into the partnership and it was to go to Mr. Arnold in lieu of 
legal fees. Id. at 84-87. 
Q. Does (the Purchase Agreement - NL 72) clarify the issue in your mind as to 
whether or not Mr. Arnold bought Mr. Lanto's interest in the Moab Express project? 
A. Arnold and Western Empire bought Lanto's position... that was the intent. 
Id. at 90. 
Q. Does having established Mr. Arnold as having bought . . . Mr. Lanto's interest 
have any impact on your testimony that he was representing you as your counsel in these 
matters? 
A. No. Id. at 94. 
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Q. After you sent Holiday Inn the $40,000 check and obtained the franchise - which 
was issued to you individually, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q -- did you then receive this Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc., new development 
license agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you familiar with this agreement? 
A. Not specifically. I know it was sent to me. 
Q. Is it assignable? 
A. I don't know if it is or not. 
Q. Did you ever intend to assign it? 
A. It was my intention to use the agreement collectively for the partnership whether 
it be assigned or not. Assignment was never an issue until I was asked to assign it or write a 
letter discontinuing my involvement in the franchise agreement so that Mr. Arnold, Mr. Barney 
and Mr. page could work directly with Holiday Express. Under what arrangements, I don't 
know. 
Q. Did you write such a letter to Holiday Inn? 
A. I didn't write the letter. Mr. Arnold faxed me a letter and I signed it and faxed it 
back to him. 
{Page 34 of the document states that 4-D Development is the fee owner of the 
Normans' property.) Id. at 101-103 
Q. After you received this (April 10, 1996) letter did you talk to Greg Page? 
A. I don't recall talking to him about it. I talked to Mr. Arnold and asked him to talk 
to Mr. Page. As you look at the letter, they had a meeting and I wasn't invited to the meeting. 
So Mr. Arnold was their spokesman. 
Q. . . . since the letter came from Page, I'm just wondering why you went to Arnold 
and not to Page. 
A. Mr. Arnold was acting attorney, my attorney, but he was also acting as legal 
counsel for the property, or the project Id. at 111-112 
n
 SDS" 
The testimony of Diane Norman is relevant to both aspects of defendant's Motion. It 
establishes that Arnold was perceived to have an integral role in the joint venture, and that the 
Normans personally looked to him, as counsel for the group, to protect their interests. 
Q. Do you understand that the consequence of not getting the loan is that the project 
would never have gone forward? 
A. No. (T)hat wouldn't have been a problem. The project could have still gone 
forward, because we wouldn't have had to pay a $40,000 franchise fee, and they could have gone 
in a different direction which they chose not to do. 
Q. Who is they? 
A. They, the whole group. I mean, they could have called and said,. . . this loan - if 
they had been honest and upfront and said this is $160,000 and we're going to have to pay all 
this stuff, and we need to get the franchise. All we were looking at at the outset was $40,000 and 
our land. Once it got to this exhorbitant amount, and we didn't even find this out until May 
(1996) - this was history know to them, and we were never notified of all this stuff, and that's 
the thing that was - this one piece of paper here was the thing that out of everything that ever 
came out is that they - // shows they already were wheeling and dealing with our life and our 
money and our land without any regard for me and my husband and that's the thing t fiat just is 
not right. 
Would you kike me to call the names now at this point for each individual? Mark 
(Arnold), Norm, Greg, Duane and Pete Lanto giving up his position - they pay off this $8,500, 
and Mark Arnold says he is now a partner. Diane Norman depo. at 75-76, 
Q. What is it, if anything, that Mark Arnold did to cause the project to fail? 
A. Well, I think just his manipulation of funds. I think his manipulation of becoming 
a partner. I think his being the lead person for us to talk to at his convenience on stuff that he 
wanted us to know and keeping quiet on the other parts that were dishonest. Mat 104, 
This is only a very small sample of Diane Norman's testimony. Her deposition is 
appended in full should the Court find it help to peruse her testimony. 
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HI. PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF THE CASE 
As a context for this Motion and to assist the Court in making its determinations, it may 
be helpful for the Court to have a basic overview of the case. 
The active and inactive defendants (Greg Page, Duane Barney, Larson & Arnold) are the 
kind of persons who go around looking for ways to make money without having to work or 
assume any risk, and all the better if the risk falls on someone else. Greg Page, Duane Barney 
and Peter Lanto had been in business before. They were trying to develop a Holiday Inn in Park 
City prior to ever meeting the Normans. They had formed 4-D development, from which 
plaintiffs were excluded, for the Park City Holiday Inn project. They had, through 4-D 
Development and unknown to the plaintiffs, entered a "Service Agreement" with defendant 
Larson on April 28, 1995, to provide funding for both the Moab and Park City projects. 
Defendant Larson had already negotiated for and would soon receive the franchise for the Moab 
Holiday Inn which he would hold solely in his name. 
The defendants were all unwilling or unable to contribute anything to the joint venture or 
assume any risk. Nevertheless, they needed some money in order to create an illusion that they 
had assets, or to pay financial institutions to loan them greater amounts of money. Defendant 
Larson contacted his attorney Mark Arnold "who knew people who could loan money (at a very 
high rate of interest) for this type of project." None of the defendants were willing to pledge any 
collateral for the loan - thus the need for the Normans. The Normans would put up their 
property (assume all the risk) in order to give the defendants money so they could try to secure 
more money. If the project worked, the defendants had arranged it so they could make a bundle. 
If it failed, well, nothing ventured, nothing lost. That would be the Normans' problem. 
Arnold's first act was to make sure he and Larson made a nice profit regardless of what 
happened. Arnold and Larson each took an $8,000 "finders fee" from off the top of the Young 
note, and Young got $3,200 as points for providing an oversecured 18% loan. Arnold then gave 
Larson $40,000 for the Holiday Inn Franchise, which Larson would nevertheless retain. The 
Normans were completely uniformed of these events. 
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Nor were the Normans informed that the money secured by their property would also be 
used for the Park City project of which they had no knowledge or interest. On June 19, 1995, 
Mark Arnold and Norman Larson formed Venture Properties II, L.C. and took money from the 
Young loan to submit as earnest money to purchase the Park City property. Incredibly, all these 
transactions and payments took place before the Normans ever signed the Promissory Note and 
Trust Deed, which tends to support their contention that they were fraudulently induced to sign a 
note for $40,000 which was later changed to $160,000. 
By October, 1995, Arnold and Larson had spent almost all of the $160,000. Duane 
Barney, the "manager and administrator" for the joint venture was a convicted felon for fraud. 
He was returned to prison on a parole violation. Arnold prepared a Power of Attorney for Greg 
Page to conduct Barney's business. No one told the Normans. Greg page dissolved 4-D 
development, and was paid the $5,000 he had advanced Larson for the Service Agreement out of 
the money secured by the Normans property. No one told the Normans. Mark Arnold, counsel 
for the joint venture, negotiated and acquired Peter Lanto's interest in the Joint Venture. The 
acquisition was made, not with his own money, but with money from the Young note secured by 
the Normans property. All of these events took place in mark Arnold's office. No one told the 
Normans. 
Sensing that the deal had gone sour and having contributed absolutely nothing, the joint 
venturers basically slunk away. Lanto took $8,500 that he may or may not have invested in the 
Park City project (he did nothing for the Moab project), and was at least smart enough to require 
Arnold to indemnify him for the liability almost sure to come. Page, who had done nothing, took 
his $5,000 back and then hid behind bankruptcy naming the Normans as creditors in the amount 
of $160,000. Barney, who had done nothing, took a similarly easy out. Larson made half-
hearted and unsuccessful attempts to save his own skin until the rest of the money was gone. 
Arnold, acting as counsel, kept the Franchise alive, again, incredibly, only long enough to offer it 
to other neighboring landowners of the Normans and his client Jim Winkler. 
The Normans, facing foreclosure, had to sell the property to Winkler and fully absorbed a 
$212,000 loss on the note, plus additional fire-sale losses on the property. The defendants 
walked away with fingers crossed. Too bad Bob and Diane. Sorry about that. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Claim of Arnold's Breach of the Joint Venture Agreement Presents 
Questions of Fact for the Jury. 
Defendant's Motion on Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action is easily resolved. Arnold 
admits that, prior to the Normans' execution of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed he "became 
the lawyer for the joint venture." (Def. Undisputed Fact #4) Indeed, Arnold secured the loan 
from his clients, transferred it to his client and business partner Norman Larson and prepared or 
caused to be prepared the Note and Trust Deed - all without the Normans' knowledge or 
consent. 
The sole purpose of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture was to " . . . develop, 
manage and maintain . . . the (Normans') 8.33 acres north of Moab, Utah." (Def. Exhibit 2, 
if 1.2) Peter Lanto was among the original joint venturers. (Def. Undisputed Fact #2) On 
October 27, 1995, Arnold acquired "any and all" of Lanto's interest in the joint venture. (Def. 
Undisputed Fact #8; Def. Exhibit 7) That is enough to defeat defendant Arnold's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on plaintiffs' First Cause of Action. 
Defendant's claim that he is entitled to Summary Judgment because the Normans never 
consented to his entry in the joint venture is untenable. Plaintiffs will produce evidence from 
which a jury would be entitled to believe that Arnold was double-dealing arid self-dealing, both 
as counsel for and as a member of the joint venture from its inception. That he continued in that 
type of conduct by making a secret and grossly unfair deal to acquire Lanto's interest without 
paying for it, hardly seems justification to grant him Summary Judgment. In other aspects of the 
case, Arnold attempts to excuse his conduct by alleging that he communicated with Page and 
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Barney and relied on them to communicate with the Normans. If that is true, then, since Page 
and Barney knew of his deal on Lanto's interest (Arnold depo. at 101-02J, it would have had to 
have been his presumption that the matter was communicated to the Normans and not objected 
to. That, of course did not occur, but defendant must not be allowed to hide behind his own 
misdeeds and breaches of fiduciary duty as a means of avoiding liability for his conduct. 
Arnold's hands are most unclean. A main aspect of plaintiffs' case is that Arnold and 
Larson intentionally set out to take advantage of and dupe them at every opportunity. Arnold, as 
the admitted counsel for the joint venture, unquestionably had a duty to make sure the other 
partners were aware of his acquisition of an interest, particularly since it was paid for with joint 
venture funds secured solely by the plaintiffs' property. It will be plaintiffs' contention that 
Arnold's acquisition of Lanto's interest was intentionally kept secret from the plaintiffs. 
Therefore, the jury will be entitled to conclude that Arnold intentionally prevented the plaintiffs 
consent by his own inappropriate conduct. 
To grant defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment under these circumstances would be 
an unconscionable injustice. 
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs did subsequently learn that Arnold had acquired Lanto's 
interest and thereafter allowed him to continue to act as a partner. By the Spring of 1996 when, 
unknown to the plaintiffs, defendants Larson and Arnold had already spent most if not all of the 
$160,000, the Normans requested a meeting in order to secure funds they desperately needed 
after a fire at their water park in Moab. The meeting was held in defendant Arnold's office on 
May 1, 1996. Therein, among other things, it was disclosed to the Normans for the first time 
that: a. Arnold had acquired Lanto's interest; 
b. Arnold had given the $160,000 to Larson and no one could account for it; 
c. Arnold was aware that $50,000 had been sent to "financial people" in Arizona 
who Arnold now believed were crooks; 
d. Arnold knew who these people were and would try to get the money back. 
(See, Plaintiffs' timeline and supporting documents.) 
The Normans thereafter considered Arnold both their partner and counsel for the joint 
venture, and Arnold both before and after that time conducted himself as such. 
1. Arnold's Purchase of an Interest in the Joint Venture is an Independent 
Basis to Hold Him Liable for Breach of the Joint Venture Agreement 
There is an additional and independent basis for requiring defendant Arnold to answer 
this claim. In the Purchase Agreement wherein Arnold "purchased" Lanto's interest he 
specifically agreed to assume Lanto's liability arising from the very claims the plaintiffs are 
making. Plaintiffs contend that Lanto knew there was substantial probability that the joint 
venture would go sour at plaintiffs' expense and so covered himself in the buy-out agreement 
with Arnold. The Purchase Agreement specifically states: 
2. In consideration of (Lanto) selling his interest, (Arnold) agrees to hold (Lanto) harmless 
from any and all claims arising out of the development of the above mentioned projects, 
including but not limited to tort claims and claims on any notes for monies previously borrowed 
totaling $160,000. 
Defendant admits that Lanto has joint and several liability under the Promissory Note. 
The Arnold-Lanto Purchase Agreement (Def. Exhibit 7) is a separate contractual agreement to 
which the plaintiffs are unquestionably third party beneficiaries. The agreement contemplated 
this very claim. Consequently, to the extent that plaintiffs prove breach of the Joint Venture 
Agreement or liability under the Promissory Note, Arnold's claim for summary judgment on this 
cause of action not only fails, his liability is conclusively established. 
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B. Plaintiffs' Claims Against Arnold For Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Also Presents Questions of Fact For the Jury, 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is also easily resolved. While 
admitting the he was counsel for the joint venture, which included Robert and Diane Norman, 
who were required to bear the entire risk of loss for the venture, Arnold appears to contend that 
he owed the Normans no fiduciary duty. To state the position is to emphasize its lack of merit. 
Arnold attempts to escape through a narrow and illogical loophole, starting with two mis-
statements. First, "The fiduciary duty the Normans claim Arnold breached is the duty of 
undivided loyalty." (Def. Memo at 13) This is simply incorrect. The plaintiffs' claim very 
simply is that Arnold owed them a fiduciary duty as members of the joint venture and as 
individuals, particularly since he was aware that the Normans were the parties most at risk in the 
venture. Second, "The Normans claim that Arnold owed them a personal fiduciary duty because 
he was their personal lawyer" (Id) As defendant takes pains to point out, and as plaintiffs 
readily admit, they have never made such a claim. Rather, plaintiffs claim is that, as members of 
the joint venture, Arnold owed them a fiduciary duty as counsel for the joint venture. In this 
case, Arnold's numerous substantial professional breeches directly impacted the personal 
interests of the plaintiffs which is the basis for their claim. 
Moreover, the Court should keep in mind plaintiffs' theory of the case which is that they 
were set up to take the fall by Arnold, Larson and the rest if the venture failed. It will be 
plaintiffs' contention, supported by ample evidence that the Normans were intentionally kept in 
the dark about the conduct of Mark Arnold and the other parties; that Arnold knew the Normans 
were getting no information from Page or Barney; and that Arnold had become a member of the 
joint venture, but nevertheless had his little side deals going on with Larson. 
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From his deposition, it is clear that defendant Arnold could not state with any precision 
who he thought he represented, but did testify under oath that he represented the Normans. In 
testimony regarding his preparation of documents when he purchased Lanto's interest, Arnold 
stated: 
Q What capacity were ou acting in when you wrote up these documents? 
A. I think it would be difficult to say what capacity. 
Q. Well, you're going to have to try. 
A. Helper. 
Q. Not an attorney? 
A. I was an attorney who was helping 
Q. Were you acting as an attorney when you wrote up these documents for someone? 
A. Not necessarily. 
Q. That won't do. (W)ere you or weren't you. 
A. I think I am an attorney and I understand how to write certain documents. I wrote 
that up. Whether I was acting as an attorney when I wrote that up, I can't say. / think in my 
mind I was acting as an attorney, 
Q. For whom? 
A. For Greg Page, Duane Barney and the Normans. 
Q. And that's all? 
A. Yes. 
Arnold depo. at 14-15, emphasis added. Arnold later specifically stated that he represented the 
Normans personally on the Holiday in project. 
Q. I want to take as much time as it takes to clarify your role in all of these 
transactions, okay? Are you or have you ever been personal attorney for (sic.) Norman Larson? 
A. I would guess only to the extent of where I tried to assist with the Holiday Inn 
project that's the subject of this lawsuit. 
Q. Mr. Larson, in his deposition, I believe you were present, mentioned some other 
cases that you represented him on. Do you recall? 
A. Mr. Larson? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I keep getting Bob Norman and Bob Larson mixed up. Would you repeat the 
previous question for me . . . Id. at 24. 
Clearly, Arnold believed the question pertained to Robert Norman, and testified that he 
had represented him individually. He later said he did not represent the Normans individually. 
Id, e.g. at 29. 
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Though he now claims to have represented the joint venture, during the relevant time 
period, Arnold was not even aware if a separate legal entity existed. 
Q Do you think you represented the "group" on certain matters, yes or no. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the group? 
A. It was Greg Page, Duane Barney, Bob and Diane Norman. 
Q. Not Norman Larson? 
A. No. He wasn't part of the group. 
Q. Did the group have a separate legal entity? 
A. When I first talked to them, I don't know. I have since learned that they have 
some kind of an organization which the called the 4-D thing. (The Normans were not members 
of 4-D) I was unaware of it. 
Q. Was it a separate legal entity? 
A. / don't know. 
Q. Did you ever bill 4-D Development? 
A. Not that I can recall. 
Q. So is it fair to say that your testimony is that you didn 7 represent them 
individually, but you represented them all individually as a group? 
A. That's what I 'm trying to say. Yes. Id. at 29-30. 
Q. You've said that you represented the group and that at some point you found out 
about 4-D Development. When did you find out about 4-D Development? 
A. I don't know when I found out about it. 
Q. Before or after the Trust Deed and Note? 
A. I can't say. 
Q. Did you ever consider that you represented the Moab Land Development Joint 
Venture? 
A. I felt like on certain things I was representing the group, which includes some of 
the signers on the agreement I believe. That's all I can say. Id. at 32. 
Q. Did you take any part in the discussion about the dissolution of the 4-D 
partnership that is set forth in (NL 71, dated 10/27/95) 
A. None. I always had it in the back of my mind that maybe the net effect of Mr. 
Lanto doing wftat he did may destroy that partnership, but I didn't know hardly anything about 
it. I had no input at all. 
Q. Did you at any time after October 27, 1995, perform legal services for what you 
called the group? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. So that group was not 4-D Development? 
A. I don't know what the group was. / viewed them as individuals. 
Q. That sort of contradicts your testimony . . . You said you didn't represent 
individuals. 
A. The group as individuals. Id. at 38-39. 
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Arnold testified that he understood the Normans had personal interests in the venture 
separate from the group, and that he was specifically looking after the Normans' personal 
interests. 
Q. After having paid himself back for those franchise fees, why would there be any 
question at all about (Larson) turning . . . (the franchise) over to the group. 
A. I think at that point in time Larson and Page weren't on the best of terms, and I 
didn't know what was going to happen. 
Q. I know. But so what? 
A. It means a lot. Simply because Norm Larson was a franchisee of record with the 
Holiday Inn, had to be, he had to be the one. And if I was going to save Bob Norman's property 
and get some way to build the motel, I needed to have some ability to get the franchise in 
someone else's hands so we could do it. 
Q. I'm having trouble making any sense of that . . . weren't you relying on Norman 
Larson to be the guy to get the money to build the thing? 
A. Well, at this point in time, those guys - they had been like a tomato rotting from 
the inside out. They were adversarial at this point in time. 
Q. What point in time is this? 
A. I can only generally tell you it was probably about the time that Diane Norman 
came to my office and the meeting from which she's got a record of. 
Q. That was May 1, 1996. 
A. Yeah. I'm not sure. But it seems to me at that point in time things were starting 
to heat up. Because Norm was not at that meeting. 
Q. But Norm reimbursed himself for the franchise (with) the first check out of the 
account in June of 1995. By May 1st of 1996, when Diane came up desperately seeking some 
money, the account had all been spent. Every cent of it had been spent. 
A. Yeah. Hence the need to find somebody that could build the hotel and save the 
Normans 'property. 
Q. Why hadn't that been done before? 
A. / don V know. All I can say is that's what I personally tried to do. Id at 104-05, 
There is also documentary evidence that Arnold considered the Normans his clients. 
Arnold wrote a letter to Holiday Inn on July 18, 1996, attempting to preserve the franchise, in 
which he refers to "my clients" Duane Barney, Greg Page and Bob Norman. (See, attached) 
Q. In this letter you do expressly state that Duane Barney, Greg Page and Bob 
Norman are your clients, do you not? 
A. I do. 
Q. When do you think Bob Norman stopped being your client? 
A. / don 7 know. I knew for purposes of this letter, I was writing it on his behalf as 
well as everyone else. Id at 169. 
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Arnold then attempts to claim that his personal representation of the Normans was 
limited to this letter. That argument however, flies in the face of the fact that the entire 
transaction, Arnold's involvement from day-one, and every aspect of this case is intimately 
involved with that same franchise. 
From defendant's own testimony, a jury would be entitled to believe that defendant 
represented the Normans individually as members of the amorphous "group." At the very least, 
a question of fact is raised. It is certain that, in performing his legal services, Arnold recognized 
that the Normans had very substantial personal interests at stake. 
1. Defendants1 Legal Authority 
The Utah legal authority relied on by the defendant in support of his Motion for 
Summary Judgment is not persuasive. Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 299 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), does establish that joint ventures 
are considered separate legal entities, like partnerships. However, no where does that case state 
or imply that representation of a joint venture precludes an attorney from having a separate or 
associated fiduciary relationship with its individual members. Defendant's other case, Kilpatrick 
v. Wiley, Rein & Fie/ding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), is cited only for the proposition 
that the plaintiffs must prove an attorney-client relationship to prevail on a legal malpractice 
claim, a point the plaintiffs here do not dispute. 
There is a legitimate question of fact, first of all, as to whether Arnold ever represented 
the "Moab Land Development Joint Venture." Indeed, it would appear from his testimony that, 
during 1995, he did not even know it existed. If Arnold was aware of the Joint Venture, and, as 
its counsel, of the Joint Venture Agreement, he certainly didn't act like it. For example, the 
acquisition of the Young loan, providing the proceeds to Larson, giving Larson a potential equity 
interest in the project, all of the expenditures from the loan fees, and Arnold's purchase of 
Lanto's interest would all have been prohibited under the joint venture agreement. (Def. Exhibit 
2) If Arnold was aware of the joint venture and was acting as its counsel, then his acquiescence 
and participation in all these violations of the agreement without informing the Normans, would, 
in itself, justify their professional liability claim against him. Arnold should not be allowed to 
avoid responsibility for his professional misconduct by hiding behind an entity that existed, if at 
all, only on paper, and which Arnold completely ignored in any event. 
Arnold may have believed he represented 4-D Development, but the Normans were not 
members or partners of 4-D. More likely, Arnold had identified no specific separate legal entity 
as his client, apart from the fact that they were a group of individuals involved in a common 
project. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt from his testimony that Arnold knew that the Normans 
were members of the "group" and that they had substantial personal interests involved in the 
venture. It is most likely that Arnold represented the Normans "individually, as members of the 
group" as he testified several times. (See, Arnold deposition testimony on this point, supra.) 
This is perfectly consistent with the Normans' understanding that Arnold represented "the 
group." The only thing that is certain is that the Normans definitely were looking to and relying 
on Arnold to protect their personal interests. 
As mentioned above, no precedent has been cited that an attorney's representation of a 
joint venture precludes a direct fiduciary duty to some or all of its members. Common sense 
would dictate otherwise, since a member's interests and contributions to a joint venture are 
usually personal. In Stocks v. USF&G, 395 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), the Court 
recognized that individual shareholders may bring an action for harm to a corporation if their 
personal interests are involved. 
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(T)his court has recognized a narrow exception to the general rule regarding a 
shareholder's capacity to bring an individual suit. A shareholder may bring an individual cause 
of action if the harm to the corporation also damaged the shareholder as an individual rather than 
a shareholder. Id. at 16. 
In this case, plaintiffs contend that Arnold's conduct as counsel for the group caused 
them to lose $212,000 on their personal property which they had pledged as collateral for a loan. 
The other "joint venturers" had contributed nothing to the project. As Arnold testified, "When 
things started getting really tight for (Barney & Page), to me they just took the position that they 
just scattered and left it. Left it in Bob Norman's lap." Arnold depo. at 15A In fact, the 
Normans were the only parties with anything at stake in the venture, and Arnold's conduct as 
counsel, whether for the Normans directly, the amorphous "group", 4-D Development, or 
otherwise was directly contrary and adverse to their personal interests. 
Moreover, it is the Normans' contention that the group knowingly and intentionally used 
them solely to assume the risk to obtain money for their often separate goals, i.e., the Park City 
project. It is absolutely clear that the "group", with Arnold and Larson leading, were united only 
in their lack of concern for the interests of Bob and Diane Norman. The group was, for all 
practical purposes, adverse to the Normans. 
Plaintiffs contend that his conduct through October, 1995 alone is sufficient for their 
fiduciary duty claim against Arnold. The plaintiffs will testify that any of the following 
disclosures would have caused them not to enter the joint venture, or immediately terminate their 
involvement: 
1. That 4-D had separate projects going on in Park City. 
2. That 4-D had secretly entered into a Service Agreement with Norman Larson to 
provide financing on several projects including Moab, and that if he was successful, would 
receive substantial equity (up to 25%) in the project. 
3. That Larson was Arnold's client. 
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4. That Arnold would pay himself, Larson and his clients the Youngs $20,000 off 
the top of the loan proceeds. 
5. That Arnold would then hand over the rest of the money to Larson with sole 
check signing authority. 
6. That money from the Young loan secured by the Normans property would be 
used for other projects in which the Normans had no knowledge or interest. 
7. That Arnold and Larson would secretly form their own separate business, Venture 
Properties II, L.C., and use money from the Young loan secured by the Normans' property. 
8. That Arnold and Larson would wire $50,000 to unknown financial people in 
Arizona. 
9. That Duane Barney was a convicted felon for fraud. 
10. That Arnold and Larson would buy out Pete Lanto's interest using Young loan 
funds, thereby leaving the "joint venture" without a building contractor. 
11. That Duane Barney would be sent back to prison on a parole violation, thereby 
leaving the "joint venture" without its administrator. 
One of the more egregious examples of Arnold's breach of fiduciary duty and 
professional negligence comes from his testimony regarding the indemnification he wrote 
regarding his purchase of the Lanto interest. 
Q. According to the plain language of this document and your signature on it, you 
agree to hold Mr. Lanto harmless from any claims arising from the borrowing of the $160,000 
secured by the Norman property. 
A. I'm not going to read any more into the document than what it says. 
Q. Well,. . . you wrote it, so what were you were trying to accomplish in paragraph 
number 2? 
A. I was trying . . . to let Mr. Lanto know - what I was doing, was obligating the 
remaining partners to hold him harmless. 
Q. (W)ho were you obligating to do that? 
A. The people that had sent me to do this. 
Q. Tell me. 
A. I assumed, I knew for sure that it was Greg Page and Duane Barney and I 
assumed that they were also partners with Bob and Diane Norman. 
Q. You were presuming to obligate Robert Norman to indemnify Pete Lanto on a 
document, which you never showed him and which doesn V mention him? 
A. That $s correct Arnold depo. at 19-20, emphasis added. 
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C. Plaintiffs' Punitive Damage Claim is Viable 
There will be evidence to support plaintiffs' claim that defendants' conduct as partially 
set forth herein was willful, malicious and/or with reckless disregard for the plaintiffs' economic 
and personal interests. The issue of punitive damages will therefore be a question for the jury to 
determine based upon appropriate instruction from the Court. 
V. PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO HAVE THEIR 
PLEADINGS DEEMED AMENDED TO CONFORM WITH THE EVIDENCE. 
Defendant's citation to Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996), was quite instructive on the law regarding legal malpractice claims and its 
application to this case. The court pointed out that legal malpractice is a generic term for at least 
three distinct causes of action - breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, and 
that, though malpractice actions based on negligence and breach of fiduciary are difficult to 
differentiate, "the central purpose of the law of legal malpractice is to guard against and to 
remedy exploitation of the power lawyers possess over their clients' lives and property." (Id. at 
1289-90). 
In this case, plaintiffs termed their cause of action as one for breach of fiduciary duty, and 
while it may not be a model for legal malpractice pleadings, it definitely covers the central 
purpose of the law of legal malpractice as above stated. It was the plaintiffs' belief that a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty subsumed negligent conduct on the part of the defendant attorney. 
The plaintiffs believe that Arnold's conduct was intentional, dishonest and adverse to their 
interests thus breaching his fiduciary duty to "exercise impeccable honesty, fair dealing and 
fidelity." Id 
If defendant really was "just an attorney who was helping" then his professional services 
were almost incomprehensibly negligent. Plaintiffs pleadings and evidence fit both distinct 
causes of legal malpractice - breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. 
Therefore, plaintiffs request that the Court allow the pleadings to conform to the evidence 
and permit the plaintiffs to go forward with claims of breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. Having secretly bought in 
to the joint venture, and having, together with defendant Larson, taken over its operation, Arnold 
cynically requests that this Court excuse him from liability because the plaintiffs did not consent 
to his becoming a partner. Whether a part of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture per se9 
or not, Arnold was a major player in the group effort which directly resulted in the plaintiffs' 
losses. 
Though the plaintiffs never personally retained Arnold as their counsel, they viewed him 
as counsel for the group in which they were members. Arnold admits that he acted as counsel 
for the group, who he viewed as individuals. Arnold recognized that the plaintiffs had 
substantial personal interests at stake in the venture which he claims, as counsel, to have been 
trying to protect. The issue of whether Arnold breached fiduciary duties owed to the Normans is 
for the jury, which should also be allowed to consider an additional legal malpractice claim 
based on neglience. 
The issues are not close. Plaintiffs assert that defendant's Motion, filed the last possible 
day after several continuances was primarily designed to cause the plaintiffs additional hardship 
through undue legal expense and delay. Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in submitting this response. 
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Dated thisffi^ day of \Jt/A>L , 2000. 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that on the b^ day of vtf/\-t 2000, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Response to Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid to: 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Norman Larson 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Matthew Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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A p r i l 27 , 1995 
Greg Page 
SENIOR FINANCE COMPANY 
4770 South 900 East 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Dear Greg: 
On Monday, April 24, 1995, I met with Trust Guarantee Corp. in 
Phoenix, Arizona and reviewed your funding request for the 
two (2) Holiday Inn Express projects. 
Prior to my going, you agreed to submit $500.00 to the cost 
expenses of the trip. 
Please issue a check to Western Empire Advisors, Inc. in this 
amount and we will proceed with your funding request since we 
have strong interest from both JWL Trust and Trust Guarantee 
Corp. to fund the request. 
Sincerely, 
Norman M. Larson 
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SERVICE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT and CONTRACT is made and intered into 
on this 27th day of April, 1995 at Salt Lake City, Utah, by 
and between Western Empire Advisors, a Utah Corporation, 
(hereafter "WEA"), and 4-D Development Co. L.L.C. a proposed 
limited liability corporation, (thereafter "BORROWER11) 
AGREEMENT 
This contract and agreement is entered into between 
WEA and BORROWER for the following purposes: 
1. BORROWER hereby stated that it is currently an 
active corporation that is registered and in good standing 
in the State of Utah as described below and is developing 
owning and managing income producing properties as described 
below: 
MOAB HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS 
Located along Utah Highway 191 
North of Moab, Grand County, Utah 
PARLEY'S HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS 
Located along Interstate Highway 80 
Between Kimball Junction and Jeremy Ranch Exit 
Near Park City, Utah 
BORROWER has retained WEA to arrange financing for 
said company under the following terms and conditions: 
AMOUNT: $7.0 Million 
TERM: 20 years with a 10 year due date. 
RATE: 10% interest with the first payment 
being due one year in arrears and the 
balance of the payments being due 
monthly in arrears. 
LIABILITY: Non Recourse 
EQUITY: 40% in the Borrowing Entity until 
the principal of the loan is 
reduced by 50%{ then the equity 
drops to 10% with a buy out 
agreement. 
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COLLATERAL:. A one (1) year Standby Letter of 
Credit with the face amount being 
equal to fifty percent (50%) of 
the funding commitment. 
FEE: Five and one/half (5.5) points to the 
lender due at closing. 
WEA FEE: An equity position equal to the 
partners in 4-D Development, 
and a fee of two percent (2%) 
of the committed amount. 
Or any such terms and conditions that are mutually agreeable 
to BORROWER, the Lending Sources, and Western Empire 
Advisors, Inc. 
2. BORROWER hereby appoints WEA to represent them in 
this transaction and authorizes WEA to submit to their 
lender(s) and/or financial sources financial data and 
information supplied by the BORROWER for the purpose of the 
lender(s) and/or financial sources making the loan and/or 
investment direct to the BORROWER. WEA will act as AGENT for 
the BORROWER for the period of 120 days from the execution 
of this agreement and will continue until cancelled in 
writing by BORROWER. WEA will put forth its best efforts to 
obtain approval and a letter of commitment as requested by 
BORROWER. WEA will rely upon the information requested to be 
full, complete( and accurate information. Any 
misrepresentations in the information supplied by BORROWER 
will void the contract and subject the BORROWER to the 
payment of all fees as described in section 3. 
3. In consideration for the efforts of WEA on behalf 
of the BORROWER in procuring said loan and/or investment 
commitment, BORROWER hereby agrees provide to WEA an equity 
position equal to the partners of 4-D Development. A fee of 
two percent (2%) of the funding commitment is also requested 
by WEA and is due at closing. 
The BORROWER reserves the right to accept or reject 
any letter of commitment or'financing arrangement at the 
sole discretion of the BORROWER. BORROWER understands that 
the equity position assigned to WEA is separate from the 
lenders and/or investors loan fees, investment fees, 
commitment fees, and/or any broker fees signed and agreed by 
BORROWER. If WEA enters into this agreement and facilitates 
BORROWER to obtain funding that is accepted by BORROWER( and 
BORROWER, for whatever reason, does not accept the funding, 
or does not provide the information as reasonably requested 
by the financial source issuing the funding, or BORROWER 
does not satisfy the terms and conditions as agreed upon in 
the funding documents, BORROWER shall be subject to the 
assignment of said equity position to WEA. If, however, WEA 
does not provide funds that are acceptable to the Borrower, 
then the above indicated fee structure and equity position 
to WEA is null and void. 
4. BORROWER recognizes that in order to prepare a 
loan request package, certain arrangement must be made. 
BORROWER agrees to deliver to WEA, with this agreement duly 
executed, a Good Faith Deposit of $5000. This deposit is 
refundable, less expenses, in the event WEA is unable to 
provide the Borrower with a Letter of Interest, and/or a 
Conditional Commitment within a timely manner. 
5. BORROWER expressly agrees and acknowledges that 
WEA is an information resource only. Any fees or 
compensation which are paid to WEA for services rendered are 
done so with the understanding that WEA is using it's best 
efforts to obtain a letter of Commitment and funding for the 
BORROWER. 
6. It is expressly acknowledged and stated between 
the parties that WEA is not a bank, lender, or an agent of 
any of the foregoing and that the BORROWER has been informed 
and fully understands that the letter of commitment which is 
being applied for is being applied for by WEA through a 
financial institution. 
7. WEA does not guarantee that any of the actual 
representations made by any of the lending and/or investment 
sources are accurate or that disbursement will be made in 
accordance with the funding source commitment. 
8. BORROWER agrees that if any further financing is 
secured by BORROWER, (whether on the same or other property 
and/or project) from sources procured by WEA during the 
period of 60 months after the execution hereof, WEA shall be 
entitled to a fee of two percent (2%) of all additional 
financing so obtained, which will be due in full upon the 
funding or commitment for funding of such additional 
financing. 
9. In the event a Commitment is issued and accepted, 
WEA is authorized to make an announcement in newspapers and 
trade journals without reference to the dollar amount of the 
loan and/or investment. 
10. This AGREEMENT if effective from the date shown 
below and shall continue for a period of 120 days from this 
date forward. Cancellation of the agreement may only be 
done in writing and not more than 30 days in advance of the 
cancellation. 
11. BORROWER WARRANTS THAT NO REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES 
OR COMMITMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO BORROWERS BY WESTERN EMPIRE 
ADVISORS INC., ITS AGENTS OR EMPLOYEES, THAT ARE NOT 
EXPRESSLY SET FORTH WITHIN THIS AGREEMENT. 
12. This AGREEMENT supercedes all previous agreement, 
written or oral, between the parties hereto, and may be 
modified only by an agreement in writing executed or signed 
by the person, or party that is chargeable under such 
modification- IN THE EVENT OF LITIGATION UNDER THIS 
AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION 
FOR, AND THE ONLY PROPER VENUE OF, ANY ACTION OR SUIT 
PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE 
BEFORE THE COURTS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
13. If the terms of outlined above reflect terms of the 
agreement, please sign there indicated. 
14. The one (1) year Standby Letter of Credit used to 
collateralize the funding reguest is the responsibility of 
the Borrower. However, WEA is has established several 
resources that would consider providing the document. WEA 
will reguest an additional one percent (1%) of the face 
amount of the letter of credit that is provided through 
WEA's efforts. 
Dated: y/^ A 
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June 6 , 1995 
Bruce Holman ^ 
John Zimbra 
TRUST GUARANTEE CORP. 
11811 North Tatum 
P-120 
Phoenix, Arizona 85028 
RE: Moab Holiday Express Motel 
Dear Bruce: 
Enclosed is a brief summary and proforraa's for the above 
indicated project. The request is for approximately $4,0 
million. We need a commitment very quickly so we can go ahead 
an pay for the franchise fee of S40K. 
Mark Arnold, the attorney for the project, will be calling you 
to confirm what needs to be done for the funding at the 
following terms and conditions: 
Amount: $4.0 million 
Term: 20 years 
Rate: 9*5% interest 
Fee's: 3 points 
The Borrower is prepared to place the amount of $100,000.00 in 
a Trust Account approved by both Borrower and Lender until 
funds can be confirmed. 
Please Advise Me Accordingly: 
Norman M. Larstth 
Srely, 
7105 So. Highland Drive Suite 202 • Sail Lake City, Utah 84121 • (801) 942-8578 
Trust Guarantee 
Corporation 
June 8, 1995 
Mr. Norm Larson 
Western Empire Advisors, Inc. 
7105 So. Highland Dr Suite 202 
Salt Lake Chy, UT 84121 
Re: Holiday Inn Express, Moab and Park City 
Dear Norm: 
Trust Guarantee Corporation, through its lending sources, will apply for loans totaling a 
maximum of Eight Million Dollars ($8,000,000.00) for the above projects. 
The final terms and conditions will be given with the Letter of Offer. However, we 
believe it will be as previously outlined: Twenty year terax, ten year call, nine and one half 
percent interest fixed, three points and an equity position of 12 - 15%. 
The loan will be based on cost and may require the land to be invested as equity. 
Construction control will be administered by Trust Guarantee Corporation 
It is my understanding that your clients are prepared to place One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($100,000.00) in your trust account to activate the Letters of Offer 
The complete package for both projects can be underwritten by Paul at our office. 
Yours truly, 
Bruce G. Holman 
CFO 
NL55 
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June 1 6 , 1995 
Trust Guarantee Corporation 
Mr. Bruce Holman 
11811 N. Tatum Blvd., Suite P-120 
Phoenix, AZ 85028 
RE: CONFIRMATION OF FUNDS IN TRUST ACCOUNT 
Dear Mr. Holman 
Please be advised that Western Empire Advisors, Inc. has on 
deposit in their Trust Account One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000.00) for the benefit of Trust Guarantee, or its 
nominee. 
The $100,000.00 will be released to Trust Guarantee 
Corporation, or its nominee, upon acceptance of the Letter 
of Offer and proof of loan funds by Trust Guarantee 
Corporation and the Borrower. 
If tne Letter of Offer is not acceptable, then monies cannot 
be released and will be returned to the original provider. 
Yours Truly, 
Norman M. Larson 
NL54 
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The undersigned persons, each being more than eighteen (18) years of age, hereby establish a limited 
liability company pursuant to the Utah Limited Liability Company Act and adopt the following 
Articles of Organization: 
NAME: The name of the limited liability company is VENTURE PROPERTIES II, LC. 
DURATION: The duration of the company will be thirty (30) years. 
PURPOSE: The limited liability company is organized for the purpose of carrying on any and all 
legal and lawful businesses in accordance with the Utah Limited Liability Company Act. 
REGISTERED OFFICE: The address of the registered office of the limited liability company is 57 
West 200 South, ste 404, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
(J G £ 
en 
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS: The address of the principal place of business of the limited —) 
liability company is 57 West 200 South, ste 404, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. £2 
REGISTERED AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS: The name and address of the registered H 
agent for service of process, for the limited liability company, is Mr. Mark E. Arnold 57 West 200 CD 
south, ste 404, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. In the event that the registered agent resigns, or his/her 
authority is revoked, or the agent cannot through the exercise of reasonable diligence be found or 
served, the Director of the Utah State Division of Corporations and Commercial Code is appointed 
as the agent for service of process of the limited liability company. 
MEMBERS: The names and address of the members of the limited liability company are: 
Mr. Mark E. Arnold Mr. Norman Larson 
57 West 200 South 7105 S. Highland Drive 
suite 404 suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
ORGANIZERS: The names and address of the organizers of the limited liability company are: 
Mr. Mark E. Arnold Mr. Norman Larson 
57 W. 200 S. suite 404 7105 S. Highland Dr. suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
53^ 
MANAGEIVIENT: The business of the limited liability company shall be conducted, by Mr. Norman 
Larson, member and organizer as listed above. 
June ^ , 1995 
# - . June /7 , 1995 
£g£2» 
Mr"Norman Larson, Organizer 
Mr. Mark ET Arnold, Organizer 
MARK E. ARNOLD, Registered Agent 
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HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C, 
F A K D A L L J. HOLMGREN 
MARKE, ARNOLD 
SCOTT L WIGGINS 
JOSEPH LEE NEMELKA 
AMERICAN PLAZA 11, SUITE 4<H 
57 \MSST 200 SOLTTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64101 
July 25, 1995 
TELEPHONE 
(SOI) 328^333 
FACSIMILE 
(801) 328^1151 
Mr. David Schori 
P.O. B;x 1921 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Re; Rasmussen Property Closing 
Dear David: 
As mentioned in your fax, we will not be able to close on July 27thrhowever in the next 
48 hours, we will have a closing date scheduled which should take place in early to mid-August. 
This letter is to request an extension of our earnest money agreement. If you choose not to 
extend, please return the $10,000.00 earnest money to us. 
Please contact me if you have any further questions. 
Respectfully, 
MEA/cb 
Mark E. Arnold \ 
Attorney at Law 
cc: Norm Larson 
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HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L-C. 
AMERICAN PLAZA II, SUITE 404 
57 WEST 200 SOUTH 
RANDALL J. HOLMGREN
 S A L T ^ ^ C I T Y f mAH 8 4 1 0 1 TELEFHONE 
tfARK E. ARNOLD (801) 328-4333 
SCOTT L WIGGINS FACSIMILE 
OSEPH LEE NEMELKA (801) 328-1151 
October^ 1995 
Via Fax: (602)996-6257 
Mr. Bruce Holman 
Trust Guaranty Corporation 
11811 North Tatum Boulevard, Suite P-120 
Phoenix, Arizona 85028 
Re: Holiday Inn Earnest Money 
Dear Bruce: 
We have wired earnest money to you in the amount of $50,000. Listed below are the 
conditions under which the earnest money is presented to you: 
1) Money is to be placetfin a trust account. 
2) If the money is moved from the trust account, it must only be used to purchase 
treasury bills. 
3) The earnest money is fully refundable to Western Empire Advisors if we do not close 
on the Holiday Inn Moab property or the Park City property by Odober 22, 1995. 
If these conditions are not acceptable to you, please contact me immediately. 
Respectfully, 
Mark E. Arnold 
Attorney at Law 
MEA/cwb 
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Friday, October 20, 1995 
Bruce Holman 
TRUST GUARANTEE CORPORATION. 
11811 N. Tatum 
Suite P-120 
Phoenix, Arizona 85028 
RE: Holiday Express Commitments 
Dear Bruce: 
Enclosed are the signed copies of the commitments to fund the three (3) Holiday Express motels 
located in Moab, Park City, and Richfield, Utah. Here is the tentative dates we would like to 
close on. 
Moab Holiday Express Closing Date November 15th 
Plans are being completed, construction costs are being 
finalized, so we should be ready to proceed by then. 
Park City Holiday Express: Closing Date November 15th for the fand only ($1.6 
million). The balance of the funding doesn't need to be 
available until February of 1996. We will have the plans and 
construction costs completed at that time. 
Richfield Holiday Express: Closing Date for the Holiday Express Motel doesn't 
need to be until December 15th. However, we won't need to 
draw down much of the construction funds until February 1996. 
We have issued $50,000 in commitment fee's for the first $5.0 million which will cover the 
construction of the Moab Holiday Express and the purchase of the Park City land. The balance 
of the commitment fee's of $50,000 will be transferred upon confirmation of the first funds being 
received through the European transaction in behatf of Trust Guarantee. 
Mr. Arnold, the attorney, has been very reluctant about releasing all commitment fee's since the 
commitment fee has been paid for the November closing and because of the delays that have 
been incurred thus far in the process of Trust Guarantee acquiring their funds. 
Sincerely, 
Norman M. Larson 
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FAX# 
FROM 
FAX# 
DATE 
# OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE 
RE: 
MESSAGE: 
Norm Larson 
(801) 942-0785 
Mark E. Arnold 
(801)328-1151 
October 27, 1995 
Holiday Inn/Pete Lanto 
NL70 
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October 27, 1995 
Pete Lanto 
2274 South 1300 East #G8-317 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Duane Barney 
c/o Holiday Inn Express 
632 Kirby Lane 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Dear Members: 
This letter is to inform you of discontinuing my association with 4D Partnership and 
therefore dissolving 4D Partnership due to differences in achieving the goals of the partnership. 
Based upon Pete Lanto's sale of interest in the Holiday Inn Hotels, Moab and Park City, 
4D Partnership is hereby and immediately dissolved. 
Sincerely, 
A T T 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
Whereas Pete Lanto, herein referred to as Seller, wishes to sell any and all interest he or any of his 
business entities holds in two Holiday Inn ventures, and 
Whereas Mark E. Arnold and Western Empire Advisors, herein after referred to as Purchaser, 
wishes to purchase the above interests, 
It is now therefore agreed as follows; 
1. For good and valuable consideration the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged 
Purchaser shall purchase and Seller shall sell all interest whatsoever Seller may own in two 
Holiday Inn ventures located in Moab Utah and Park City Utah for the total amount of EIGHT 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($8,500.). 
2. In consideration of Seller selling his interest, Purchaser agrees to hold Seller harmless, 
and all claims arising out of the development of the above mentioned projects, including but noi 
limited to tort claims and claims on any notes for moneys previously borrowed totajing $160,p00. 
BUYER t&jtl/^S 
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POWER OF ATTORNEY 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That I, DUANE BARNEY, of Utah County, State of Utah, do hereby make, constitute and appoint 
GREGORY A. PAGE, my true and lawful attorney, for me, and in my name, and on my behalf, to: 
1. Ask, demand, recover and receive, all and any sum or sums of money, debts, 
dues, merchandise or effects, due, payable, coming or belonging, or which 
may at any time be due, payable, or belonging to me, from any person or 
persons whatsoever; 
2. Sell all, or any part o£ said goods, merchandise and effects, which may come 
to his/her possession or knowledge, on such credit, and for such prices as 
he/she may deem meet; 
3. Purchase any goods, merchandise, specie, currency, shares of stock or other 
commodities, on my account for such prices and to such amount as he/she 
may deem meet, and the same to sell again for my benefit and on my account, 
for any prices whatsoever, to ship or transport the same, or any part thereof, 
on my behalf and account, to any post or posts, place or places, whatsoever, 
in any vessel or vessels or other means of transportation, and with and to any 
person or persons whatsoever, and there barter, exchange, and dispose of the 
same; 
4. Insure and cause insurance to be made, of any such goods, merchandise, 
specie or other commodities, or of any part thereof at such premiums, and for 
such risks as he/she may deem meet; 
5. Accept any bill or bills of exchange or orders, make and execute any note or 
notes of hand, bond or bonds, or other instruments or contracts, in my name, 
and on my account, to and for any amount which he/she may deem meet or 
expedient; 
6. Sell, barter, exchange or dispose of any real estate of which I am now seised 
or possessed in fee simple, or for any less estate, to any person or persons, for 
any price, or in any manner whatsoever, and for these purposes to execute and 
acknowledge any deed or deeds, lease or leases, or other assurance or 
assurances, with general covenants of warranty against all persons, or any 
other covenants whatsoever, as he/she may deem expedient; 
7. Purchase any real estate on my account, in fee simple or otherwise, at any 
price or any exchange whatsoever, and for these purposes to receive, confirm, 
make and execute any contracts, deeds, conveyances, or other instruments 
whatsoever, 
8. Settle and adjust all partnership accounts and demands, and all other accounts 
or demands now subsisting, or which may hereafter subsist between me and 
any person or persons whatsoever, and submit the same to and decide them 
by arbitration; 
9. Compound for any debts, dues, or demands owing, or which may hereafter be 
owing to me, and to take less than the whole, or otherwise to agree for the 
same, in such manner, and on such terms as he/she, in his/her discretion, may 
deem proper; 
10. Pay and discharge all debts and demands due and payable, or which may 
hereafter become due and payable by me unto any person or persons 
whatsoever; 
11. Enter into any lands or other real estate to which I am or may be entitled, and 
recover the possession thereof, and damages for any injury done thereto, and 
to distrain for rent due thereon; 
12. Commence and prosecute unto final judgment and execution, any suit or suits, 
action or actions real, personal or mixed, which he/she shall deem proper for 
the recovery, possession, or enjoyment of any matter or thing which is or 
which may hereafter be due, payable, owing, belonging, accruing or 
appertaining to me, for or by reason of the premises, or any part thereof, and, 
in any such suits or actions, for me in person, or by such attorney or attorneys, 
or counsel, he/she may deem necessary or proper to retain or employ to 
appear and plead, before any courts or tribunals having jurisdiction thereof, 
and all stipulations, undertakings, recognizances and other requisites in any 
suits or actions, and any question arising on the same, by arbitration or other 
compromise, and of all receipts and recoveries in the premises, due 
acquittances and discharges to execute and deliver, and generally to do and 
perform all matters and things, transact all business, make, execute and 
acknowledge all contracts, orders, deeds, mortgages, satisfaction of 
mortgages, leases and assignments of the same, and all other writing, 
assurances and instruments of every kind, which may be requisite or proper 
to effectuate all or any of the premises, or any other matter or thing 
2 
appertaining or belonging to me, with the same powers, and to all intents and 
purposes, with the same validity as I could, if personally present. 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of UTAH 
) 
.ss 
) 
Personally appeared before me DUANE BARNEY and signed the 
this 3L day of QCj&h^y , 1995. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MARK E. ARNOLD 
57 West 200 South #404 
Salt Uke City, UT 84101 
My Commission Expires 
January 10th, 1999 
STATE OF UTAH 
Notary Public 
3 
Wesiern 
lLmvire 
ors 
Friday, November 03, 1995 
Bruce Holman 
TRUST GUARANTEE CORPORATION 
11811 N Tatum 
Suite P-120 
Phoenix, Arizona 85028 
RE Moab Holiday Express 
Dear Bruce 
Enclosed are the basic plans and rendering for the Moab Holiday Express Mark Arnold, the 
Attorney, and myself will come to Phoenix with a check when you can confirm a closing date for 
this project and the purchase of the land in Park City We are very anxious to proceed since we 
own an equity position in both projects and I have the Holiday Express Franchise 
Norman M Larson 
J\.duis 
NT .68 , 
Pay to the 
order of_ 
?*/ls4 s&f0'£0***y' 
19 2*r 97250/1243 
t 
r \%\^^p% 
. Dollars 
For 
BRIGHTON BANK 
8«ft Itkt C*y, Utrt m 
• i ieuaossoii : u so a 51. i«« . • '0000 5 0 0 0 0 0 , ' ' 
•C S«ourty P * * « « , lie. 
21009-6M 
96/21/20 
Western 
iLmpire 
J\dxnsors 
April 3, 1996 
INCOME & EXPENSE RECONCILIATION 
FOR 
MOAB HOLIDAY EXPRESS PROJECT: 
$160,000 
6/12 Loan fees $16,000 
6/19 WEA Franchise fee $40,000 
6/21 Ann Young $ 3,200 
6/30 Park City $10,000 
9/14 Kindra Const. $ 1,000 
9/15 Trust $50,015 
10/31 Pete Lantos $ 8,500 
10/23 Jerry Young $14,400 
2/12 Greg Page $ 5,000 
2/13 1st City Cap $ 3,000 
2/13 TCA Constr. $ 2,638.45 
3/12 Ann Young $ 9,192.80 
Total $162,946.25 
NL91 
71HO C~ u: 
0</dT& 
19-<^2^» 97-250/1 
BRIGHTON BANK 
'
 f
 * is* Ul« C*y. W«h 
For sV^JrfZ^ <&?/&*.?-
j : I g»i30g503«: l l TO E 5J._k«! t»0 .t'DODD gnnnnni 
C Stcurty PrVrttr*. In©. 
Ff?Q1 : oVg-C CO. PHONE NO. : 801 4664224 Apr. 10 1996 07:32PM PI 
C $r finance & capital co. • po box 17622 • salt lake city, utah 84117 • ph. 801-466-2600 Max 801-466-4224 
April 10, 1996 
Mr. Norm Larson 
Western Empiie Advisors 
7109 So. Highland Drive, suite 201 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84121 
RE. Moab and Jerem> Ranch, Utah Hotel Projects 
Dear Norm, 
When we brought the above mentioned projects to you a year ago, to provide financing, 
you told us you could secure the financing needed to complete the projects. In addition, 
you said you would provide any additional capital needed to secure the financing in 
exchange for a share of the ownership As of this date you have been unable to piovide 
the financing, and the land in Moab, Utah is now encumbered with a $178,000 loan. 
After conferring with the other partners, we have decided to terminate our agreement with 
you to find financing for these projects immediately. In regards to your shaie of the 
partnership, you can either take over the debt on the land and release it of all 
encumbrances, thus complying with our agreement that you would provide all additional 
capital. Or you can decide to give up your share of the developments, and pa> back the 
fees you were paid on the loan and the fees paid out to your sources. You have 48 hours 
until 4.00 PM Friday April 12, 1996 to officiall) notify us in writing as to your decision 
along with the outstanding funds. 
Regardless of the decision you make about our partnership, we expect to receive by the 
same time and date mentioned above the remaining balance of the funds entrusted to your 
care with interest and copies of all checks drawn on the funds along with copies of the 
bank statements showing the appropriate interest earned on these funds. 
BN0061 ^ 
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We look forward to you compliance with our directives and to your decision on the 
handling of the repayment of die loan. All funds must be received by April 19, 1996. 
All responses and correspondence should be directed to me at the address shown on first 
page. 
Sincerely, 
cc: Bob Norman 
Duane Barney 
Mark Arnold 
BN0062 
€U° 
NOTES FROM SALT LAKE CITY TRIP May i and 2, 1996 
TRIP TAKEN TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS WITH LARSON, ARNOLD, 
PAGE, BARNEY AND HOLIDAY INN MR. LONGENECKER. 
MAY 1, 1996 10:00 - 12:45 
Met with Micheal Hughes at 9:45 at the Lobby of Marks 
building and went for coffee to discuss our case. 
Met at Mark Arnolds office at 10:00 with all of the 
principals except for Norman Larson and the Youngs. 
Question on where the $160,000 went that was signed for by 
all of the original people. Greg Page stated that Norm 
Larson would not release that information. 
It seems that the Land in Bountiful that is owned by Mark 
Arnold is somehow tied to the Moab property owned by the 
Normans and held by the Youngs. Mark Arnold said he is 
trying to free up the Norman Land. It is held by a 10195 
transfer clause but I do not know what that is. 
Pete Lanto who was the holder of the Jeremy Ranch property 
was bought out by Mark Arnold for 8,500 dollars, according 
to Norm Larson it was paid for by the 160,000 indebtedness 
that was accrued by the partnership of Normans, Rasmussen, 
Barney, Lantos signature. We still do not have a 
dissolution of the partnership of Lanto or the institution 
of Mark Arnold and Norman Larson. 
At the meeting it was stated that the money $50,000 was 
being held by Guarantee Trust in Phoenix Arizona, later in 
the day in meeting with Norman Larson it was stated that it 
was 1st City Capitol that holds the money, but the amount is 
not listed as that amount. (See attached) 
Norman Larson had already paid the $40,000 when we were 
asked to sign the paper borrowing $40,000, we learned that 
the paper stated $160,000 this was and has been a conflict 
and may never be resolved. 
Norman Larson holds the franchise, and he also holds the 
secured moneys that was secured from the Youngs. 
It was stated that Greg and Barney had looked at a building 
site to the south of Moab, before they got with the Normans. 
Apparently according to Mark Arnold, Pete Lantos is about to 
go bankrupt and the 8,500 was to bail him out. It was not 
discussed that it was paid for with the 160,000 loan money, 
Mark Arnold said he paid it. (See Attached) 
It was discussed by David Longenecker that specific things 
had to happen: 
1. That the County must say that the septic system can 
be expanded and used. 
2. And a specific document that both water and septic 
could be used for the Motel with an affidavit from the 
county (Health Inspector?). 
' ' ® Divinn-jn 
3. Also it was stated by David Longenecker that on 10-
1-95 the Franchise was given and on 2-1-96 was the end 
of the extension-
4. It must also be shown to Holiday Inn a copy of the 
following: 
a. The moratorium issue 
b. The Norman Larson Issue 
c. A request to Holiday Inn with a paper 
showing secured financing 
d. Site Control 
e. End of the quarter, and who will pay for 
further extension. ($6,000). 
f. Letter stating plans for review of Holiday Inn 
Board. 
g. And additional information to be given to Doug 
Artusio in Atlanta, Georgia for now new 
requirements as the extension was lapsed on March 
7th. 1996 
The afternoon of May 1st. 3:00-4:30 Robert, Chara and 
Diane met with Norman Larson. He gave us details as to the 
money, on stationary of his company Western Empire Advisors, 
and it was dated April 3, 1996. (See Attached) He said he 
was working on financing and possibly moving the Holiday Inn 
motel site to south of Moab, one site being Dar C truck 
plaza, and the other being Susie Tayors Branding Iron. 
He said he would get back to us and seemed most helpful 
as to where the money was and promised us that the loan to 
the Youngs would be paid off no matter weather he built on 
our land or moved to another piece and thus freeing up our 
land for sale. 
MAY 2, 1996 10:00 AM - 3:00 PM 
Micheal Hughes was most helpful, we took up most of his day, 
he tried to find us some hard money and was able to after he 
helped to get a bridge loan from SBA, and Mr. Brad Byby. He 
explained how a bridge loan worked and solved one of our 
main pressing problems of the time of no liquid cash. 
Without this being done, it would have been most difficult 
to secure enough financing to pay the monthly payment. 
Micheal Hughes was our consultant during both days and is 
now our council as to how to proceed with the continuing 
land holdings that we have and how to liquidate them. 
Faxed this 7th day of May to Micheal Hughes 355-5070 
Typed to the best of my recollect4"" 
A. Diane Norman 
P. % 7 
BN0071 
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June 18, 1996 
Norm Larson 
c/o Western Empire Advisors 
7105 South Highland Drive #202 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
f » . . » r _ _ J L T 7 . T . ' J . . . T . . _ . T? n__.r_-.rf 
Dear Norm: 
As per your request, we held a strategy/resolution meeting regarding the Moab Holiday Inn. 
We have concluded that both legally and equitably the resolution of the financing and franchise 
purchase should be as follows: 
Scenario 1—In the event you obtain the financing as previously required, you will be given an 
equal interest in the project with Duane Barney, Bob Norman, Greg Page, and Mark Arnold, less any 
agreed equity to be given to an investor. 
Scenario 2—Should you not obtain financing and either Greg Page, Duane Barney, or Mark 
Arnold obtains financing for the project, you will receive no equity interest in the project and you 
must agree to transfer your interest in the franchise to a development company to be formed at the 
time financing is obtained. 
Scenario 3—Should no financing be obtained-and the francliise lost, the group shall look to 
you for repayment of the $50,000 plus interest paid to Guaranteed Trust and/or National Acceptance 
Corporation, In addition, you will remain responsible for your share of the remaining $128,000. 
Dunnoc 
rROM : SF&C CO. PHOME NO. : 801 4864224 Jun. 13 1396 04:5GPM P2 
Norm Larson 
June 18, 1996 
Page 2 
We sincerely regret that this project has proceeded in this fashion. 
Sincerely, 
MEAAnc 
MaikE. Arnold 
Dnanrt Rnrn^.v 
Greg Page 
Bob Norman 
fij 
BN0086 
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*li the beneficial Interest and nahts / ^ ' 
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"ecured thereby, which Trust Deed u dated > O A t -T - ^ "*"*"' ^ " " k d e b t e d f l e 3 3 
R u t j i . t r (I. rtottrrvMS * C ^ -v - i ^ ' . 19'I'o ,wa3 executed by 
'0 A r Y v ^ ^ ^ ^ _ _ ^ ^ as Trustor. 
waa recorded on 0 ^ < L * 3 ^ K , as Trustee, 
or therecorci ,o f th e c 0 u l l t > nec 0 n i c r o £ & ' " ^ • « ^ , N o . q 5 W ^ . I n * * ^ ^ , , 5 w ^ 
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J 
sgpii* NOTARY PUBLIC I 
ft CHRISTOPHER L DURUNGl 
/ My Cflmmcujfl £»pri» Jin 12,2CCQ 
STATE OF UTAH 
Dated thl*3 IS7^ ***<* fiu^UbT 
y^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 'ZX^JK- U ( A 
On the £ 1 ^ day of f\\>-vi 
0/ the foregoing Instrument, who duly acknowledged to 
My Commission Expires- I//WjtrX' 
fOOMH3 1-ASSIGNMENT Of'THUST DEED-X.llr Co MW m -
^ 
ANN Yo^nC^ 
. W I J C . 
, 1 9 ^ , personally appeared before me 
.the signer... 
me that ...he execiifed,the same. 
K C L /s 
Notary; 
^ r 
August 21, 1996 
uSdersiin^H ^v C° ni l d e r a t l 0 n' A n n Y o u n cJ a n d Norman Young, the 
int^f^? f^K fw b y a s s i < ? n s ' grants and transfers all beneficial 
«Jv^f within this note, together with all rights accrued or to 
dff?^!i 2 *. h e d e e d ° f t r u s t' securing same, so far as the trust 
deed relates to the note, to: James w. Wrinkler. 
A 
Ann Young ,y
 D a t e 
Norman YoUng I Date 
& 4- ot 9 
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MARK E ARNOLD 
bCOTT L UIGGINb 
DIANA L (, \RRETT 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C 
ATTORNhYS \ND COl'NSLLORS AT LAVt 
AMERICAN PLAZM1 SUITh 404 
S7 \XhST200 SOUTH 
SALT LAkb C m UTAH 84101 I t l h P H O N t 
(HOI) 32H4333 
TACSlMlLh 
(801)32H 1151 
Kent Johnson 
230 West 300 South 
Moab, UT 84532 
Dear Kent, 
Please be advised that this firm has been retained by Pacific Development to assist them in 
the master planning and developing of approximately 17 acres in Moab and contiguous to a two 
acre parcel owned by your family Because of the location of your property it would be beneficial 
to develop it together with the above referenced 17 acres However we have been unable to make 
contact with you to discuss the possible sale or trade 
Because you have been difficult to contact, we are left to assume that you are not interested 
in discussing the same with us If this is in fact the case, please understand that it forces us to 
develop around you and because you will have no without access it will make it virtually 
impossible for you to develop your piece 
We are in the process of master planning the 17 acres, with excavation beginning as early as 
February 1997 Once the master planning is completed, Pacific Development will not amend its 
development to accommodate your parcel 
Presently, Pacific Development is in a position to purchase your property at fair market 
value or assist you in trading perhaps under a 1031 exchange, for properties presently owned by my 
client in Grand, Utah or Davis Counties 
Please contact us as soon as possible and let us know what your intentions are 
cc Randy Day r 
Jim Winkler / 
Otto Belvedere/ 
Sincerely, 
£: 
MarkE Arnold 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L C 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L C 
ATTORNEYS A N D C O U N B E L O R B AT LAW 
AMERICAN P L A 2 A II SUITE 4 0 4 
57 WEST 200 50UTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 U01 1^1=032 
' 9 M « u « « I 
15*41511 
Kent Johnson 
230 West 300 South 
Moab, UT 84532 
BN0095 
SOUTH EASTERN UTAH TITLE COMPANY 
150 East 1st North 
P.O. Box 700 
Moab, Utah 
435-259-7635 
B. Type of Loan 
1.1 } FHA 2.[ J FmHA 3.[ ] Conv. Vains 
4 [ ] V A S.f ] Conv. Ins. 
6. File Number 
50,480-G 
7, Loan Number 8. Mortgage Ins. Case Number 
C. Notc:This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are shown. 
Items marked "(p.o.c.)" were paid outside the closing; ihcy are shown here for informational purposes and are not included in the totals. 
D. Name and Address of Buyer 
JAMES W. WINKLER 
2700 NORTH US HIGHWAY 40 
HEBER, UTAH 84032 
E. Name and Address of Seller 
ROBERT R. NORMAN 
A. DIANE NORMAN 
P.O. BOX 1300 
MOAB, UTAH 84532 
| G. Property Location 
T25S, R21E, SECTION 26, A PORTION 
F. Name and Address of Lender 
H. Settlement Agent: 
South Eastern Utah Title Company 
Place cf Settlement: 150 East 1st North 
Moab, Utah 
Settlement Date: 
5/22/98 
J. Summary of Buyer's Transaction 
100. Gross Amount Due From Buyer 
1
 101. Contract sales price 
102. Personal Property 
I 103. Settlement charges (line 1400) 
104. 
105. 
j Adjustments for Items paid by seller In advance 
106. 
1 107. County taxes 5/23/98-to 12/31/98 
1 108. 
109. 
110. 
111. 
1 112. 
j 120. Gross Amount Due From Buyer 
200. AxnouDU Pmld BY Or In D«haJf oT Buyer 
1 201. Deposit or earnest money 
! 202. Principal amount of new loan 
I 203. Existing loan taken subject to 
_2Q4_CREDIT FOR PAYOFF FROM NORMAN 
! 205. 
206. 
207. 
208. 
209. 
Adjustments for items unpaid bv seller 
210. 
211. County taxes to 
212. 
213. 
214. 
215. 
216. 
217. 
218. 
219. 
220. Total Paid By/For Buyer 
300. Cash At Settlement From/To Buyer 
301. Gross Amtdue from buyer (line 120) 
302. Gross Amt pd bv/for buver (line 220) 
303. Cash [X] From [ ] To Buyer 
K 
420,000.00 
87 
648.40 
420,735.40 
212000.00 
212,000.00 
420,735.40 
212.000.00 
208,735.40 
Summary of Seller's Transaction 
400. Gross Amount Due To Seller 
121 Contract sales price 
402. Personal Property 
403. 
404. 
405. 
Adjustments for Items paid by seller In advance 
406. 
407. County taxes to 
408. 
409. 
410. 
411. 
412. 
420. Gross Amount Due to Seller 
500. Reduction In Amount Due to SeUer 
501. Excess deposit 
502. Settlement Charges to Seller (line 1400) 
503. Existing loan taken subject to 
504. Payoff of first mortgage loan-winker 
505. Payoff of second mortgage loan 
506.Payoff Linda Bohannon on adjacent property 
507. 
508. 
509. 
Adjustments of Items unpaid by seller 
510. 
511. County taxes 1/1/98 to 5/22/98 
512. Delinqunet 1996 taxes 
513. 1997 taxes 1 
514. 
515. 
516. 
517. 1 
518. 
519. 
520. Total Reduction Amount Due to Seller 
600. Cash At Settlement From/To Seller 
601. Gross Amt due to seller (line 420) 
602. Less reduction in amt due seller 
603. Cash [X] To [ ] From Seller 
420.000.00 
420.000.00 | 
380 
212000.00 
38.229.25 
412.88 
1,125.99 
949.52J 
253,097.64 | 
""420,000.00 
253,097.64 
166,902.36 
(tfoUy ravwwvt fee H U M S M I C C M M SutencM « d to 0* bti. o4 my knowiedce « 4 belief. t t U i n c w ) 
1 k»v t>^ tv t t i » copy of th< HUD-J S<u)«a««i S U M M M . 
iteMM •( »U rcctlpu tad dttbuium * fcy MM 1A IB)< U M M C U M . I Amber etrufy 
As\^ 
ycr: JAN^ES W. WINKLER 
—V— 
S e l l e r : ^ E ^ R . J * 0 R M < £ N ^ , 
BN0099 
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Page 2 
^ Settlement Charges 
700 Total Sales/Broker's Commission Based on price S (S) %* 
Division of Commission (line 700) as follows 
701 S to 
702 $ to 
703 Commission paid at Settlement 
704 
800 Items Payable In Connection With Loan 
801 Loan Origination Fee % to 
802 Loan Discount % 
803 Appraisal Fee to 
804 Credit Report to 
805 Lender's Inspection Fee to 
806 Mortgage Insurance Application Fee to 
807 
808 
809 
810 
811 
| 900. Items Required by Lender To Be Paid In Advance 
901 Interest from to (5}S /day 
902 Mortgage Insurance Premium to 
903 Hazard Insurance Premium to ' 
904 
905 
|| 1000 Reserves Deposited With Lender 
1001 Hazard insurance months (S),% per month 
1002 Mortgage insurance months (a)$ per month 
II 1003 
1004 County property taxes months (2),$ per month 
II 1005 
1006 
1007 
1008 Aggregate Accounting Adjustment 
U H00. Title Charges 
1101 Settlement or closing fee to South Eastern Utah Title Company 
|| 1102 
1103 
1104 
1105 
1106 Document Preparation to South Eastern Utah Title Co 
j| 1107 
1108 Title Insurance to South Eastern Utah Title Company 
i 1109 Lenders coverage $ 
II 1110 Owner's coverage $10,000 00 MINIMUM PER INSTRUCTIONS FROM BUYER 
I 1111 
1 1112 
1113 
|| 1200 Government Recording and Transfer Charges 
|| 1201 Recording Fees Deed S12 00.Rclcases$80 00 
J 12.02 
1.1.203 
1 1204 
1 1205 
j 1300. Additional Settlement Charges 
1
 1301 Survey to 
1302 Pest inspection to 
1303 
1304 
1305 
1400, Total Settlement Charge* 
Paid From 
Borrowers 
funds at 
Settlement 
i 
75 00 
12 00 
• W , w 1 
Paid From 
Sellers 
Funds at 
Settlement 
75 00 
25 00 
200 00 
80 00 
380.00 1 
m*H\JI^\Stnianmt$uummitad^ikehmofmykaowitd%etndUite( a u t tntt tad tcatnu u 
« copy of U« HUD-IS 
• M M AM 10 UMt MM 01 Oiy kl U of til r«ccipu tad di$bvrt€mtaii mud* •* my tcctxuu tmymtunhu trtmstcuoa f fttnixr certify 
V. MHKLM 
"he HUD-1 Settlement Statement which I 
e disbursed in accordance with this slate 
by 
Settffement Agent 
YEARNING; U is a crime to knowingly make false statement* m th~ T i~ . - J «* find and imprisonment F~^ ^ — \* < *-
Seller £b\K& WSSm^^&WU*^ 
is d true and accurate account of this transaction I have caused or will cause the funds to 
"fa 
HOLMGREN. ARNOLD S WIGGINS, LC . 
AtTc.'R>:r:vs x\ 
July 18, 1996 
. ' . 'PALI J H> xi MORE:-
v. \?.K. E -\r.xiOl 0 
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m A N A i.. r , . \ r .Rf7T 
Holiday Inns Worldwide 
Three Ravinia Drive, Suite 2500 
Atlanta, GA 30346 
Re: Extension of Franchise Agreement, Demand 
Dear Ms. Stillman: 
Please be advised that this firm has been retained by Mr. Duane Barney, Mr. Greg Page, and 
Mr. Bob Norman for the purpose of enforcing an oral agreement made between themselves and 
Holiday Inns Worldwide for the extension of a franchise agreement for the construction and operation 
of a Holiday Inn Express Hotel in Moab, Utah. 
It has been indicated by my clients that for reasons which are not relevant at this time, they 
were expressly promised that their franchise agreement would be extended for an additional 60 to 90 
days from July 22, 1996 upon their removal of Mr. Norman Larson from the franchise. Apparently, 
this was due to Holiday Inns' dissatisfaction with Mr. Larson, not only in Moab, but other locations 
as well. 
Pursuant to direct instruction from Holiday Inns Worldwide, Mr. Larson was removed, 
leaving all rights associated with the franchise left to my clients. (Please see attached letter to Mr. 
Jim Darby dated July 2, 1996). After having performed as directed by Holiday Inns Worldwide, my 
clients were then notified that the franchise no longer existed and that Mr. Larson's removal was 
contrary to the franchise agreement. From that point in time, it appears that all has gone downhill 
with both Sales and Franchise Administration departments blaming each other for the apparent 
"communication." 
Holiday Inns' subsequent position constitutes bad faith under the present agreement as well 
as an enforceable oral agreement for the extension of their contract under Utah law.1 As has been 
indicated by my clients, preliminary architectural plans have been completed and a site has been 
1
 It has also come to the Moab partnership's attention that others have been contacted by 
Holiday Inns Worldwide for the sale of the Moab franchise, but to date this has not been verified. 
Needless to say, if this were the case, it would constitute an additional act of bad faith and frilly 
explain Holiday Inns' conduct to date. 
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purchased for the Hotel, leaving only the actual funding of the construction loan which is scheduled 
to occur on or before August 30, 1996. To date, the Moab partnership has expended over two 
hundred thousand dollars on the project and they are not willing to walk away from these costs in the 
event Holiday Inns Worldwide should refuse to extend the franchise as agreed. I have been 
specifically instructed to file suit should Holiday Inns Worldwide refuse to honor their agreement. 
We have had a lengthy and beneficial relationship with Holiday Inns as evidenced by Express Hotel 
and to now become adversarial over a three month extension is unreasonable. However, should 
Holiday Inns Worldwide attempt to terminate the franchise, we would be left with no other option 
except litigation.2 
At the same time, my clients realize that Holiday Inns Worldwide has a vested interest in 
seeing that a Hotel be built in Moab. To this end, ail parties involved in the partnership are willing 
to execute the appropriate agreements to, in effect, walk away from the project and hold Holiday Inns 
Worldwide harmless for the losses incurred once the 90-day extension has expired. 
I would expect your response to this matter on or before July 28, 1996. Please judge 
yourselves accordingly. 
Sincerely, 
Mark E. Arnold ( 
Attorney at Law 
MEA/mc 
Enclosure 
cc: Duane Barney 
Greg Page 
Bob Norman 
Michael Hughes 
2
 Please keep in mind that a major reason for the delay has been the Moab City 
Moratorium placed on utility hook-ups. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT ARNOLD'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Civil No.: 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") respectfully files this reply memorandum in 
support of his motion for partial summary judgment on the first, third, and fourth causes of 
action in plaintiffs Robert and Diane Norman's (the "Normans") amended complaint. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his motion for partial summary judgment, Arnold is not asking this court to rule that he 
has no liability to the Normans. Nor is he asking the court to prevent the Normans from 
11 £AC fiAi o\OA-\rir:x70 A\CT n m iOA 
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Deputy' ~ 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
proceeding to trial or from presenting their case to a jury. In fact, it is precisely because this case 
will proceed to trial that Arnold has filed this motion. If the alleged facts are presented to the 
jury under the alleged legal theories, the jury will be forced to hammer square pegs into round 
holes. Arnold's objective in filing this motion is to put this case into an analytical framework 
that will allow the jury to make a fair and principled decision. From the shotgun approach in the 
Normans' opposition memorandum, it is obvious that their objective is precisely the opposite. 
Whatever causes of action the Normans might have against Arnold, they simply do not 
have a claim for breach of the joint venture agreement or for breach of fiduciary duty. They do 
not have a claim for breach of the Agreement, first, because it is undisputed that .Arnold was not 
a party to it. Second, the Normans have unequivocally admitted that they never consented to 
Arnold becoming a joint venture partner. Under the Agreement and Utah law, Arnold simply 
could not become a partner without their consent, and thus could not have been grafted into the 
joint venture agreement. 
There may be a disputed issue of fact about whether Arnold and Western Empire 
Advisors assumed liability under the promissory note and deed of trust when they ostensibly 
purchased Peter Lanto's joint venture interest. However, the Normans are pursuing that claim in 
their second cause of action for default of promissory note and trust deed, and that second claim 
is not the subject of Arnold's motion. The possibility of liability under Lanto's purchase, 
however, cannot make Arnold liable for breach of an entirely separate contract to which he was 
never a party. 
The Normans also do not have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because, again, they 
unequivocally admit that Arnold was "never" their lawyer and, therefore, he never acquired a 
2 
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fiduciary duty that could be breached. Contradicting the Normans' deposition testimony, their 
lawyer now asserts - without citation to the record or authority of any kind - that it is "certain" 
that "the Normans definitely were looking to and relying on Arnold to protect their personal 
interests." Opp'n. Mem. at 24. As shown in more detail below, there is absolutely no evidence -
not even a single affidavit from the Normans - that suggests Arnold undertook to perform any 
legal services on behalf of the Normans' personally. 
Finally, the Normans have not addressed Arnold's argument seeking summary judgment 
on their claim for punitive damages. In the absence of any opposition, the Court should grant 
summary judgment for Arnold on that claim. The Court also should grant summary judgment on 
the claim because it is predicated on the Normans' fiduciary duty claim, which fails because 
Arnold did not owe the Normans a fiduciary duty as a matter of law. 
In short, granting this motion will not deprive the Normans of their day in court, and it 
will not prevent them from recovering damages if they can prove such damages are justified. 
The only effect of granting this motion will be to force the Normans' to do what is required of 
every claimant in every lawsuit: plead and prove specific facts that satisfy the necessary 
elements of applicable legal claims. The Normans have not done so with respect to three of the 
four causes of action in their complaint. Those causes of action - for breach of the joint venture 
agreement, breach of a non-existent fiduciary duty, and for punitive damages - should be 
dismissed. 
II. REPLY TO THE NORMANS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Normans have provided the court with numerous documents and have alleged 
numerous facts that may be relevant to the lawsuit, but are not material for purposes of this 
motion for partial summary judgment. In doing so, the Normans have attempted to bury the 
court in minutiae that is immaterial to the present motion in the hope that the court will conclude 
that there must be a disputed issue of fact in there somewhere. So the court will not be misled by 
this strategy, it is important to note that the only facts material to this motion concern (1) whether 
Arnold was a party to the joint venture agreement; (2) whether the Normans consented to admit 
Arnold as a joint venture partner; and (3) whether Arnold provided legal representation to the 
Normans in their individual capacity as opposed to their capacity as members of the joint 
venture. By the same token, the only documents that pertain to these material issues are those 
attached to Arnold's moving papers. 
In this light, Arnold replies to the Normans' Response to Undisputed Material Facts as 
follows1: 
2. The Normans contend that Defendant's undisputed material facts 14-19 do "not tell the 
whole story." Opp'n Mem. at 5. The "whole story," however, is simply not material to the 
discrete legal issues raised in this motion. 
3. All factual allegations about the promissory note and trust deed do not pertain to the 
issues in this motion, and therefore are not material. 
4. None of the alleged facts surrounding the Young loan and the expenditure of Young loan 
proceeds are material to the issues before the court in this motion. 
5. The acquisition of the Holiday Inn Franchise is not material to this motion. 
In addition to their Response to Undisputed Material Facts, the Normans also provided 
Plaintiffs' Additional Undisputed Facts. Opp'n Mem. at 7-13. This section, consists only of 
selective excerpts from various deposition transcripts. However, none of the excerpts cited 
1
 Arnold's numbering corresponds to the numbering used in the Normans' opposition. 
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pertain to the discrete issues raised in Arnold's motion. Instead pertain only to alleged acts of 
wrongdoing, which will be duly considered at trial. 
III. ARGUMENT 
"[Sjummary judgment is proper when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 
P.2d 797, 1992 Utah App. LEXIS 122, * 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In resisting a motion for 
summary judgment, "bare contentions, unsupported by any specifications of facts in support 
thereof, raise no material questions of fact." Brigham Truck & Implement Co. v. FridaL 746 
P.2d 1171, 1173 (1987). Id Moreover, "in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the 
plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving all the elements of his or her cause of action." 
Hipwell v. IHC Hospitals. 944 F.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997). As will be shown below, although 
the Normans' opposition accuses Arnold of wide variety of wrongs, these allegations consist 
largely of the conclusory and assertions of their counsel, not citations to the record. Few, if any, 
of the wrongs asserted are "material to the applicable rule[s] of law" of breach of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and punitive damages, and none "support [ ] the essential elements" of 
these claims.." Norton. 669 P.2d at 859; HipwelL 944 F.2d at 339. 
A. Arnold Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Normans' Breach of Contract 
Claim Because Arnold Was Not a Party to the Contract. 
In the first cause of action, the Normans allege that Arnold breached the joint venture 
agreement. However, in their opposition memorandum, the Normans concede the applicable 
law: a person cannot breach a contract to which he never became a party and never assented to 
be bound by its terms. Vasels v. LoGuidice. 740 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
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(observing that mutual assent of parties to a contract is "essential" to create binding contract); 
Bunnell v. Bills. 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) ("[a] binding contract can only exist where there 
has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms.") The 
Normans further concede, as they must, that Arnold was never a party to the joint venture 
agreement. Based on these concessions alone, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on the 
first cause of action because it is undisputed that he never became a party to the agreement he is 
accused of breaching. 
Unable to identify any facts or law to satisfy the first and most fundamental element of a 
breach of contract claim, the Normans ask the court to overlook that fatal defect for three 
reasons. 
First, the Normans assert the complete non-sequitur that Arnold's alleged unclean hands 
somehow compensate for the fact that he was never a party to the joint venture agreement. 
Specifically, they allege that: 
Defendant's claim that he is entitled to Summary Judgment 
because the Normans never consented to his entry in the joint 
venture is untenable. Plaintiffs will produce evidence from which 
a jury would be entitled to believe that Arnold was double-dealing 
and self-dealing, both as counsel for and as a member of the joint 
venture from its inception. 
Opp'n. Mem. at 16. Even assuming all of the alleged bad acts are true, however, the law simply 
does not provide an unclean hands exception to the rule that a person cannot breach a contract to 
which he is not a party. That, of course, is why the Normans have not cited any authority for this 
theory. The alleged bad acts may be actionable under some other legal theory, but they do not 
make Arnold a party to the joint venture agreement. 
6 
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Second, the Normans claim that Arnold somehow became a party to the joint venture 
agreement because he and Western Empire Advisors entered into a "Purchase Agreement" with 
Peter Lanto, one of the joint venture partners. Under that purchase agreement, Arnold and 
Western Empire Advisors purported to purchase Lanto's interest in the joint venture. The 
Normans contend that the purported purchase made Arnold a joint venture partner and, hence, a 
party to the joint venture agreement. 
This argument fails, first, because entering into the purchase agreement with Lanto did 
not make Arnold a party to the entirely separate joint venture agreement. Nor did the purchase 
Agreement make Arnold a joint venture partner. The law in Utah is absolutely clear that 
"subject to any agreement between them . . . [n]o person can become a member of a partnership 
without the consent of all partners." Utah Code Ann. §48-1-15(7) (supp. 1999). The Utah 
Supreme Court, in Folsom v. Fernstrom. 134 P. 1021, 1024 (Utah 1913), further observed that 
"[o]f course [defendant] could not become a member of the partnership without the consent of 
both [the plaintiff] and [the co-defendant], the original members of the firm." Moreover, "[a] 
partner may sell his interest in the partnership to a third party . . . but the sale does not, alone, 
make the third party a partner in the firm against the will and consent of the other partners." 59A 
Am.Jur.2d § 397. 
Consent to partnership admission is not only the law of Utah, it is also required by the 
joint venture agreement. The agreement unambiguously provides that "[additional Joint 
Venturers may be added to the Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of the then 
existing Joint Venturers" Def s. Undisputed Material Facts 1f 11. There are good reasons for 
this. In the absence of this requirement of unanimous consent, an infinite number of claimants -
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strangers to the partnership agreement - would be allowed to materialize if and when any 
partnership became a success, and to sue on their "entitlement" to partnership profits or assets. 
For this reason, if the joint venture had been a success, the Normans almost certainly would be 
arguing that Arnold is not a partner. 
Third, the Normans now claim they "subsequently learn[ed] that Arnold had acquired 
Lanto's interest and thereafter allowed him to continue to act as a partner." Opp'n. Mem. at 17. 
To the extent this assertion is intended to suggest that the Normans retroactively consented to 
admit Arnold as a partner, it is both unsupported and directly contradicted. This is a legal and 
factual conclusion that appears without citation to the record or to evidence of any kind, disputed 
or undisputed. It is not even supported by a self-serving affidavit from the Normans. Of course, 
the Normans would not and could not give such an affidavit because this newly advanced 
conclusion directly contradicts the Normans' sworn deposition testimony, taken only in March of 
this year. The Normans' depositions - as opposed to their lawyer's assertions - definitively 
establish that they at no time consented to Arnold's admission to the joint venture as a partner: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold becoming 
a partner? 
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Never. 
Def s. Undisputed Mat. Fact f 13. Moreover, Mr. Norman has testified under oath on two 
different occasions that "[n]obody asked [him] about" Arnold becoming a member of the joint 
venture, and that he never consented to Arnold's admission. Def's Undisputed Material Facts ^ 
12. 
8 
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The first cause of action, therefore, should be dismissed, because Arnold never became a 
party to the joint venture agreement or a partner in the joint venture. 
B. Arnold Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Normans' Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty Claim Because Arnold Did Not Owe Them a Fiduciary Duty. 
In their third cause of action, the Normans allege that Arnold owed and breached a 
fiduciary duty because he was their personal lawyer. Contradicting this claim his supporting 
memorandum and affidavit, Arnold provided undisputed facts and dispositive authority 
demonstrating that he was not the Normans' personal lawyer and therefore did not owe them a 
fiduciary duty as a matter of law. In opposition, the Normans now reluctantly admit that it "may 
be technically true . . . that [Arnold] was not the Normans' personal attorney." Opp'n Mem. at 2. 
The Normans further concede the law; that is, that an attorney does not owe a fiduciary duty 
absent an attorney-client relationship, and that an attorney representing a partnership does not 
owe a fiduciary duty to the individual partners.2 Notwithstanding the undisputed facts and law, 
the Normans argue that the third cause of action should not be dismissed because (1) Arnold 
allegedly committed acts of wrongdoing, (2) the Normans' interests were personally affected; 
and (3) Arnold was unclear about whether or not he represented the Normans personally. Each 
of these arguments is unavailing. 
2
 See Kibatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("an attorney-
client relationship" is an essential element of a legal malpractice claim based on a breach of fiduciary 
duty); Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24.8 (4th ed. 1996) ("a lawyer who 
represents a partnership does not thereby become counsel for or owe a duty to the partners"); Salt Lake 
Knee & Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Snorts Medicine, 909 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (joint venture is a "distinct and separate" legal entity from the individual joint venture 
partners). 
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First, the Normans "contend that [Arnold's] conduct through October, 1995 alone is 
sufficient for their fiduciary duty claim against Arnold." Opp'n Mem. at 25 (emphasis added). 
Elaborating on this theory, the Normans assert, that 
. . . the Court should keep in mind plaintiffs' theory of the case 
which is that they were set up to take the fall by Arnold, Larson 
and the rest if the venture failed. It will be plaintiffs' contention, 
supported by ample evidence that the Normans were intentionally 
kept in the dark about the conduct of Mark Arnold and the other 
parties; that Arnold knew the Normans were getting no 
information from Page or Barney; and that Arnold had become a 
member of the joint venture, but nevertheless had his little side 
deals going on with Larson. 
Opp'n Mem. at 19. Thus, the Normans are making the entirely circular argument that Arnold 
acquired a fiduciary duty by breaching a fiduciary duty. They contend that Arnold, by keeping 
them "in the dark" and having "his little side deals with Larson," violated a fiduciary duty. Yet 
they do not explain, nor can they, how Arnold acquired a duty of disclosure, a duty of loyalty, or 
any other fiduciary duty. 
Second, the Normans argue that "the basis for their claim" is that Arnold owed them a 
fiduciary duty as members of the joint venture whose personal interests were "directly impacted' 
in the course of the representation. Opp'n Mem. at 19. In support of this contention, the 
Normans cite only one case, Stocks v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 2000 Utah App. LEXIS 
46 (Ct. App. Utah 2000). This case, in fact, proves the exact opposite of what the Normans 
contend. 
In Stocks, similar to the Normans' allegations here, individual shareholders of a 
corporation sued third-party insurers for alleged breaches of duties owed to the corporate entity. 
Because the individual shareholders claimed a personal harm, like the Normans, they claimed 
10 
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that the corporation's insurers owed duties directly to them. As the Normans contend, the Utah 
Court of Appeals indeed recognized one "narrow exception" to the general rule that individual 
shareholders do not have standing to sue third parties for the breach of duties owed to a 
corporation. Stocks, 2000 Utah App. LEXIS 46, **6. The Normans quote the Stocks court as 
stating that "[a] shareholder may bring an individual cause of action if the harm to the 
corporation also damaged the shareholder as an individual rather than as a shareholder." Id. 
However, the Normans failed to quote the very next sentence of the Stocks opinion, which 
expressly sets forth the circumstances in which this "narrow exception" applies: "[t]his 
exception applies to cases in which the wrong itself is a 'violation of a duty arising from a 
contract or otherwise, and owed directly to the shareholder.'" Id (emphasis added). 
Thus, the appellate court found that the plaintiff shareholders did not have standing to sue 
the corporation's insurer and upheld summary judgment against them on this basis. The court 
found that the exception (on which the Normans rely) did not apply to the plaintiff shareholders 
despite the fact that they (1) were the corporation's "sole shareholders, directors, officers, and 
agents"; (2) were the personal guarantors of the corporation's debts; (3) had financed the 
corporation's defense in its suit against the insurer "out of their own pockets"; and (4) had 
suffered mental and emotional distress as a result of the insurer's conduct. Stocks. 2000 Utah 
App. LEXIS at **7-8. Perhaps most significantly, in the face of these facts, the court still 
refused to apply the exception because the insurer's duties "were owed to the corporation, " not 
the plaintiffs, even though the plaintiffs "were named insureds and thus [had] a contractual 
relationship with [the insurer]." Id. 
11 
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In short, Stocks affirms rather than alters the general rule that "a lawyer who represents a 
partnership does not thereby become counsel for or owe a duty to the partners." Ronald E. 
Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24.8 (4th ed. 1996); Bieter Co. v. 
Blomquist 132 F.R.D. 220, 224 (D. Minn. 1990) (law firm's representation of joint venture did 
not constitute representation of individual joint venturers); see also Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.13; 
Mareuiles v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985) ("an attorney representing a 
corporation or similar entity owes allegiance to the entity rather than to its shareholders.") 
Therefore, this second argument by the Normans - that Arnold owed them a duty because they 
were personally affected - also is circular. Even if the Normans suffered personal harm, they 
cannot sue Arnold for breach of fiduciary duty unless Arnold owed them a personal duty in the 
first place. 
Third, the Normans claim that "defendant Arnold could not state with any precision who 
he thought he represented . . . . " Opp'n Mem. at 20. Therefore, the Normans contend, there is a 
disputed issue of fact about whether Arnold represented the Normans personally. Beyond this, 
the Normans now claim that "[t]he only thing that is certain is that the Normans definitely were 
looking to and relying on Arnold to protect their personal interests." Opp'n Mem. at 24. These 
claims are both unsupported and directly contradicted by the Normans' sworn testimony. 
Because his deposition transcript arguably was unclear, Arnold filed an affidavit in 
connection with this summary judgment motion in which he stated unequivocally that "[njeither 
my law firm nor I have ever provided legal services of any kind to Robert or Diane Norman 
individually." Arnold Aff. 1J 3. Arnold further testified that "[njeither my law firm nor I have 
ever received payment for legal services of any kind from Robert or Diane Norman 
12 
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individually." Id *\] 4. Thus, there is no question of fact about whom Arnold thought he 
represented. 
Moreover, even if Arnold had thought he represented the Normans personally, the 
Normans themselves deny it. The Normans both have repeatedly and unequivocally testified 
under oath that although Arnold acted as "the lawyer for the group," he "never" represented them 
individually: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] . . . . You've told me that you believe that 
Arnold was the lawyer for the group; right? 
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Uh-huh. 
Q: [Arnold] represented the group, and do you know if he 
represented Page, Barney, or Lanto individually? 
A: No, I don't. 
Q: And he did not represent you individually? 
A: Never. 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] In the event that your interests became different 
from say Page or Barney, did you believe that Arnold would then 
represent your interests rather than Page or Barney's? 
A: [By Mr. Norman] No, I was just - as the group is the only 
thing. 
Q: Did you think about whether Mr. Arnold would look out for 
your interests rather than Page or Barney's in the event your 
interests became different from Page's and Barney's? 
A: I don't think it would be singled out - that I would be singled 
13 
out as being shown any favor, it was strictly for the group, that's it. 
Def.'s Undisputed Material Facts 1fl[ 14 and 15. 
Thus, the Normans have testified that (1) Arnold was "never" their lawyer; (2) they did 
not rely on Arnold even for communications about the joint venture; and (3) when they wanted 
representation "personally" in the joint venture, they retained counsel of their own. Def.'s 
Undisputed Material Facts lfi| 14-20. Unlike the Marguiles case where "[a]ll three of the 
[plaintiff partners] attested" that it "was their impression and belief that "Jones, Waldo was 
acting for their individual interests as well as the interest of the partnership," the Normans cannot 
even assert in good faith that they believed Arnold represented their personal interests. Having 
so emphatically acknowledged that Arnold was never their personal attorney, the Normans 
cannot now contradict themselves and, unlike the Marguiles case no attorney-client relationship 
can be implied. 
Summary judgment on the third cause of action should be granted because Arnold did not 
owe the Normans a fiduciary duty. 
C. The Normans' Claim for Punitive Damages Should be Dismissed Because They 
Are Not Available Here As a Matter of Law. 
The Normans' opposition to Arnold's motion for partial summary judgment does not 
address Arnold's argument that punitive damages are not available at all. As a result, the 
Normans' fourth cause of action for punitive should be dismissed for failure to raise an 
opposition. 
14 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Normans have Arnold and other to share in the loss resulting from the failed joint 
venture. They have cited to numerous documents and alleged facts to support their contention 
that Arnold and others are partially or completely responsible for that alleged loss. In this 
motion, Arnold is not seeking to prevent the Normans from presenting their allegations to a jury. 
Arnold is merely seeking the court's assistance in placing the factual allegations within the 
correct legal framework. Accordingly, Arnold has moved for partial summary judgment on the 
Normans' first, third, and fourth causes of action because they simply are the wrong causes of 
action for this case. 
DATED this day of June, 2000. 
SNELL & W I L M E R L L P . 
Matthew L. Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
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I hereby certify on this // ° ^day of June, 2000,1 caused a true and conect copy of the 
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Steve Russell, Esq. 
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab,UT 84532 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
James C. Haskins, Esq. 
Haskins & Associates, P.C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Norman M. Larson 
By mail only: 
Mark R. Gaylord, Esq. 
Craig H. Howe, Esq. 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & IngersoU, LLP 
201 South Main Street, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Norman M. Larson 
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ORAL ARGUMENTS 
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Date: August 2, 2000 
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Plaintiff(s): ROBERT SR NORMAN 
DIANE NORMAN 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s) : STEVE RUSSELL 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MATTHEW LALLI 
Video 
Tape Number: 00-46 Tape Count: 11:35 
HEARING 
TAPE: 00-46 COUNT: 11:35 
There has been a motion for a partial summary judgment. Mr. Lalli 
presents his arguments to the court. Mr. Russell presents his 
argument. He would like the court to award attorneys fees and 
costs. The court grants the summary judgment as 
to causes 3 and 4. There are no punitive damages for breach of 
contract only a tort claim. 
Mr. Russell addresses the court. Mr. Lalli address the court. 
The court orders Mr. Lalli is submit an order. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR. and DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD and NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 980700116 CN 
ORDER 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson 
On August 2, 2000, the motion of defendant Mark E. Arnold for partial summary 
judgment came on for hearing in this court. Matthew L. Lalli appeared for Arnold and Steve 
Russell appeared for plaintiffs. Based upon the supporting memoranda, exhibits, affidavits, the 
record hearing, and the argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The motion for partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' first cause of 
action for Breach of Joint Venture Agreement is denied because there are disputed issues of fact 
concerning whether plaintiffs consented, through their conduct, to admit Arnold as a partner to 
the joint venture. The court will fashion a jury instruction that a finding of such consent is a 
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prerequisite to establishing Arnold's liability, if any, on this first cause of action. 
2. The motion for partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' third cause of 
action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty vs. Defendant Arnold is granted because Arnold's 
representation of the joint venture did not give rise to a fiduciary duty to the individual plaintiffs 
as a matter of law. This cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. 
3. The motion for partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' fourth cause 
of action for Punitive Damages is granted because plaintiffs' remaining claims are based upon 
breach of contract theories for which a punitive damage claim is unavailable. This cause of 
action is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this / ^Kday of August, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
Lmp^K. Anderson 
seventh District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson. 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Ruling on 
Defendant Arnold's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
Civil No. 9807416 
Judge Anderson 
On August 2, 2000, a hearing was held on defendant Arnold's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. Defendant requested the dismissal of Counts I, III & IV of plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint. (I - Breach of Joint Venture Agreement; III - Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
and IV - Punitive Damages.) The Court denied the Motion and to Count I and granted the 
Motion to Dismiss Counts III & IV. 
For the purpose of making and preserving the record in this matter, plaintiffs hereby 
object to the ruling dismissing Counts III & IV on the following grounds: 
1. The Court ruled that defendant Arnold did not owe the plaintiffs a personal 
fiduciary duty since his role as an attorney was with the joint venture and not the individual 
plaintiffs. The ruling that Arnold owed the plaintiffs no fiduciary duty as a matter of law is error 
under Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985). 
Since the holding in Margulies is that an attorney for an entity such as a partnership or 
joint venture may, under appropriate circumstances, owe a fiduciary duty to the individual 
members of the entity, the issue of whether the facts of this case gave rise to a fiduciary duty on 
the part of defendant Arnold to the Normans should have been for the jury. 
2. Questions if fact precluding summary judgment exist as to whether defendant 
Arnold owed the plaintiffs a fiduciary duty outside that imposed by an attorney/client 
relationship; i.e. a fiduciary duty arising from his role as a joint venturer or partner of the 
plaintiffs. 
3. The Court dismissed plaintiffs claim for punitive damages on the ground that 
Counts I (Breach of Joint Venture Agreement), and II (Liability Under a Promissory Note) were 
contract claims for which punitive damages are unavailable. Plaintiffs assert that those claims 
are not solely contractual in nature, but also sound in tort, i.e. plaintiffs claim fraudulent conduct, 
intentional misrepresentation, and intentional interference with existing and potential economic 
relations, any of which would support a claim for punitive damages. 
4. Defendant Arnold's breach of his fiduciary duties as a joint venturer with or 
partner of the plaintiffs would support a claim for punitive damages. 
Dated this / J^dayof Qioj^s 1 ,2000-
Steve Kussell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that on the /3/May of OMSUASA- 2000, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Objection to Order was mailed, postage prepaid to: 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Norman Larson 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Matthew Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson. 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to 
Reinstitute Claim for Punitive 
Damages 
Civil No. 9807-H^ 
Judge Anderson 
On August 2, 2000, the Court granted defendant Arnold's Motion for Partial Summary 
group of individuals engaged in a joint venture to develop a Holiday Inn on property owned by 
the plaintiffs. I he Co further ruled that, since a claim for punitive damages must be based 
upon a tort and cannot be based on upon breach of contract, plaintiffs' claim for punitive 
damages also failed as a matter of law. However, the Court invited counsel to provide authority 
to the contran *•- indicated a willingness to change the in: i lling based i ipon appropriate authority. 
As stated at the hearing, plaintiffs' initial Complaint dated September 18, 1998, included 
a clain i foi pi inith fe damages | 
October, 1999. (The original and amended Complaints are exactly the same except for the 
addition of the fiduciary duty claim. References therefore will be to the Original Complaint.) 
The Court apparently believes that plaintiffs original claims were based solely on breach 
of contract. Such an interpretation misapprehends plaintiffs' claims. In fact, there is no specific 
contract upon which plaintiffs' claims are based. The statement of facts set forth in the 
Complaint alleges fraudulent conduct in the effort to get the Normans to pledge their property for 
a loan (f 15-22); intentional misrepresentation including the failure to make necessary 
disclosures; intentional diversion of loan proceeds for purposes other than the joint venture fl[24-
27, 29); and through these, intentional interference with the plaintiffs' present and prospective 
economic interests. As was also stated at the hearing, the plaintiffs have learned a great deal 
more about defendants' conduct through discovery. For example; 
1. That defendant Arnold secretly became a member of the joint venture through a 
payoff to Pete Lanto, not of his own funds, but those of the joint venture; 
2. That defendants Arnold and Larson formed another entity, Venture Properties II, 
L.C., and diverted funds from the joint venture to a competing project. 
Plaintiffs' First cause of Action is for Breach of the Joint Venture Agreement. A 
document entitled the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement was executed, but 
never adhered to. Nevertheless, the venture continued. The real "joint venture agreement" was 
simply for the parties involved to use their best efforts to develop a Holiday Inn on the Normans' 
property. Defendants' conduct is not specifically characterized as a breach of contract, and 
among the numerous acts and omissions that violated the joint venture agreement, several are 
tortious. In fact, although the Court ruled that defendant Arnold did not owe the plaintiffs a 
fiduciary duty as an attorney, it did rule that there is a legitimate issue as to whether he was a 
partner. If he was, numerous issues of fact exist as to whether he breached his fiduciary duty as 
a partner, which is in itself, a tort. The same goes for defendant Larson. 
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A "tort" is defined simply as, "a breach of duty, other than a breach of contract, for which 
the offender will be subject to legal responsibility." Webster' Deluxe Edition (1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that in some cases an act constituting a 
breach of contract may also result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract mid 
give rise to causes of action in tort. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P. 2d 795, 800 n.3 
(Utah 1985). ' vest Construction i ' I 'aimer, 886 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1991), 1 1 ic G n n t 
affirmed that tort liability is not always precluded just because there is a contract between the 
plaintn - defendant Ii i some cases, an act or omission resulting in breach of contract may 
also constitute breach of a duty that is not subsumed by the contract and may thereby give rise to 
a cause of action sounding in tort In that case, the Court dismissed tort causes of action, but 
only after finding that the alleged tortious conduct was "entirely controlled" by a very specific 
written contract. 
I he lav T of pai tnei ship ai id joii it \ enti ii e express!) ai id ii nplicitly i ecognizes that tl ic 
partners acts as agent for each other. This enhances their fiduciary relationship. Hal Taylor 
Associates v. Union America Ins., 65 71 > 2d 743. 748 (Utah 1.982), though not in the context of a 
joint venture states that, wholly apart from contractual obligations undertaken by the parties, the 
law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary obligation to their principals with respect to matters 
falling within the scope of their agency. 
A large portion of the misconduct attributable to defendant Arnold was his failure, 
intenifional in otherwise In intonii (In Norni.ms of mloim.ilion uitual lo Ilk |ninl nmlute. 
U.C.A. §48-1-17 provides that, "(J°int venturers) shall render on demand true and full 
information of all tilings affecting the joint venture . . ." The breach of this duty is a tort that 
could, under appropriate circumstances, form the basis for plaintiffs' punitive damage claim. 
While the terms of any implied contract between the Normans and defendants are 
amorphous at best, it is evident that Arnold's secret and dishonest entry into the joint venture 
would fall outside the terms of any such contract. The same can be said about the Arnold -
Larson formation of Venture Properties II, L.C., and the use of joint venture funds for purposes 
other than the Moab Holiday Inn. 
The Court requested legal authority on the issue. In DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 
P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), plaintiff suffered losses in a robbery after defendant had installed an alarm 
system and entered into a service and maintenance contract. The evidence established that the 
alarm system had been circumvented in a manner known to the defendant that could have been 
remedied by a simple and inexpensive alteration to the system. However, defendant failed to 
inform plaintiff of the potential problem and remedy. The Court recognized that a party who 
breaches his duty of care toward another may be found liable in tort, even when the relationship 
giving rise to such a duty originates in a contract between the parties {Id. at 434-35), and went 
on to hold that, 
[T]he defendant's duty to warn the plaintiff of the vulnerability of the alarm system did 
not come from any provision contained within the four corners of the contract. Instead, the duty 
as it exists in this case is derived from defendant's general duty of due care which accompanies 
its ongoing relationship with plaintiff for service and maintenance of the alarm system. Thus, 
the plaintiff allegation of failure to warn provides the basis for a cause of action in tort which is 
entirely separate from any contract based claim which plaintiff might present. Id. at 436. 
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra, the plaintiff insured brought an action 
against his insurer for the failure to settle a claim uninsured motorist benefits. This being a 
"first-party" claim (insured vs. insurer), the Court ruled that the duties running between the 
parties, including that of good faith and fair dealing were contractual as opposed to tortious. 
Consequently, in Beck, as here, the plaintiffs' punitive damage claim was dismissed. 
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However, in explaining the law, the Court made numerous observations directly 
applicable to this case which would support a ruling that the 1 km. nai is' claims som id ii 1 tort, ai id 
therefore may be a basis for additional damages including punitive damages. 
vs. insurer) and a third-party claim (third party vs. insured). 
In the third party situation, the insurer must act in good faith and be as zealous in 
protecting the interests of the insured as it would be in regard to its own. In the first party 
situation, the insured and the insurer are, in effect and practically speaking, adversaries. 
Id at 799 
In this case the plaintiffs claim that their relationship with the defendants is far more 
analogous to a third-party fiduciary situation than a first-party contractual situation. There was 
no specific contract between the plaintiffs and defendants. The parties were supposedly engaged 
in a joint venture for their mutual benefit and therefore had fiduciary duties to each othei I he 
members of a joint venture are required to protect the interests of the joint venture and 
consequently each otl ler. , rather tl i,ai i beii lg aci\ rei sai ial. 
An insurer's (joint venturer) failure to act in good faith exposes its insured (partners) to a 
judgment and personal liability... 
In essence, the contract (joint venture) itself creates a fiduciary relationship because of the trust 
and reliance placed in the insurer (defendants) by its insured (partners). Id at 799. 
In this case, the defendants had assumed complete control and authority over the funds 
secured b> plaintiffs' propeit I therefore complete authority arid control regarding plaintiffs' 
personal stake in the joint venture. 
In addition, when dealing with third parties, the insurer (defendant) acts as an agent for the 
insured (partners) with respect to the disputed claim (joint venture). Wholly apart from the 
contractual obligations undertaken by the parties, the law imposes a fiduciary obligation to their 
principals with respect to matters falling within the scope of their agency. 
(Id. at 799-800; The parenthetical additions are those of the plaintiffs.) 
Conclusion 
It is plaintiffs5 contention quite simply that the unique circumstances of this case give rise 
to duties on the part of defendants Arnold and Larson greater than those that arise from an arms-
length contractual situation where both sides are expected to be primarily concerned with their 
own interests. Though the Court has ruled that Arnold did not owe the plaintiffs a personal 
fiduciary duty as a result of his role as attorney for the joint venture, that role, combined with an 
interest as a partner of the plaintiffs is sufficient to give rise to fiduciary duties outside the 
attorney/client context. 
Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages should be reinstated. 
Dated this lf*h day of /-Ivan J , 2000. 
SteveKussell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that on the / [>J- day of Liu/i^^ 2000, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Motion in Limine to Reinstate Punitive Damages Claim was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Norman Larson 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Matthew Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City JJtak^/m01 
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Matthew L. Lalli (#6105) 
SNELL & WlLMER LLP. 
Gateway Tower West 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT MARK E. AlOULD J> 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION IN LIMINE TO REINSTITUTE 
CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Civil No.: 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") respectfully submits this opposition to plaintiffs' 
Robert and Diane Norman (the "Normans") motion in limine to reinstitute plaintiffs' claim for 
punitive damages. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Court dismissed the Normans' third claim for breach of fiduciary duty against 
Arnold at the August 2, 2000 hearing on Arnold's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The 
Court ruled that Arnold did not owe the Normans a fiduciary duty because the Normans 
unequivocally testified that they were not Arnold's clients, and because Arnold's fiduciary duties 
ran to the joint venture as a matter of law. Because each of the Normans' two remaining claims 
sounds in contract, not in tort, the Court also dismissed the Normans' dependent claim for 
punitive damages as a matter of law. 
As counsel for the Normans' correctly notes, however, in so ruling, the Court invited the 
Normans to come forward with any competent authority holding that punitive damages are 
nevertheless recoverable for breaches of contract. Because the general rule is that punitive 
damages are not available for breaches of contract, "even if intentional and unjustified," unless 
"there is some independent tort indicating malice, fraud or wanton disregard for the rights of 
others," the Normans have not and cannot accomplish this task. Hal Taylor Assocs. v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750 (Utah 1982). 
Unable to provide evidence or legal authority that would justify punitive damages based 
on their contract claims, the Normans instead argue that their complaint, amended once in late 
1998, somehow contains five entirely new causes of action - claims ranging from common law 
fraud to intentional interference with economic advantage - each conveniently sounding in tort. 
Such claims are not part of the Normans' complaint. They have not made a motion to amend, 
and such a motion could not be granted at this late stage without causing substantial prejudice to 
Arnold. New tort claims simply cannot be added by way of a motion in limine to reinstitute 
punitive damages literally on the day of trial This motion must be dismissed. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Under the guise of a Motion In Limine to Reinstitute Their Punitive Damages Claim, the 
Normans' are asking the court to grant an untimely motion to amend their complaint. In their 
motion, the Normans argue that, although their complaint contains only two claims for "Breach 
S0RENSA\SLC\138041.1 
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of Joint Venture Agreement" and "Default of Trust Deed Note," they in fact have sued Arnold 
and Larson for (1) "fraudulent conduct"; (2) "intentional misrepresentation"; (3) "intentional 
diversion of \oan proceeds"; and (4) "intentional interference with the plaintiffs' present and 
prospective economic interests." Punitive Damages Motion at 2. Not satisfied with four new 
claims, the Normans further assert for the first time that Arnold and Larson also breached their 
fiduciary duties as alleged partners in the joint venture. Id 
Even more incredibly, despite the fact that the Normans' suit is based solely on the 
March 15, 1995 Joint Venture Agreement and the June 27, 1995 Promissory Note Secured by 
Deed of Trust, the Normans now claim that the written Joint Venture Agreement is beside the 
point, and the contract at issue is a nebulous, unwritten agreement to develop the Holiday Inn in 
adherence to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Such claims present entirely 
new bases for recovery for the Normans, claims which Arnold and Larson have been completely 
precluded from explonng in discovery, from addressing in dispositive motions, and for which no 
jury instruction or a single defense witness has been prepared. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) prohibits precisely this kind of conduct. Under the 
Rule, a plaintiff who seeks to amend his complaint after the defend atit has answered may do so 
only by leave of court or on written consent of the adverse party. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 15(a). 
Although Rule 15 "tends to favor the granting of leave to amend," Westlev v. Farmer's Ins. 
Exclu 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983), the Utah courts have not hesitated to deiiv such motions 
under facts far less prejudicial than those presented here. 
In Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds, 
Meadowbrook v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115. 119 (I Itah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
district courfs denial of leave to amend where the motion to amend was made the first day of 
trial, it proposed "new and different causes of action," and defendants wc - ;M- r - ejudice "if 
3 
required to meet the new causes of action." More recently, in Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight, 845 
P.2d 250, 253-54 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion 
in denying the plaintiffs motion to amend where the plaintiff waited eighteen months after filing 
its complaint to seek leave to amend, plaintiff "should have known" of the proposed claims at the 
time it filed its first complaint, and the defendant had "already completed his discovery and 
submitted his motion for summary judgment" at the time the plaintiff moved to amend. 
Similarly, in Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P.2d 794, 798 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the appellate 
court upheld the denial of a motion to amend where the movant delayed bringing the motion 
until two weeks before trial, the reasons for bringing the untimely motion were "inadequate," and 
the movant failed to demonstrate that the refusal to allow the pleadings resulted in any prejudice. 
Thus, Utah Courts routinely deny motions to amend when made at the time of trial 
Here, however, the Normans have not even moved to amend. They merely have made a motion 
in limine -ostensibly an evidentiary motion - that seeks to completely transform the nature of the 
case they pled and Arnold has defended. Directly contradicting the claims alleged in their 
complaint, the Normans now purport to assert causes of action sounding in tort, entitling them to 
recover punitive damages. Arnold has had no notice of these claims, no opportunity for 
discovery into their merits, and no opportunity to challenge them in dispositive motions. This 
type of pleading gamesmanship violates the rules of procedure and should not be tolerated by 
this court. 
If the court takes this motion at face value - a motion to reinstitute punitive damages - it 
still must fail. The Normans nowhere identify any authority indicating that punitive damages are 
available for breaches of contract alone. Instead, the Normans primarily rely on DCR, Inc. v. 
Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), for the entirely unremarkable proposition that 
contractual relationships can give rise to causes of action sounding in tort. Arnold concedes this 
SORENSA\SLC\l 38041.1 
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point, as far as it goes. However, the argument that a relationship based on a contract can also 
give rise to claims for tort recovery between the parties to the contract in no way changes the fact 
that the Normans' complaint contains no tort claim - against Arnold or anyone else. Nor does it 
change the fact that the law in Utah does not allow the recovery of punitive damages for 
breaches of contract - even where such breaches are malicious, intentional, or unjustified. Hal 
Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750 (Utah 1982). The Normans have 
provided no factual or legal basis for allowing punitive damages based on the two contract 
claims that remain in issue. 
Moreover, the Normans also rely on Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 
(Utah 1985). In Beck, the Utah Supreme Court specifically held only that "the good faith duty to 
bargain or settle under an insurance contract is only one aspect of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing implied in all contracts and that a violation of that duty gives rise to a claim for breach of 
contract." 701 P.2d at 798. In so holding, the supreme court expressly declined the view of a 
majority of the states permitting an insured to institute a tort action against its insurer who fails 
to bargain in good faith, thus allowing insureds in other jurisdictions to recover "extensive 
consequential and punitive damages." id. at 798-99. The Normans discuss at some length dicta 
in Beck contrasting first-party and third-party insurance claims, and attempt to analogize a third-
party insurance claim with partaking in a joint venture. Ultimately, they correctly, if 
bewilderingly, conclude that joint venture partners owe each other fiduciary duties. 
Again, this is a point Arnold concedes. But the Normans have never sued Arnold for 
breach of fiduciary duty arising from a partner relations!up, They sued him for breach of 
fiduciary duty arising from an alleged attorney-client relationship, and that claim proved 
defective on summary judgment. For the reasons described above, the Normans cannot amend 
their complaint through a motion in limine to add a new fiduciary duty claim. Moreover, as 
5 
explained in Arnold's motion in limine, even if Arnold did become a partner and acquire a 
fiduciary duty to the Normans in that way, such a duty did not arise until May 1996. By that 
time, all of the acts the Normans contend Arnold did in violation of a fiduciary duty already had 
occurred. Acts or omissions that Arnold may have committed before he allegedly became a 
partner simply cannot be the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Obviously, Arnold could 
not have breached a fiduciary duty before one arose. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Normans' Motion to Reinstitute Claim for Punitive 
Damages should be denied. 
s DATED this <^>> day of August, 2000. 
SNELL & W I L M E R L L P . 
X^/^CcyJu-
Mattfiew L. Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on this day of August, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be Federal Expressed to: 
Steve Russell, Esq. 
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab,UT 84532 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
James C. Haskins, Esq. 
Haskins & Associates, P.C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Norman M. Larson 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, J 
husband and wife, ! 
j Reply re: Motion in Limine 
j To Reinstate Punitive Damage 
Plaintiffs, I Claim 
v. 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson. I 
j Judge Anderson 
Defendants. 
Attorney defendant Arnold claims it would be unfair to have to face the legal 
consequences of his conduct because he did not get sufficient warning of the exact nature of 
plaintiffs' claims. One would hope the persuasive impact of this argument would be lessened by 
the fact that plaintiffs have been hampered in their pleadings by Mr. Arnold's lies, intentional 
misrepresentations, failure to provide documents and other dishonest conduct. 
Nonetheless, he has had plenty of notice of plaintiffs' claims. Virtually the full extent of 
his 180 page deposition that led to the breach of fiduciary duty claim (prior to Mr. Lalli's 
involvement) centers on tortious conduct, i.e. fraud, conversion, intentional misrepresentation. 
To state that Arnold had no expectation of such claims is nonsense. Moreover, plaintiffs have 
claimed that Arnold is liable as a partner since the original Complaint was filed. Thus the claim 
that his breach of fiduciary duty as a partner is itself sufficient to support a claim of punitive 
damages. Arnold, an attorney, drafted the indemnification agreement at the time he bought into 
the partnership. He specifically indemnified Lanto from '"tort claims and claims on any notes for 
moneys previously borrowed totaling $160,000." Arnold and Lanto knew what he was up to 
even if the plaintiffs at the time, did not. 
Well, but - says Arnold, all of my really bad conduct took place before I secretly became 
a partner. To that, plaintiffs respond that Arnold and Larson brought all their baggage with them 
when they "officially" joined the venture. They certainly knew what they had done before. 
Quite probably, Arnold and Larson were the only partners with complete knowledge of the status 
of the joint venture and its prospects. 
Less than a week after the acquisition of Lanto's interest in the venture, defendant Larson 
sent a letter to the prospective financing source precisely spelling out the situation. 
(Arnold and Larson) are very anxious to proceed since we own an equity position in both 
projects and (Larson) has the Holiday Express Franchise. See, attached. 
Since Arnold and Larson were fully prepared to reap any and all possible benefit as 
partners in the joint venture, despite their previous conduct, they should be held accountable to 
the plaintiffs as partners for that same conduct. 
Defendant feigns surprise that plaintiffs would raise this issue at the last moment in a 
Motion in Limine. However, in plaintiffs' response to Arnold's Motion For Summary Judgment 
and in argument before the Court the plaintiffs stressed the importance of the Court allowing 
plaintiffs' pleadings to conform to the evidence. 
The issue is settled by Rule 15(b), U.R.Ctv.P., which provides, 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they have been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and 
to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after Judgment; but 
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial on these issues. If evidence is objected 
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such 
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. 
Plaintiffs contend that the issues of Arnold's tortious conduct and fiduciary liability are 
adequately raised in the pleadings. Even if they are not, defendant is fully aware of plaintiffs 
position as a result of discovery and plaintiffs' response to his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Arnold was personally aware of the nature of plaintiffs' claims prior to Mr. Lalli's involvement, 
and respective counsel have been discussing these claims since Mr. Lalli's initial appearance. 
Regardless, the presentation of the merits of plaintiffs' case will definitely be subserved by the 
presentation of this evidence. Defendant's only legitimate concern of prejudice is that the jury, if 
the claim is presented with a complete picture of the facts, will be more likely to rule against 
him. 
Plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed on any and all claims supported by the evidence. 
A defendant should never be allowed to avoid a legitimate claim, even if inadequately plead, 
when it was his own intentional misrepresentations and failure to make necessary disclosures 
that precluded the plaintiffs' full knowledge of the facts. 
Dated this J VM day of 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Mailing Certificate 
ith This is to certify that on the^ ' day of CtuyOA 2000, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Request to Schedule Oral Argument was mailed, postage prepaid to: 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Norman Larson , r n \ t 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 ty[l l-J>?'b>^l L 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Matthew Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold c\n , - 7 < 7 _ ))( (T> 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 * l r 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Wesfern 
JLnxtnre 
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Friday, November 03, 1995 
Bruce Holman 
TRUST GUARANTEE CORPORATION. 
11811 N. Tatum 
Suite P-120 
Phoenix, Arizona 85028 
RE: Moab Holiday Express 
Dear Bruce: 
Enclosed are the basic plans and rendering for the Moab Holiday Express. Mark Arnold, the 
Attorney, and myself will come to Phoenix with a check when you can confirm a closing date for 
this project and the purchase of the land in Park City. We are very anxious to proceed since we 
own an equity position in both projects and I have the Holiday Express Franchise. 
Sincerely, 
Norman M. Larson 
J\iuis 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT - MOAB COURT 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT SR NORMAN Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK E ARNOLD Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
JURY TRIAL 
Case No: 980700116 CN 
Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Date: August 28, 2000 
Clerk: claudiap 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): ROBERT SR NORMAN 
DIANE NORMAN 
Defendant(s): MARK E ARNOLD 
NORMAN M LARSON 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s) : STEVE RUSSELL 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JAMES C. HASKINS 
MATTHEW LALLI 
AMY SORENSEN 
00-50 Tape Count: 9:09 
Video 
Tape Number: 
TRIAL 
TAPE: 00-50 COUNT: 9:09 
Jurors are called, given voir dire, and 8 jurors are seated and 
given the oath. 
TIME: 10:02 AM Jurors are excused until 10:45. 
TIME: 10:03 AM Mr. Dayzie approaches the bench he advises he had 
a felony charge in 1985 in Arizona for burglary. He is excused 
from the courtroom but advised to return at 10:45 A.M. 
TIME: 10:04 AM Mr. Russell has no objection to his remaining 
empaneled. Mr. Haskins requests to look at Mr. Dayzie's 
questionaire. Mr. Haskins requests a 5 minute recess. Court allows 
same. 
TIME: 10:43 AM Court declares a mistrial. Mr. Lalli moves to go 
forward with the Motions in Limine in the file and Court so orders. 
Parr^ 1 
Case No: 980700116 
Date: Aug 28, 2000 
TIME: 10:44 AM Jurors are brought back into the courtroom. 
TIME: 10:45 AM Jurors are excused and advised they are excused 
for the remainder of this term. 
TIME: 10:49 AM Mr. Lalli argues his Motion in Limine. 
TIME: 11:14 AM Mr. Haskins gives argument 
TIME: 11:19 AM Mr. Russell gives argument. 
TIME: 11:28 AM Objection by Mr. Haskins. 
Argument by Mr. Russell. Court takes a recess. 
TIME: 1:11 PM Court back in session with all parties present. 
Mr. Russell continues with argument. 
TIME: 1:39 PM Mr. Arnold addresses the court. 
Mr. Lalli gives clarification for the court. 
2:08 PM Argument by Mr. Haskins 
2:13 PM Mr. Lalli gives argument 
2:15 PM Court grants Defendant Arnold7s Motion in Limine, 
2:17 PM Mr. Russell requests clarification. 
Mr. Russell moves to amend the complaint. 
Mr. Russell requests Rule 54B. Court requests Mr. Russell file 
motion for same. 
2:22 PM Mr. Russell requests another clarification. 
2:23 PM Mr. Russell is to file a Motion to Amend. 
2:24 PM Mr. Russell argues his Motion in Limine 
2:26 PM Mr. Lalli gives argument. 
2:48 PM Trial is set for January 16 through 19, 2001. 
TIME: 
TIME: 
TIME: 
TIME: 
TIME: 
TIME: 
TIME: 
TIME: 
TIME: 
JURY TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 01/16/2001 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: DIST. COURT 
GRAND COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
125 EAST CENTER 
MOAB, UT 84532 
Before Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 01/17/2001 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Page 2 
Case No: 980700116 
Date: Aug 28, 2000 
Location: DIST. COURT 
GRAND COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
125 EAST CENTER 
MOAB, UT 84532 
Before Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 01/18/2001 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: DIST. COURT 
GRAND COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
125 EAST CENTER 
MOAB, UT 84532 
Before Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 01/19/2001 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: DIST. COURT 
GRAND COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
125 EAST CENTER 
MOAB, UT 84532 
Before Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON 
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Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C. 
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (435) 259-7321 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs' Motion to File 2' 
Amended Complaint 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Mark E, Arnold & Norman M, Larson. 
Judge Anderson 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rules 15, 19 & 21 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, move the Court 
for an Order allowing the filing of a Second Amended Complaint in this action. The purpose of 
the amendment is to adjust plaintiffs' existing claims in conformance with pretrial rulings of the 
Court, To name the Moab Land Development Joint Venture as a party plaintiff, to add additional 
parties as defendants and to assert additional claims on behalf of the joint venture. 
This motion is supported by an accompanying memorandum of legal authority. 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
r'VFNTH DISTRIC 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that on the/__ day of ^ y£p yf/^J^ 'POOP, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiffs' Motion to File 2n Amended Complaint was mailed, postage prepaid 
to: 
James C Haskins 
Attorney for Norman Larson 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Matthew Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 
Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C. 
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone (435)259-7321 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, j 
husband and wife, 
Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to File 2nd Amended Complaint 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson, 
Judge Anderson 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rules 15, 19 & 21 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, have requested 
the Court for an Order allowing the filing of a Second Amended Complaint in this action. 
The purposes for the amendment which will be explained below are as follows: 
1. To add the Moab Land Development Joint Venture as a party plaintiff; 
2. To assert claims of professional negligence and liability as agent against Mark 
Arnold (as counsel) and Norman Larson and/or Western Empire Advisors (as financial expert). 
3. To add Eric Rasmussen as a defendant. 
4. To add Pete Lanto as a defendant. 
5. To assert claims against Lanto and Rasmussen arising under the Moab Land 
Development Joint Venture. ("MLDJV") 
. re?*- r~ 
This matter was set to be tried to a jury on August 28. 2000 A procedural problem in 
jury selection resulted in a mistrial, and trial was rescheduled to commence January 16, 2001. 
Following the mistrial the Court made a number of evidentiary ruling that materially alter and 
limit the plaintiffs' case as presently plead. 
Rule 15(a), URCiv.P. provides in relevant part that, "A party may amend his pleading 
by leave of Court; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
Rule 19(a), provides in relevant part, "A person who is subject to service of process and 
whose joinder will not deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall 
be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among 
those already parties.^ 
Rule 21 provides that, "Misjoinder of parties is not a ground fcr dismissal of an action. 
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the Court on motion of any party or of its own 
initiative at any stage in the action and on such terms as are just." 
1. Addition of the MLDJV as a Party Plaintiff. 
Plaintiffs claims in this case arise from the failure of a joint venture that was intended to 
develop a Holiday Inn in Moab, Utah on land owned by the plaintiffs. The joint venture was 
identified in plaintiffs' original complaint. Plaintiffs did not name the MLDJV as a party 
plaintiff due to: 
a. Its changing and ambiguous nature over the course of its existence; 
b. Plaintiffs' belief that the other members of the joint venture had acted contrary to 
the interests of the joint venture and the plaintiffs' individual interests; 
c. The members of the joint venture abandoned both the joint venture and their 
obligations therein; and 
d. Since the plaintiffs had solely assumed the joint venture obligation that is the 
subject of this case, any recovery on the part of the joint venture would rightfully belong to the 
plaintiffs. 
Nevertheless the defendants have insisted that the case arises, if at all, from the MLDJV, 
and the Court has appeared to adopt that position. Moreover, the Court has ruled that the duties 
and obligations of defendants Arnold and Larson run, if at all, to the joint venture and not to the 
plaintiffs individually. Adding the MLDJV as a plaintiff is therefore necessary for a fair and 
complete adjudication of the claims plaintiff has heretofore unsuccessfully attempted to assert. 
2. Addition of Claims of Professional Negligence and Liability as Agents Against 
Defendants Arnold and Larson on Behalf of the MLDJV. 
At the hearing on August 28, 2000, defendants Arnold and Larson pronounced that they 
were professionals hired by the joint venture to accomplish its ends. The Court has ruled that the 
defendants' duties and obligations, if any, ran to the joint venture. Plaintiffs, as members of the 
joint venture, assert that defendants Arnold and Larson conducted their duties negligently, and 
with intentional disregard for the interests of the joint venture resulting in financial loss and the 
failure of the joint venture. Allowing the addition of these claims is necessary for a fair and 
complete adjudication of all causes of action arising from the joint venture. 
2a. Addition of Western Empire Advisors as a Defendant 
Western Empire Advisors (WEA) is Norman Larson's Company. Though the distinction 
between Larson and WEA in the facts and circumstances of this case is in no way apparent (for 
example, Larson acquired the Moab Holiday Inn Franchise individually, and became an obligor 
on the Young loan individually), defendants insist that WEA is a separate entity and is the entity 
that actually is responsible for much of the conduct set forth in plaintiffs' claims. Further, 
defendants correctly point out that it was WEA that jointly acquired Pete Lanto's interest in the 
joint venture with Mark Arnold. Adding WEA as a defendant is necessary in order to make sure 
that, as between defendant Larson and WEA, the correct party is held responsible for any 
liability eventually determined. 
3. Addition of Eric Rasmussen as a Party Defendant 
Eric Rasmussen signed the MLDJV. See, attached. Pursuant to Paragraph 4.1 and 
Schedule A of the Agreement, Rasmussen is responsible for 25% of the losses of the joint 
venture. Defendants have wondered aloud why Rasmussen was not named as a party and 
insisted he should have been. Allowing the addition of Eric Rasmussen as a defendant is 
necessary so that all parties liable under the MLDJV pay their fair share of the losses. 
4. Addition of Pete Lanto as a Party Defendant 
Pete Lanto was named as a defendant in plaintiffs' original complaint. Plaitiffs' claims 
against him were not actively pursued based on plaintiffs' information and belief that Lanto's 
interest in the joint venture had been acquired by Mark Arnold. Still later, the plaintiffs learned 
that Lanto's interest had been acquired by Arnold and WEA, and that the purchasers had also 
agreed to indemnify Lanto for liability under the Young note, any tort claims, and any other 
claims arising from his involvement in two Holiday Inn ventures. 
However, the Court has ruled that the Arnold - WEA acquisition did not make them 
members of the joint venture since the plaintiffs, without knowledge of the transaction, did not 
affirmatively consent. Defendants insist Arnold and WEA should not be liable under the 
unambiguous indemnification agreement unless Lanto is first adjudicated as liable under the 
Young note or otherwise. Plaintiffs are uncertain of whether the Court ruled or what that ruling 
on this issue may have been. Plaintiffs contend that the contortion of suing Lanto should be 
unnecessary however, since no further evidence is needed to establish Lanto's liability under the 
note or MLDJV Agreement, and the Court has ruled that plaintiffs are entitled to contribution 
having effectively paid the note in full with interest. See, accompanying separate Motion on this 
issue. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs seek only to proceed in accord with the law and proper procedure. 
If it is necessary to add Pete Lanto as a defendant in order to effectuate the document prepared 
and signed by Arnold and Lanto, plaintiffs will do so. 
5. To Assert Claims on Behalf of the MLDJV Against Lanto and Rasmussen. 
(See, above.) 
The foregoing amendments, as has been repeatedly pointed out by the defendants, are all 
necessary in order to properly adjudicate the claims in this case. Additionally, from the 
plaintiffs' perspective, the amendments are necessary in the interests of fairness and justice. 
None of the claims are "new." Plaintiffs have been trying to get them adjudicated from the 
beginning. They were merely insufficiently or improperly plead. Plaintiffs anticipate no further 
discovery or new documents, although one never knows in this case. Should new, relevant 
documents surface, they will be provided to all concerned parties without need of request. 
Rasmussen and Lanto will have to be found and served. Though the need for discovery on their 
part is unlikely, the plaintiffs will agree to expedited discovery if necessary. If the January, 2001 
trial date has to be continued, so be it. Defendants are hardly in a position to complain about a 
continuance at this stage having already requested and received several. 
The Proposed 2nd Amended Complaint is filed herewith. 
Dated this (_^_ day of ^^Hpth^^W^,. 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that on the jj^_ day of l f ^ / ^ C , 2000, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiffs' Motion to File 2nd Amended Complaint was mailed, postage prepaid 
to: 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Norman Larson 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Matthew Lalli 
Attorney fcr Mark Arnold 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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W THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sn, & Diane Norman, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson. 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs9 Reply Re: Motion to 
Amend Complaint and Motion 
Regarding Lanto Interest 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Judge Anderson 
Plaintiffs hereby reply to defendant Arnold's memo in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to 
amend complaint and motion regarding the interest of Pete Lanto in the MLDJV. 
Plaintiffs' Motions are not at all complicated. They are, in fact, an attempt to incorporate 
plaintiffs' understanding of the Court's rulings to date. 
Regarding the Lanto Interest 
This Motion is simply designed to allow the parties to litigate what should be obvious. 
Defendants Arnold and WEA purchased Lanto's interest in the joint venture. Those defendants 
also specifically and unambiguously indemnified Lanto against "tort claims and claims on any 
notes for moneys previously borrowed totaling $160,000." (Lanto was apparently aware of the 
fact that there were several different notes in the files of Arnold and Larson.) 
1 
The fact that the Normans eventually had to assume full liability under that Note is what 
this case is about. No number of Byzantine and contradictory defenses can change the fact that 
Arnold and Larson (WEA) spent and lost the money and agreed to assume Lanto's 
unquestionable contractual liability therefor. 
Granting the Motion will allow the plaintiffs to get the liability of the responsible parties 
before the jury, assuming they are allowed to present any evidence. If the plaintiffs have to go to 
the wasteful time and expense to sue Peter Lanto in order to enforce the unambiguous and 
integrated provisions of the Lanto Purchase Agreement, they will do so, as evidenced by the 
companion Motion to Amend the Complaint for that purpose. 
Defendant's assertion that the Normans are not "intended beneficiaries" of the 
indemnification agreement is nonsense. All one needs to do is consider the actual relevant facts 
regarding the Purchase Agreement. The "moneys previously borrowed" was secured by property 
owned by the Normans. No one else in the joint venture had contributed anything. When the 
Purchase Agreement was secretly executed, everyone involved knew that if losses were incurred 
it would be the Normans who would bear the brunt of them. Indeed, the other partners couldn't 
cover their posteriors fast enough. 4-D Development (Page, Barney and Lanto), the entity that 
had hired Larson/WEA and Arnold to provide professional services, was dissolved on the same 
day the Purchase Agreement was executed. As should be clear, the "intended beneficiaries" of 
any indemnification agreement includes anyone who might foreseeably assert a claim against the 
person being indemnified. The Normans are securely within that category of persons. 
That Lanto was also indemnified for tort claims in the Purchase Agreement drafted by 
attorney defendant Arnold is illustrative that the defendants knew their conduct was tortious. 
2 
Regarding the Proposed Amended Complaint 
As stated above, the proposed amended complaint reflects the arguments (to date) of 
defense counsel and this Court's rulings. Among other things, defendants have continually 
insisted that Lanto and Rasmussen should be defendants, though never having availed 
themselves of the opportunity to join those parties themselves; that WEA is an additional real 
party in interest; that plaintiffs' claim is one for contribution rather than breach of the joint 
venture agreement and default of the trust deed note, and so forth. Arnold's assertion that the 
amended complaint "would significantly transform the nature of the case and would require a 
substantial amount of new discovery" (def memo at 3) is more nonsense. The proposed 
amended complaint contains no new facts or allegations and is significantly simpler than the 
present complaint, other than the allegation that the Normans were not to be liable under the 
Young note. In that regard, on February 17, 1999, defendant Larson testified: "/ think it was 
part of the agreement that Mr. Norman wouldn 7 be liable for any loans . . ." (Larson depo. at 
131) The Normans have a document (not yet excluded) confirming this Agreement between the 
joint venturers. 
Defendants have not yet asserted any legal theories that would prevent the plaintiffs from 
presenting this evidence to a jury. 
Defendant Arnold asserts that plaintiffs' Motion to Amend should be denied: (1) because 
it is untimely; (2) because there is insufficient justification for its alleged untimeliness; (3) 
because Arnold will be prejudiced; and (4) because the claims asserted are doomed to fail. 
Plaintiffs will consider each in turn. 
3 
Timeliness 
Plaintiffs original Complaint was filed in September, 1998. Plaintiffs conducted 
discovery and took the depositions of Arnold and Larson. In that process, plaintiffs found out for 
the first time the facts surrounding the failed venture through documents never before seen and 
forced disclosures of the defendants. Defendants essentially did nothing. Arnold in fact, was 
rescued from default by the Court. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint in November, 1999, 
to add a claim for professional liability against Arnold. Arnold requested and obtained a trial 
continuance to obtain counsel and conduct discovery. After 5 months, Arnold's liability insurer 
hired counsel who, after requesting and obtaining another trial continuance, conducted discovery 
and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The professional liability claim was dismissed. 
Through the process, defendant Larson has continued to do nothing other than threatening to file 
for bankruptcy protection. 
The case was scheduled for trial on August 28, 2000. A Mistrial was declared due to a 
juror disqualification. Significantly, the defendants refused several options that would have 
allowed the trial to go forward that day before a jury. The trial was rescheduled four months 
hence, beginning in January, 2001. Following the Mistrial the Court heard and ruled on several 
Motions in Limine, the result of which significantly altered the nature and scope of plaintiffs' 
case. 
For these reasons, even though it occurred on the day scheduled for trial, plaintiffs view 
the last round of Motion Proceedings as far more analogous to a Pretrial Hearing where the 
issues to be tried are narrowed, or in this case changed completely. Indeed, on the subject of 
timeliness, the Motions in Limine should have been heard sufficiently in advance of trial to allow 
the parties to react and prepare accordingly. As it is, the case is still four months from trial. That 
4 
span provides more than ample time for the defendants to do whatever they think they need to 
do. Plaintiffs do not plan on any additional discovery since there still is nothing different about 
the case, with the exception that much of the important evidence may be unavailable. 
The Court has discretion on the decision of whether to grant a Motion to Amend. 
Precedent from other cases is helpful, see, e^ g., Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 
1981)(allowing amended answer after the pre-trial order because, as here, the pretrial order 
significantly affected the defense and there was still ample time before trial); but the critical 
aspect of any discretionary decision are the particular facts of the'case at hand. In this case, 
plaintiffs' proposed amendment is to assert the claims defendants have argued should have been 
asserted all along. 
If the issue is close, the Rules of Procedure, "leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires" favor granting the amendment. 
Justification 
Plaintiffs have stated repeatedly since the filing of defendant Arnold's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, that the unusual circumstances of this case require that the Court be 
sensitive to the plaintiffs' need to amend their pleadings as necessary and/or allow the pleadings 
to be deemed amended to conform to the evidence. 
Plaintiffs' case is simply to seek recovery of their losses from a failed business venture 
from those who are actually responsible for the losses. The present defendants, whose conduct 
was secretive, dishonest and intentionally contrary to the plaintiffs' interests, have thus far been 
successful in eliminating plaintiffs' claims and evidence. Plaintiffs' only goal is to get the 
evidence, the whole story as it were, before an impartial jury and let them decide who should be 
responsible for the losses. 
The plaintiffs have been very straight-forward in explaining why they have proceeded as 
they have to date, to wit Limited knowledge of the actual facts due to defendants' deception 
and intentional non-disclosures, coupled with amendments necessary to adapt to the Court's 
rulings With regard to parties: The joint venture was not named as a plaintiff because it seemed 
and still seems illogical given its virtual non-existence in reality. However, if the only avenue to 
legitimate claims against the defendants is through the joint venture, there is no good reason to 
deny the plaintiffs' that opportunity Western Empire Advisors was not named as a defendant, 
because it and Larson are indistinguishable There is not even a corporate veil to be pierced If 
however, the Court has any notion to allow Larson to hide behind the entity, it should allow the 
plaintiffs to bring WEA in It has always been there Lanto was not named because the clear 
evidence shows that, not only was he bought out by Arnold and WEA, but his liability was also 
expressly assumed by them. What justification exists for allowing the defendants to escape 
liability for this objective fact? Let them try to convince a jury that they should have no liability 
under the purchase agreement. 
There was a time when the plaintiffs felt it was simply unfair to go after Eric Rasmussen. 
Well, fairness has to go both ways. He signed the MLDJV and is liable under its terms. 
Defendant Arnold will surely agree that the parol evidence rule will prohibit the admission of 
evidence that Rasmussen was not intended to be a member of the joint venture. Mr. Rasmussen 
can then try to figure out a way to deal with his brother-in-law and other responsible parties. 
Under §78-12-23, the statute of limitations for claims under a written contract is six years. The 
MLDJV was executed in March, 1995. 
The proposed amendments are necessary because the plaintiffs' case has been boxed-in 
and limited. These limitations did not occur until August 28,2000. 
6 
Prejudice to Defendant Arnold 
Let's talk about prejudice. The Court has heard the litany of Arnold's alleged misdeeds 
enough that they need not be repeated. Suffice to say however, that if defendant Arnold had 
bothered to inform the plaintiffs of his conduct as counsel for the joint venture, and, if one looks 
at the evidence, an equity partner of the joint venture, we would not be here today. The 
plaintiffs' proposed amendment states the case in the form that defendant Arnold would have it -
though having done so, Arnold finds it objectionable. It is disappointing, though not at all 
surprising, that Arnold's procedural maneuvering has as its sole aim the avoidance of deserved 
liability. 
Plaintiffs' proposed amendments will not result in the introduction of any evidence the 
defendant has not already been confronted with a dozen times. Plaintiffs do not plan to conduct 
any additional discovery if their motion is granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs are willing to 
allow the defendant all the time he wants, up to the 2002 Winter Olympics if need be, to prepare 
himself 
The only prejudice defendant faces is letting the plaintiffs have a chance to get a 
recognizable version of the facts before an impartial jury. Unfortunately for him, that is the 
primary and overriding goal of the civil justice system. 
Co-defendant Larson has made no objection to plaintiffs' Motions, nor does he claim 
prejudice. 
7 
Futility 
Defendant Arnold's final claim is that plaintiffs' Motion to Amend should be denied 
because the new causes of action fail as a matter of law. This is curious. One would suppose 
defense counsel confronted with a Motion to Amend substituting impossible claims would seize 
the opportunity to allow his opponents to hang themselves. 
Actually though, Arnold only makes the point with regard to plaintiffs' allegation that the 
other Members of the joint venture agreed to indemnify them under the Note, stating that such 
evidence would be inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. Defendant jumps the gun. The 
question now is only whether plaintiffs should be permitted to file an 2nd Amended Complaint. 
Thereafter, defendant can make his evidentiary objections and it will be up to the Court to 
determine whether the MLDJVA is an integrated document, "a final and complete expression of 
the parties' agreement" as a matter of law. If it is, then the Court can consider parol evidence 
issues. Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 866 R2d 604, 606-08 (Ut. App. 1994); 
Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Ut. App. 1987). Plaintiffs will contend that 
the indemnification agreement does not alter the terms of the MLDJVA, but rather that it is a 
completely separate agreement between individuals with regard to the completely separate 
obligation under the note. (Let us recall defendant Arnold's position on parol evidence when he 
wants to explain his signature on the unambiguous, fiilly integrated Lanto Purchase Agreement.) 
Why don't we just try the case? Even if the Court determines that the parol evidence 
rule prohibits establishing a separate the agreement of the parties, it doesn't result in the failure 
of plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law, it simply means that the ratios and percentages of liability 
have to be refigured. 
8 
The Professional Liability Claim 
This argument is classic Both the Court and the defendants have been quite clear in the 
opinion that defendants' professional duties run to the joint venture Do the defendants seriously 
suggest that they are unaware of the conduct alleged to justify this claim? They might read the 
Complaint, or more particularly the Amended Complaint The proper objection here is for a 
more definite statement, not dismissal of the claim If the Court determines a more definite 
statement is necessary, plaintiffs' will gladly provide it Defendant Arnold then states that 
plaintiffs have identified only personal losses, and not losses of the joint venture Here again, 
defendant forgets the box plaintiffs have been placed in by previous defense arguments, and/or 
has failed to read the Second Amended Complaint which alleges plainly that, "The Young loan 
was acquired for business purposes of the MLDJV, and was thereby a debt or liability of the joint 
venture " (Proposed 2nd Amended Complaint at f 31 ) 
The professional liability claim is brought on behalf of the joint venture as defendant has 
insisted it must be The unnecessarily circular argument goes like this Defendants' professional 
misconduct caused the joint venture to fail and lose at least $212,000, the Normans sue on behalf 
of the joint venture for its recovery (other members are most welcome to join as plamtiffsf), if 
the joint venture recovers, the members share m the recovery under the terms of the MLDJV A, 
however, since the Normans covered the entire loss they would be entitled to contribution from 
the other members If that is what the law requires, the Normans, on behalf of the joint venture, 
will do it 
Co-defendant Larson did not object either individually or on behalf of WEA with regard 
to this claim 
9 
Defendant Larson's Failure to Respond 
Is Additional Support For Granting Plaintiffs' Motions 
Defendant Larson did not object or respond to plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the 
Complaint or their suggestion for handling the Lanto interest. Since Arnold and Larson are 
essentially in the same boat, said failure provides additional justification for the Court to grant 
plaintiffs' Motions. At the very least, the failure to respond should result in the granting of 
plaintiffs' request to add Westaern Empire Advisors as a defendant. 
Conclusion 
With regard to the Lanto, plaintiffs will defer to the Court's decision as to whether he 
needs to be a party defendant. Given the evolved circumstances of the case, including the fact 
that it is four months from trial and plaintiffs are willing to give defendant Arnold all the time he 
wants, the Motion to Amend is neither untimely nor unjustified. The alleged prejudice to 
defendant Arnold is fanciful, and in any event, not nearly as great as the prejudice to the 
plaintiffs if the Motion is denied. 
Dated this jfyh day of ji^hmb^K^
 12000. 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., and DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD, DUANE R. BARNEY, 
PETER LANTO, ERIC A. RASMUSSEN, 
GREGORY A. PAGE, and NORMAN 
M. LARSON, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
FILE 2ND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
COMES NOW Defendant Norman M. Larson, by and through his undersigned 
counsel, and objects to the Plaintiffs' Motion to File 2nd Amended Complaint. 
While Utah R. Civ. Proc. 15(a) provides that leave to amend a pleading "shall be 
freely given when justice so requires," in Utah it is well recognized that "the liberality of 
the rule is not without limit, particularly when nothing new or of substance is contained 
in the proposed amendment." Duplerv. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah 1960). The 
resolution of motions for leave to amend pleadings are left to the sound discretion of 
the trial court. Christiansen v. Utah Transit Authority, 649 P.2d 42 (Utah 1982). In 
general, the decision whether to grant leave to amend is governed by three factors: (1) 
the timeliness of the motion; (2) the moving party's reason for the delay; and (3) the 
resulting prejudice to the responding party. Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance 
Co., 829 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah App. 1992). However, the timeliness of the motion for 
leave to amend is of primary significance. Thus, where the only excuse for an untimely 
motion is the moving party's failure to conduct appropriate discovery, the motion for 
leave to amend will be denied. Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah App. 
1988). A motion of leave to amend was denied where the moving party conducted no 
previous discovery, the opponent had completed his discovery based upon the original 
pleadings, and the motion to amend was filed only one day before the opponent's 
motion for summary judgment was to be filed. Span East Airlines, Inc. v. Digital 
Equipment Corp., 486 F. Supp. 831, 835 (D. Mass. 1980), cited with approval in 
Chadwick v. Nielsen, supra. 
This is the second time the Plaintiffs have sought to amend the Complaint, which 
was originally filed on September 23, 1998, almost two full years ago. The Plaintiffs5 
motion was filed after the first trial in this case, which resulted in a mistrial on August 
28, 2000. The Plaintiffs now seek to alter in a radical fashion the bases for their 
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complaints against the Defendants, who have completed their discovery based upon 
the original pleadings The Plaintiffs seek to add an additional party plaintiff, seek to 
add two Defendants, who were originally included in the Complaint but subsequently 
dismissed, and seek to assert professional negligence and liability claims against the 
Defendant Larson based upon his alleged status as a financial expert All of these 
claims are patently untimely 
The Plaintiffs' only explanation for their delay in seeking to amend the Complaint 
is that "[fjollowing the mistrial the Court made a number of evidentiary ruling [sic] that 
materially alter and limit the plaintiffs' case as presently plead " (Plaintiffs' Supporting 
Memorandum, p 2 ) This explanation is wholly insufficient to allow the amendments 
the Plaintiffs now propose First, the Plaintiffs should not be permitted to amend their 
Complaint merely upon the basis that they were negligent in failing to anticipate the 
Court's evidentiary rulings, particularly where it is not alleged in the moving papers that 
those rulings were in error Where there has been a substantial delay in seeking an 
otherwise appropriate amendment and the moving party has failed to offer any reasons 
for the delay, Utah courts have not hesitated, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, 
to deny motions for leave to amend Mountain America Credit Union v McClellan, 854 
P 2d 590 (Utah App 1993). 
On the merits, the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend is not well taken They 
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acknowledge as they must, that they failed to join the Moab Land Development Joint 
Venture as a party herein despite their knowledge of its existence at the time they filed 
both their original Complaint and their First Amended Complaint The Plaintiffs refer to 
the "changing and ambiguous nature" of the Joint Venture, but fail to allege the 
existence of a single fact unknown to the Plaintiff at the time the original Complaint was 
filed They assert that other members of the Joint Venture "acted contrary to" their 
interests and "abandoned" the Joint Venture but, again, they fail to assert any facts 
which were not known to them at the time the original Complaint was filed An 
amendment to a pleading is prejudicial to opposing parties where it occurs in an 
untimely fashion and after discovery has been completed See Bushnell Real Estate v 
Nielson, 672 P 2d 746, 751 (Utah 1983) 
The Plaintiffs also assert that they should be permitted to raise a claim of 
negligence against Defendants Arnold and Larson based upon the Court's ruling that 
the Defendant's duties and obligations, if any, ran to the Joint Venture and not to the 
individual Plaintiffs The Plaintiffs admit, however, that "[n]one of the claims are new" 
Plaintiffs' Supporting Memorandum, p 5 It is thus apparent that those claims could 
have been raised by them two years ago, when the original Complaint was filed The 
Plaintiffs should not be permitted to capitalize on their own failures to raise these 
obvious issues when this action was filed or, at the latest, at the time the Plaintiffs filed 
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their First Amended Complaint, particularly where the Plaintiffs have not come forward 
with any explanation whatsoever for the untimeliness of their attempt to amend the 
pleadings. 
But the most significant difficulty with the Plaintiffs' Motion is that, as the Court 
has already determined, there can be no duty owed to the Plaintiffs by any Defendant 
who had no agreement with the Plaintiffs to become partners in the joint venture 
project. Before there can be any liability, there must be consent by the Plaintiffs and 
the Defendant to become a partner or joint venturer in the project. Virtually all of the 
evidence in this case is to the effect that none of the parties at any time understood 
Defendant Larson to be a member of any joint venture with them with respect to the 
Holiday Inn project. Consequently, even if the new factual allegations in the proposed 
Amended Complaint are accepted, the Plaintiffs cannot prevail on any theory against 
Defendant Larson because, as they have previously acknowledged, they never at at 
any time consented to Larson becoming an additional member of the joint venture. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Plaintiffs Motion to 
File 2nd Amended Complaint should be denied by the Court. 
DATED t h i s ^ day of September, 2000. 
rnes C. Haskins 
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I hereby certify that the foregoing Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion to File 2nd 
Amended Complaint was served on the^V1 day of September, 2000, by mailing the 
same in a U.S. Postal Service postage-paid envelope addressed as follows: 
Steve Russell, Esq. 
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC. 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Matthew L. Lalli, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 South West Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
W iU^ 
\Thomas N. \honhpson 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, 
husband and wife, I 
Motion to Further Amend 
Complaint 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Civil No. 9807416 
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson. 
Judge Anderson 
Defendants. 
Upon further consideration, and based upon the current status of the case and defendant 
Arnold's response to plaintiffs' Motion to file a 2nd Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs, pursuant to 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, move the Court to consider an alternative 2nd Amended 
Complaint in this action. In order to be efficient, the alternative Complaints should be 
considered at the same time. 
This motion is supported by an accompanying memorandum of legal authority. 
Dated this day of ^ipk<y)n^/C , 2000. 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that on the^fr day of <fyOnjfrh*iL , 1999, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion to Further Amend Complaint were mailed, postage prepaid to: 
James C Haskins 
Attorney for Norman Larson 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Matthew Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C. 
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (435) 259-7321 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, I 
husband and wife, 
Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Further Amend Complaint 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Mark E, Arnold & Norman M. Larson. 
Judge Anderson 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, submit the following memorandum in support of their 
Motion to further amend the complaint. The purpose of the further amendment is to allow the 
plaintiffs to plead alternative theories of liability: 1) under the joint venture agreement, and 2) 
individual liability. Support for plaintiffs' request to file a Second Amended Complaint, and the 
amendments to the joint venture theories of liability are set forth in plaintiffs' previous memo. 
Argument 
Plaintiffs have attempted to impress on the Court the unusual and difficult circumstances 
presented by this case. For example, the Moab Land Development Joint Venture that never 
really was followed; the ulterior motives and competing projects of the "other group" Lanto, 
Page, Arnold and Larson (WEA); the undisclosed and conflicting roles of Arnold and Larson. It 
• i < ; < - • - -
• r:o 
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is plaintiffs belief that thev were used by the other group solely as person who had land to 
secure a loan to give the other group money for their own purposes 
Plaintiffs' original Complaint was set forth in the context of the MLDJV since it was one 
of the few documents that plaintiffs had Defendant Arnold has done a good job of seizing on 
that context to artificially restrict plaintiffs' case See, Arnold's Memo in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to File a 2nd Amended Complaint, particularly section 11(A) regarding the 
existing Complaint Plaintiffs' case, as formulated by the defendants, and as limited by 
evidentiary rulings is virtually impossible to prove 
Arnold, for example, has found great comfort in the provision of the MLDJV requiring 
unanimous consent for new partners, and argues that, as an integrated contract, the Court may 
not look outside its four corners regarding any aspect of the joint venture This interpretation is 
the equivalent of a grant of immunity for conduct that resulted in the failure of the joint venture 
and plaintiffs' eventual losses Plaintiffs have tried to explain and demonstrate that the MLDJV 
was nothing more than a vehicle to get them to pledge their property It was, in fact, never 
observed by any of the other individuals involved Consider 
1. There is not one other document which so much as mentions the MLDJV as an 
entity Where an entity is named, it is 4-D Development (Page, Barney & Lanto), in which the 
Normans were not involved, and which was dissolved on October 27, 1995 
2. Pursuant to [^1 5 and 1 6 of the MLDJV, it would have dissolved, by its own 
terms, not later than March 15, 1996 The involvement if defendants Arnold and Larson (WEA) 
continued long after that 
3. The "LLC to be created" mentioned in those same sections, was never created 
4. Duane Barney was named Administrative Agent fl[2.1). As administrative agent 
he was "to manage the assets and invest the funds of the joint venture." We know that those 
function were carried out by Arnold and Larson (WEA). 
5. According to f5.1, funds of the joint venture "will be used only for investments 
approved by an affirmative and unanimous vote of the joint venturers." We know, however, that 
funds were diverted by Arnold and Larson (WEA) to a project in Park City of which the 
Normans had no knowledge. We also know that Arnold and Larson (WEA) sent $50,000 to 
Arizona without the Normans knowledge or consent. 
6. Paragraph 8.1 calls for a joint venture bank account, with checks to be signed by 
the administrative agent, Barney. No joint venture bank account ever existed. The only joint 
venture funds were given to Larson (WEA) by Arnold. Larson thereafter had sole check signing 
authority, and testified that he always had the expenditures approved solely by Arnold. 
7. It was 4-D Development that hired Larson (WEA), not the MLDJV, and yet 
Larson (WEA) clearly took control of the financing for the MLDJV and acquired a potential 
equity interest. 
8. It was Larson, individually, who owned the very Holiday Inn Franchise that the 
MLDJV was organized to acquire, (f 1.2 and 1.5) 
9. Clearly, the nature and composition of the "group," whatever it was, changed 
drastically on or about October 27, 1995 when Arnold and Larson (WEA) bought out Lanto, 4-D 
Development was dissolved and administrative agent Barney went to prison. 
At no time did the defendants conduct themselves pursuant to the provisions of the 
MLDJVA, and that agreement should provide them no protection from plaintiffs' claims. 
Rather than providing Arnold and Larson (WEA) with an escape from liability, it would 
be more logical to hold that the events of October 27, 1995, particularly since Normans were 
intentionally uninformed, resulted in a dissolution of the MLDJ V. Thereafter, it would appear 
that there was either another unnamed and informal joint venture in operation, or the conduct of 
the various parties was undertaken as individuals. Significantly, while Arnold and Larson 
(WEA) had possession and complete control of the loan funds, the liability under the Young note 
that the Normans assumed and paid, makes no mention of any joint venture. The Normans never 
transferred their property into the joint venture. The Normans signed the Trust Deed as 
individuals, as did the signers on the Trust Deed Note. It is the testimony of both Arnold and 
Larson that the Youngs requested and obtained Larson's personal guarantee on the Note. 
In the words of defendant Arnold when asked to explain his role as counsel in the project: 
44(I) represented them all individually as a group. " (depo. at 30) "/ don V know what that group 
was. I represented them as individuals. " (depo. at 39). 
Consequently, plaintiffs contend that they should be allowed to proceed under alternative 
and/or cumulative theories. 
1. Liability under the terms of the MLDJ V. 
2. Individual liability, both in the conduct of the failed venture and under the Note. 
This has been plaintiffs' point all along. It makes no difference whether the MLDJV ever 
existed in reality or not. The loss of the money that the Normans had to assume responsibility 
for was a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Arnold and Larson (WEA). The plaintiffs 
should be allowed to get their claim before a jury. 
Plaintiffs' proposed 2nd Amended Complaint, as further amended is attached. 
Dated this Q?k day of Kt/lk^O^ , 2 0 0 0 ^ , 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT .NOKMAN, SR., & DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
PlaiiivilTs, 
v<? 
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM TN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO * URTHER 
AMEND COMPLAINT 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Civil No- 9S07-U6 
Judge Lyle R. Anderscc 
I INTRODUCTION 
In this memorandum, defendant Maik Arnold ("Arnold") is compelled to respond to the 
Mornians1 second motion to amend their Complaint ia the month aaace the first day of trial, 
winch unfortunately ended ra a mistnal. Arnold oppo&cd the first po3t-trial motion to amend nr. 
September 14,2000. Before that motion could be heard, huwevcr, the Nctnume inexplicably 
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tiled rhis second motion :o amend. Not only is this second moiion to amend procedurally 
unprecedented and unjustified, it suffers from the same, incurable infirmities as the first. 
As explained at length in Arnold's opposition to the first motion to amend., Utah law 
makes clear that both of the Normans' motions simply come too late. The Normans do not 
allege surprise or new evidence, nor do they justify their requests for leave to amend in any way 
odicr than to candidly admit that they believe their case "as formulated by the defendants, and as 
limited by the Court's evidentiary rulings/' to be Virtually impossible to prove." Plfs.5 Motion 
to Further Amend Complaint (hereinafter "Second Morion to Amend") at 2. As set forth in 
/ jnold'b original opposite. to the Norman*7 motion to amend, the Normans5 motions are 
x,ntimely, unjustified, and extremely prejudicial tc Arnold, and Arnold reasserts and incorporates 
by reference those arguments herein. 
Second, and again as before, the Normans' additional proposed claims cannot be 
incorporated into the complaint because they are futile. The Normans seek to add a new claim 
J
.bi "Individual Liability for Lob&es Incurred by ihe Joint Venture/' whatever that is, and they 
also attempt to cure defects in their pruposcd claim for Arnold's alleged professional liability" 
o the joint venture. The 'Individual Liability for Losses Incurred by the Business Venture" 
wlaim fails because no such claim exists under die laws of this or any other state. The Normans' 
modifications to their proposed "professional liability" is simply an attempt to reintroduce the 
fiduciary duty claim, which the court dismissed on summary jadgmen:, through the back door. 
Regardless of the label the Normans try to attach, they simply can't iecovcr a pcr3onal loss for 
breach of duties Arnold did not owe to them personally, but the joint venture. 
Finally, the Normans have filed an additional motion to amend before the Court could 
rule on their first motion. In so doing, the Normans have forced Arnold to respond 10 two 
motions without justification- No rule of procedure allows them to do so. As a rc&ult, pursuant 
to the Court's inherent powers to regulate the parties and litigation before it, Arnold requests that 
2 
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he be awarded his fees and costs incurred in responding to the Normans' unprecedented and 
unauthorized "Motion to Further Amend Complaint.5' 
I I ARGUMENT 
A. The Normans* Motion to Further Amend Should Be Denied as Untimely, 
Unjustified, and Prejudicial, as Set Forth In Arnold's Original Opposition. 
The Court should deny the Nonnans7 Motion to Further Amend because it is untimely, 
u ljusrifieri, and prejudicial to .Arnold. As the Utah courts have repeatedly made clear, Utah Rule 
o f Civil Procedure 15 does not permit amendment under these circumstances. These arguments 
a:e fully set forth in Arnold's opposition to the Normans' first post-trial motion to amend and 
provide adequate and independent grounds for denial. In the interest of efficiency, however, 
/anold incorporates those arguments herein by reference, rather than setting them forth in their 
entirety a second time. 
B. The Normals* Proposed Claim for "Individual Liability for Losses Incurred 
bv the Business Venture* Is Fntile Because It Has No Basis in Utah Law, 
In their second motion to amend, the Normans propose to add yet another new claim for 
"Individual Liability for Losses Incurred By the Business Venture." Second Proposed Am. 
Compl. at TJ 38-49. They allege that if the joint venture "ever existed in reality/' it was 
eventually ''dissolved" as of the October 27,1995 Lanto Purchase Agreement IdL at fl 43. 
further, although the Normans admit that "efforts to secure the Holiday Inn Development 
continued," they allege that a "new joint venture or partnership was [not] formally organized." 
id at fflf 45-46 Eventually, the Normans claim that these development efforts failed, the 
Holiday Inn franchise was lost and the Nonnans alone assumed full responsibility for repaying 
the promissory note, hi at ^  46-47, From this, and without further explanation, the Normans 
conclude that they "are entirled to recover their losses from each individual defendant in such 
amounts aa ore to be proved at trial to have proximately resulted from each individual's 
i 
conduct." W. 2t<fU9. 
In Utah, leave to amend "should be denied when the moving party seeks to assert a new 
claim that is legally insufficient ox futile." Andalex Resources, Inc, v. Mvers, 871 P.2d 1041, 
1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Here, even assuming the Normans' factual allegations as set forth 
above axe true, their "individual liability" claim simply fails to set forth any claim recognizable 
uader Utah law. The Normans r.laim that Arnold, Larson, Lanto, Rasmussen, and Western 
Empire Advisors ore each individually liable for unidentified losses "in such amounts as are 
proved at trial," but do not identify any contract oral or written, from which such liability may 
arise, nor du they identify any tort duty or standard that has been breached. Second Proposed 
Am, CompL al % 49. The Normans do not even identify the alleged wrongful conduct that could 
create such individual liability. The Normans cannot simply create new law or manufacture new 
claims. They must plead and prove this case under established legal theory. 
C The Normans' Modifications to the Propped Claim Against Arnold and 
Larson for Professional Liability On Behalf of the Joint Venture Cannot 
Cure Its Defects. 
The Normans next attempt to cure the defects in then claim against Arnold and Larson 
for '"professional liability" to the joint venture. This is simply the latest attempt to try to hold 
.Arnold and Larson liable for breach of fiduciary duty so the Normans can reinstitute their 
rmnitive damages claim and hope for a runaway jury. The Normans initially tried to hold Arnold 
liable as their personal fiduciary, but the court correctly held that Arnold was not their person 
lawyer and therefore owed them no personal fiduciary duty. Second Proposed Am- CompL, fflf 
56-89. Next, after the court granted Arnold's motions in limine, the Normans filed their first 
motion to amend alleging that Arnold and Larson were "professionally liable" to the joint 
venture, but not to ths Normans personally. However, in opposition to the first motion to amend, 
the Normans failed to identify what legal services Arnold performed or negligently failed to 
orvDirxTCA\<:r r M ^ l " * •? 
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perform, or ho^ he breached a fiduciary duty in doing so. In response, the Normans here 
attempt to "amend" their proposed amendment adding some thirty-three paragraphs of alleged 
^vroDga" committed by Arnold and Larson. 1^ Of course, the Court has excluded all of this 
evidence at the hearing on the parties' motions in limine as irrelevant to the Normans' existing 
claim*. Realleging theee fects after the date set for trial has come and gone, and even after the 
iNOiroanb have already filed one motion to amend, is nothing more than an attempt to avoid the 
consequences of the Court's ruling, 
The only damage the Normans identify in connection with 7he claim is their own personal 
loss in paying off Qic promissory note. Second Proposal Am. CornpL at 188. They do net -
and, since this is the Normals' second attempt at amending their complaint, cannot - claim that 
Arnold did or failed to do any thing which damaged the joint venture. In fact the only loss the 
Normans have ever identified in any vf their complaints hae been the loss resulting from the 
repayment of the promissory note. The Nonnans' existing complaint already contains two 
claims which seek recovery for this personal loss, and this Court has ruled that Arnold did not 
owe the Normans themselves a fiduciary duty, The Normans' proposed claim for professional 
liability "on behalf of the joint venture" is futile, and they should be denied leave to amend as a 
result 
D. Arnold Is Entitled to AD Award of His Attorney Fees and Costs Incurred In 
Opuusiap the Normans* Motion to Further Amend Complaint. 
Finally, the Court should award Arnold his attorney fses and costs incurred as a result nf 
having to oppose this unprecedented and unjustified second motion to amend. In Utah, the 
district courts are given "statutory authority to control proceedings before [them]" and they 
"possess certain inherent power to impose monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their conduct 
thwart the court's scheduling and movement of cases," including attorney's fees. Barnard v. 
WassermaiL 855 P,2d 243,249 (Utah 1993), citing Utah Code Ann. §§ ^8-7-5,78-7-17. In 
s 
Barnard, the Utah Supreme Court Jpheld the district court's order requiring an attorney who 
foiled to appear at or notify his client of a contempt hearing to pay the attorney's less of the 
opposing party. The supreme court found that such a sanction was justified beCLise the 
aitomcy's actions "interfered with the administration of justice and resulted in wasted time and 
c Toit by opposing counsel" IcL 
The Normane moved to amend their complaint and submitted a proposed amended 
CDmplaint adding new parties, claims, and allegations. Because amendments to the complaint at 
this late date would cause Arnold substantial prejudice, Arnold was forced to spend a substantial 
amount of time opposing xhc Normans' untimely motion. In response and before the first motion 
to amend was neard, ihc Noimans filed a second motion tn amend and submitted a new proposed 
amended complaint attempting to cure the infirmities identified in Arnold's opposition. The 
second motion to amend can only he treated as superseding the fir^rt, and as a tacit 
acknowledgment thai the first wa* insufHcicnt. 
The Normans cite no authority - nor can they for such conduct Asa result after going 
io substantial expense to fully respond to the Normans' first motion, the Norma** needlessly 
"^ ave forced Arnold to spend additional time and money to respond to yet another. Accordingly. 
Arnold respectfully requests that the Court award him his attorney's fees and costs in responding 
to the Normans' motion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Noimans clearly believe that the Court's evidentiary rulings have somehow 
"artificially restricted]" their case and that therefore, they are entitled to proceed under whatever 
"alternative and/or cumulative theories," they may allege. Second Motion to Amend at 2,4. hi 
fact, Arnold's opposition to the Normans' previous motion to amend and the Court's earlier 
evidentiary rulings do nothing other than require the Noimans to prove the causes of action they 
have selected, using only evidence that is relevant to establishing the elements of those claims. 
6 
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3xi cither motion, the Normans cite no authorir/ whatsoever which would allow the Conn to grant 
them leave to file an amended complaint under these circumstances. This matter is ready to be 
Uicd. 
Tor the reasons set forth herein, and for the reasons set forth in Arnold's opposition to the 
Normans3 Motion to Amend, the Cnun should deny the Normans' Motion to Amend and their 
Motion lu Further Amend Complaint. In addition, pursuant to its inherent powers, the Court 
sliould award Arnold hx3 attorney fees anri COSTS in opposing the Motion to Further Amend 
Complaint. 
DATED this J " Y "day of October, 2000. 
SNELL & W I L M E R L X * 
tf&ithew L. LaDi 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
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Moab?UT 84532 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
James C. Haskks, Esq. 
Haskins & Associates, P,C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, LIT 84111 
Attorney for Norman M, Larson 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO FURTHER 
AMEND COMPLAINT 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Civil No.: 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this memorandum, defendant Mark Arnold ("Arnold") is compelled to respond to the 
Normans' second motion to amend their Complaint in the month since the first day of trial, 
which unfortunately ended in a mistrial. Arnold opposed the first post-trial motion to amend on 
September 14, 2000. Before that motion could be heard, however, the Normans inexplicably 
filed this second motion to amend. Not only is this second motion to amend procedurally 
unprecedented and unjustified, it suffers from the same, incurable infirmities as the first. 
As explained at length in Arnold's opposition to the first motion to amend, Utah law 
makes clear that both of the Normans' motions simply come too late. The Normans do not 
allege surprise or new evidence, nor do they justify their requests for leave to amend in any way 
other than to candidly admit that they believe their case "as formulated by the defendants, and as 
limited by the Court's evidentiary rulings," to be "virtually impossible to prove " Plfs.' Motion 
to Further Amend Complaint (hereinafter "Second Motion to Amend") at 2. As set forth in 
Arnold's original opposition to the Normans' motion to amend, the Normans' motions are 
untimely, unjustified, and extremely prejudicial to Arnold, and Arnold reasserts and incorporates 
by reference those arguments herein. 
Second, and again as before, the Normans' additional proposed claims cannot be 
incorporated into the complaint because they are futile. The Normans seek to add a new claim 
for "Individual Liability for Losses Incurred by the Joint Venture," whatever that is, and they 
also attempt to cure defects in their proposed claim for Arnold's alleged "professional liability" 
to the joint venture. The "Individual Liability for Losses Incurred by the Business Venture" 
claim fails because no such claim exists under the laws of this or any other state. The Normans' 
modifications to their proposed "professional liability" is simply an attempt to reintroduce the 
fiduciary duty claim, which the court dismissed on summary judgment, through the back door. 
Regardless of the label the Normans try to attach, they simply can't recover a personal loss for 
breach of duties Arnold did not owe to them personally, but the joint venture. 
Finally, the Normans have filed an additional motion to amend before the Court could 
rule on their first motion. In so doing, the Normans have forced Arnold to respond to two 
motions without justification. No rule of procedure allows them to do so. As a result, pursuant 
to the Court's inherent powers to regulate the parties and litigation before it, Arnold requests that 
2 
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he be awarded his fees and costs incurred in responding to the Normans' unprecedented and 
unauthorized "Motion to Further Amend Complaint." 
II. ARGUMENT 
A, The Normans5 Motion to Further Amend Should Be Denied as Untimely, 
Unjustified, and Pre judicial, as Set Forth In Arnold's Original Opposition. 
The Court should deny the Normans' Motion to Further Amend because it is untimely, 
unjustified, and prejudicial to Arnold. As the Utah courts have repeatedly made clear, Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 15 does not permit amendment under these circumstances. These arguments 
are fully set forth in Arnold's opposition to the Normans' first post-trial motion to amend and 
provide adequate and independent grounds for denial. In the interest of efficiency, however, 
Arnold incorporates those arguments herein by reference, rather than setting them forth in their 
entirety a second time. 
B. The Normans' Proposed Claim for "Individual Liability for Losses Incurred 
by the Business Venture" Is Futile Because It Has No Basis in Utah Law. 
In their second motion to amend, the Normans propose to add yet another new claim for 
"Individual Liability for Losses Incurred By the Business Venture." Second Proposed Am. 
Compl. at fflf 38-49. They allege that if the joint venture "ever existed in reality," it was 
eventually "dissolved" as of the October 27,1995 Lanto Purchase Agreement. IdL at ^ 43. 
Further, although the Normans admit that "efforts to secure the Holiday Inn Development 
continued," they allege that a "new joint venture or partnership was [not] formally organized." 
Id. at ffl[ 45-46. Eventually, the Normans claim that these development efforts failed, the 
Holiday Inn franchise was lost, and the Normans alone assumed foil responsibility for repaying 
the promissory note. Id at ^ 46-47. From this, and without further explanation, the Normans 
conclude that they "are entitled to recover their losses from each individual defendant in such 
amounts as are to be proved at trial to have proximately resulted from each individual's 
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conduct." IdL at f 49. 
In Utah, leave to amend "should be denied when the moving party seeks to assert a new 
claim that is legally insufficient or futile." Andalex Resources. Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 
1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Here, even assuming the Normans' factual allegations as set forth 
above are true, their "individual liability" claim simply fails to set forth any claim recognizable 
under Utah law. The Normans claim that Arnold, Larson, Lanto, Rasmussen, and Western 
Empire Advisors are each individually liable for unidentified losses "in such amounts as are 
proved at trial," but do not identify any contract, oral or written, from which such liability may 
arise, nor do they identify any tort duty or standard that has been breached. Second Proposed 
Am. Compl. at f 49. The Normans do not even identify the alleged wrongful conduct that could 
create such individual liability. The Normans cannot simply create new law or manufacture new 
claims. They must plead and prove this case under established legal theory. 
C. The Normans' Modifications to the Proposed Claim Against Arnold and 
Larson for Professional Liability On Behalf of the Joint Venture Cannot 
Cure Its Defects. 
The Normans next attempt to cure the defects in their claim against Arnold and Larson 
for "professional liability" to the joint venture. This is simply the latest attempt to try to hold 
Arnold and Larson liable for breach of fiduciary duty so the Normans can reinstitute their 
punitive damages claim and hope for a runaway jury. The Normans initially tried to hold Arnold 
liable as their personal fiduciary, but the court correctly held that Arnold was not their person 
lawyer and therefore owed them no personal fiduciary duty. Second Proposed Am. Compl., fflf 
56-89. Next, after the court granted Arnold's motions in limine, the Normans filed their first 
motion to amend alleging that Arnold and Larson were "professionally liable" to the joint 
venture, but not to the Normans personally. However, in opposition to the first motion to amend, 
the Normans failed to identify what legal services Arnold performed or negligently failed to 
S0RENSA\SLC\142113.2 
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perform, or how he breached a fiduciary duty in doing so. In response, the Normans here 
attempt to "amend" their proposed amendment, adding some thirty-three paragraphs of alleged 
"wrongs" committed by Arnold and Larson. Id Of course, the Court has excluded all of this 
evidence at the hearing on the parties' motions in limine as irrelevant to the Normans' existing 
claims. Realleging these facts after the date set for trial has come and gone, and even after the 
Normans have already filed one motion to amend, is nothing more than an attempt to avoid the 
consequences of the Court's ruling. 
The only damage the Normans identify in connection with the claim is their own personal 
loss in paying off the promissory note. Second Proposed Am. Compl. at f 88. They do not -
and, since this is the Normans' second attempt at amending their complaint, cannot - claim that 
Arnold did or failed to do anything which damaged the joint venture. In fact, the only loss the 
Normans have ever identified in any of their complaints has been the loss resulting from the 
repayment of the promissory note. The Normans' existing complaint already contains two 
claims which seek recovery for this personal loss, and this Court has ruled that Arnold did not 
owe the Normans themselves a fiduciary duty. The Normans' proposed claim for professional 
liability "on behalf of the joint venture" is futile, and they should be denied leave to amend as a 
result. 
D. Arnold Is Entitled to An Award of His Attorney Fees and Costs Incurred In 
Opposing the Normans' Motion to Further Amend Complaint 
Finally, the Court should award Arnold his attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of 
having to oppose this unprecedented and unjustified second motion to amend. In Utah, the 
district courts are given "statutory authority to control proceedings before [them]" and they 
"possess certain inherent power to impose monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their conduct 
thwart the court's scheduling and movement of cases," including attorney's fees. Barnard v. 
Wasserman. 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993), citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-7-5, 78-7-17. In 
5 
Barnard, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the district court's order requiring an attorney who 
failed to appear at or notify his client of a contempt hearing to pay the attorney's fees of the 
opposing party. The supreme court found that such a sanction was justified because the 
attorney's actions "interfered with the administration of justice and resulted in wasted time and 
effort by opposing counsel." L± 
The Normans moved to amend their complaint and submitted a proposed amended 
complaint adding new parties, claims, and allegations. Because amendments to the complaint at 
this late date would cause Arnold substantial prejudice, Arnold was forced to spend a substantial 
amount of time opposing the Normans' untimely motion. In response and before the first motion 
to amend was heard, the Normans filed a second motion to amend and submitted a new proposed 
amended complaint attempting to cure the infirmities identified in Arnold's opposition. The 
second motion to amend can only he treated as superseding the first, and as a tacit 
acknowledgment that the first was insufficient. 
The Normans cite no authority - nor can they - for such conduct. As a result, after going 
to substantial expense to fully respond to the Normans' first motion, the Normans needlessly 
have forced Arnold to spend additional time and money to respond to yet another. Accordingly, 
Arnold respectfully requests that the Court award him his attorney's fees and costs in responding 
to the Normans' motion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Normans clearly believe that the Court's evidentiary rulings have somehow 
"artificially restrict[ed]" their case and that therefore, they are entitled to proceed under whatever 
"alternative and/or cumulative theories," they may allege. Second Motion to .Amend at 2, 4. In 
fact, Arnold's opposition to the Normans' previous motion to amend and the Court's earlier 
evidentiary rulings do nothing other than require the Normans to prove the causes of action they 
have selected, using only evidence that is relevant to establishing the elements of those claims. 
6 
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In either motion, the Normans cite no authority whatsoever which would allow the Court to grant 
them leave to file an amended complaint under these circumstances. This matter is ready to be 
tried. 
For the reasons set forth herein, and for the reasons set forth in Arnold's opposition to the 
Normans' Motion to Amend, the Court should deny the Normans' Motion to Amend and their 
Motion to Further Amend Complaint. In addition, pursuant to its inherent powers, the Court 
should award Arnold his attorney fees and costs in opposing the Motion to Further Amend 
Complaint. 
DATED this 5 T day of October, 2000. 
SNELL & W I L M E R L L P . 
Matthew L. Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on this , ^ - ^ d a y of October, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be faxed and mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Steve Russell, Esq. 
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab,UT 84532 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
James C. Haskins, Esq. 
Haskins & Associates, P.C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Norman M. Larson 
feuZ/n,^ 
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Tab 19 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT - MOAB COURT 
GRAND COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT SR NORMAN Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK E ARNOLD Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Case No: 980700116 CN 
Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Date: October 10, 2000 
Clerk: geriw 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): ROBERT SR NORMAN 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): STEVE RUSSELL 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MATTHEW LALLI 
Video 
Tape Number: 
JAMES C. HASKINS 
00-58 Tape Count: 11:19 
HEARING 
TAPE: 00-58 COUNT: 11:19 
Court addresses the case. 
COUNT: 11:22 
Mr. Russell addresses the court. 
COUNT: 11:27 
Mr. Lalli addresses the court. 
COUNT: 12:04 
Mr. Haskins gives his arugment. 
COUNT: 12:11 
Mr. Russell gives argument. 
COUNT: 12:28 
Judge takes attorney's from both sides to chambers. 
COUNT: 12:51 
Court resumes and court denies motion to amend complaint. 
COUNT: 12:53 
Mr. Russel makes request on motions. Court states that both 
parties are entitled to look at the file. 
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Tab 20 
.•-•>r".-'n;OT COURT 
Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C. 
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab,Utah 84532 
Telephone: (435) 259-7321 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson. 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' Objection to 
Proposed Orders 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Judge Anderson 
On October 10, 2000, the Court heard plaintiffs' Motion to file a 2nd Amended 
Complaint, and incorporate further amendments that were made prior to the hearing date. At the 
time it was pointed out that defendants had not filed Orders based upon rulings on various 
Motions in Limine made by the Court on August 28, 2000. In an off-record conference in 
chambers on October 10, 2000, the Court and counsel acknowledged that the case is destined for 
appeal, probably on several issues. Counsel for the plaintiffs pointed out the deficiencies in the 
current record, and the need to have the basis for the Court's rulings adequately set forth in any 
written Orders to be placed in the record. 
Subsequently, defendant Arnold submitted proposed Orders on several issues from the 
August 28, 2000 hearing and the October 10, 2000 hearing. The Proposed Orders merely state 
whether the Court granted or denied each of the various motions. No attempt is made to set for 
the factual basis or legal rationale for any of the rulings and are therefore insufficient, both in 
terms of making an adequate record and for purposes of appellate review. 
Dated this i ) ^ K day of /f> Vn h< <€ , 2000. 
sfi . 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that on the £t ^day of VCUJI^^X^ , 2000, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Objection to Proposed Orders was mailed, postage prepaid to: 
James C. Has kins 
Attorney for Norman Larson 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr, Matthew Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Tab 21 
Matthew L. Lalli (6105) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark Arnold 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR. and DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD and NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 980700116 CN 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson 
On October 10, 2000, the following motions of plaintiffs Robert and Diane Norman came 
on for hearing in this Court: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Second Amended Complaint; 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion Regarding Lanto Interest; and 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Further Amend Complaint; 
Matthew L. Lalli appeared for defendant Mark Arnold and Steve Russell appeared for the 
plaintiffs. Based upon the supporting memoranda, exhibits, affidavits, the record hearing, and 
the argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing 
SORJENSA\SLC\l 42996.1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Second Amended Complaint is denied; 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion Regarding Lanto Interest is denied; and 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Further Amend Complaint is denied. 
DATED thisfrftv day of Gteteber , 2000. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
BY THE COURT: 
G J T - E ^ , , 
^ c Or xiyr ^~ 
e R. Anderson n 
eventh District Coftrt JUdge- j 
! \ 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
fames C. Haskins 
Attorney for Norman M. Larson 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980700116 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
Dated this / day of 
METHOD 
Mail 
Mail 
Mail 
// A^A^m^H^— 
< 
NAME 
JAMES C. HASKINS 
ATTORNEY 
357 South 200 East 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
MATTHEW LALLI 
ATTORNEY 
15 W. S TEMPLE, STE 1200 
GATEWAY TOWER WEST 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
STEVE RUSSELL 
ATTORNEY 
729 Bartlett circle 
Moab UT 84532 
, 20^70 . 
JvU /^7*^M^^ 
Deputy CourtIClerk • ; 
"'A 
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Matthew L. Lalli (6105) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 -1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark Arnold 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR. and DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD and NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 980700116 CN 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson 
On August 28, 2000, Defendant Mark E. Arnold's Motion in Limine came on for hearing 
in this Court. Matthew L. Lalli appeared for Mark Arnold and Steve Russell appeared for 
plaintiffs. Based upon the supporting memoranda, exhibits, affidavits, the record hearing, and 
the argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing 
SORENSA\SLC\ 143005.1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
Defendant Mark E. Arnold's Motion in Limine seeking the exclusion of evidence, 
argument or comment concerning : 1) the terms of the Young loan; (2) the Park City 
development and the formation of Venture Properties II; (3) the preparation of or representations 
about the trust deed and note; (4) the expenditure of loan proceeds; and (5) Arnold's relationship 
with Jim Winkler, is granted. 
DATED this £<fL day of (A#ber , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: ^rr:—._ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
R. Anderson I I 
Seventh District Court Judge 
\ * ' & • • • - . .
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•:> If 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
les C. Haskms 
Attorney for Norman M. Larson 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980700116 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JAMES C. HASKINS 
ATTORNEY 
357 South 200 East 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mail MATTHEW LALLI 
ATTORNEY 
15 W. S TEMPLE, STE 1200 
GATEWAY TOWER WEST 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Mail STEVE RUSSELL 
ATTORNEY 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab UT 84532 
Dated this / ~ day of // tv^^rv^f-o^, , 20 01> 
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Matthew L.Lalli (6105) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark Arnold 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR. and DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD and NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 980700116 CN 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson 
On August 28, 2000, the following motions came on for hearing in this Court: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine to Reinstitute Claim for Punitive Damages; 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine Re: Interest, Attorney's Fees and Costs; 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine to Require Production of Documents; and 
4. Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine Request to Use Hearsay Evidence; 
Matthew L. Lalli appeared for defendant Mark Arnold and Steve Russell appeared for the 
plaintiffs. Based upon the supporting memoranda, exhibits, affidavits, the record hearing, and 
the argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing 
SORENSA\SLC\l 43019 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine to Reinstitute Claim for Punitive Damages is denied; 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine Re: Interest, Attorney's Fees and Costs is denied; 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine to Require Production of Documents is denied and 
any evidence of or testimony about the bankruptcies of Greg Page and Duane Barney will not be 
presented to the jury; and 
4. Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine Request to Use Hearsay Evidence is granted on the 
ground that the evidence which the plaintiffs seek to admit therein, if not offered for its truth, is 
non-hearsay. 
DATED this V^ day of Qetober, 2000. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
BY THE COURT 
n 
w 
Lyre R. Anderson *.* 
Seventh District CourtUfudge 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
ames C. Haskins 
Attorney for Norman M Larson 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980700116 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JAMES C. RASKINS 
ATTORNEY 
357 South 200 East 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mail MATTHEW LALLI 
ATTORNEY 
15 W. S TEMPLE, STE 1200 
GATEWAY TOWER WEST 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Mail STEVE RUSSELL 
ATTORNEY 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab UT 84532 
7^ 
Dated this V day of /*? /QV^MC^ 20 & ° . 
Deputy Cowct Jfcl^rkr H % 
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James C. Haskins (#1406) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-0234 
Facsimile: (801)539-5210 
Attorneys for Defendant Norman M. Larson 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., and DIANE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
NORMAN, husband and wife, JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. Civil No. 9807-116 
MARK E. ARNOLD, DUANE R. BARNEY, 
PETER LANTO, ERIC A. RASMUSSEN, 
GREGORY A. PAGE, and NORMAN 
M. LARSON, 
Defendants. Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant Norman M. Larson, by and through his undersigned counsel here, 
and pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56, moves this Court for summary 
judgment with respect to the remaining issues herein. The remaining issues are 
whether Defendant Larson is in breach of a joint venture agreement, and whether the 
Defendant Larson is liable on the alleged default of a promissory note. There is simply 
no support for the material allegations of the First Amended Complaint with respect to 
these issues; and thus there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to 
either of them. 
A supporting memorandum is submitted herewith. 
A^CKV 
DATED this > day of ectobefr2000. 
ames C. Haskins 
Attorney for Defendant 
Norman M. Larson 
Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment 
was served on the "^"^ day of,Octt5ber, 2000, by mailing the same in U.S. Postal 
Service postage paid envelopes addressed as follows. 
Matthew L. Lalli, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Steve Russell, Esq. 
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER P.C. 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, Utah 84532 
i M 4 ^ 
fhomas N. Thompson/ 
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James C. Haskins (#1406) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-0234 
Facsimile: (801)539-5210 
Attorneys for Defendant Norman M. Larson 
, v_5Bfe^ 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., and DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD, DUANE R. BARNEY, 
PETER LANTO, ERIC A. RASMUSSEN, 
GREGORY A. PAGE, and NORMAN 
M. LARSON, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT NORMAN 
M. LARSON'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiffs were the owners of 8.33 acres of realty located adjacent to 
North Highway 191 in Grand County, Utah. They operate a water park adjacent to this 
property. (Complaint, ffij 5, 6,13.) 
2. In 1995, the Plaintiffs met with Duane Barney, who is not a defendant 
herein, in Spanish Fork, Utah, to discuss a potential development project for a Holiday 
Inn to be located in Moab, Utah. Mr. Barney was then running a Holiday Inn Express in 
Spanish Fork. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo, p. 13-14, 21.) 
3. Mr. Barney advised Plaintiff Robert Norman that he had contacts, among 
whom he named Greg Page, and said that he had put together a proposal to construct 
another Holiday Inn in Spanish Fork, and that he could assist the Plaintiffs in doing the 
same thing in Moab. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo, p. 14-15.) 
4. Greg Page is not a party herein. 
5. Subsequently, at a second meeting in Moab, Utah, Plaintiff Robert 
Norman met with Duane Barney, Greg Page, and Peter Lanto, to discuss the 
development proposal. Mr. Lanto was going to be the builder on the project. (Exhibit 
G, Norman Depo, p. 16-18.) 
6. Peter Lanto is not a party herein. 
7 Plaintiff Robert Norman made a series of cross-sections across the 
property and provided those cross-sections to Mr. Lanto. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo, p. 
18.) 
8. For reasons which Plaintiff Robert Norman did not comprehend, it was 
Plaintiff Norman's understanding that Eric Rasmussen — Greg Page's brother in law — 
would become a member of the venture in lieu of Greg Page. (Exhibit G, Norman 
Depo, p. 18.) 
Page 2 
9 Eric Rasmussen is not a party herein 
10 Greg Page proposed that the parties enter into an agreement for the 
development of the Holiday Inn, prepared such an agreement, and submitted it to 
Plaintiff Norman (Exhibit G, Norman Depo, p 19 ) 
11 Greg Page and Peter Lanto represented that they were affiliated with an 
entity called 4-D Development (Exhibit G, Norman Depo p 22 ) 
12 4-D Development is not a party herein 
13 The Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement ("the Joint 
Venture Agreement") is dated March 15, 1995 The parties to the Joint Venture 
Agreement were Plaintiff Robert R Norman, Sr, Plaintiff A Diane Norman, Duane R 
Barney, Peter Lanto, and Eric A Rasmussen Pursuant to the Joint Venture 
agreement, the Plaintiffs contributed the 8 33 acres of realty referred to m paragraph 1 
above, to the joint venture (Exhibit A, Complaint, U 13 ) 
14 The Moab Land Development Joint Venture is not a party herein 
15 The Joint Venture Agreement contains, inter alia, the following provisions 
U . Additional Joint Ventures 
Additional Joint Venturers may be added to the Joint Venture at any time 
upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint Venturers 
3J_ Capital Contribution 
Page 3 
Each Joint Venturer shall made a contribution(s) to the Joint Ventrue in 
cash, property or expertise. The percentage ownership for the Hotel 
Development is shown in Schedule A, the percentage ownership for any 
other projects utilizing the remaining land and artesian well is shown in 
Schedule B. In the event additional capital is required to finance any 
project development, the Administrative Agent has the right to sell a 
portion of the development to secure the needed capital for such project 
by an unanimous affirmative vote of the Joint Venturers. 
4.1 Allocations 
All profits and losses of the Joint Venture shall be allocated among the 
Joint Venturers in accordance with their relative contributions as set forth 
on Schedules 'A' and 'B' attached hereto. 
8.6 Amendments 
This Agreement may be amended in writing only. All amendments must 
be approved by the Joint Ventures5 unanimous decision. 
(Exhibit A.) 
16. The individuals who signed the Joint Venture Agreement represented all 
of the members of the Joint Venture. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo., p. 27) Those 
members did not include Defendant Norman M. Larson. 
17. Plaintiff Robert Norman never gave his consent to the addition of any joint 
venturers other than the original joint venturers. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo. p. 28-29; 
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18 At some point in the Spring of 1995, Plaintiff Robert Norman learned that 
Defendant Larson would be involved in the financing of the project (Norman Deop pp 
33 35) 
19 As part of the financing for the transaction, the Plaintiffs executed a 
deed of trust on the realty underlying the project in favor of Ann and Norman Young, 
who loaned the venture $160,000 00 (Exhibit B ) 
20 A promissory note in the amount of $160,000 00, and secured by a deed 
of trust on the realty underlying the project, was executed in favor of Ann and Norman 
Young and signed by Plaintiff Robert R Norman, Plaintiff A Diane Norman, Duane R 
Barney, Peter O Lanto, Gregory A Page, and Defendant Norman M Larson (Exhibit 
C) 
21 Plaintiff Robert R Norman did not read the deed of trust or the promissory 
note referred to in paragraphs 19 and 20, above He was advised by Greg Page that 
the purpose was to secure a franchise for the proposed Holiday Inn development, 
which would cost $40,000 00 (Exhibit G, Norman Depo , pp 37-40 ) 
22 Plaintiff Robert Norman telephoned Ann Young, who told him that she 
was interested in getting the motel project going and that she would work with them in 
any way to achieve that goal Plaintiff Robert Norman concluded that Ms Young would 
work with them in any way she could (Exhibit G, Norman Depo , pp 46-47 ) 
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23 In connection with the Plaintiffs' participation in the joint venture, Greg 
Page was their principal contact (Exhibit G, Norman Depo , p 61-62, 75 ) 
24 On May 9, 1996, Defendant Larson, as President of Western Empire 
Advisers, Inc ("WEA"), wrote to the Plaintiffs and proposed, inter alia, that his 
company, WEA, "pay off the hen of $160,000 00 that presently exists on the land 
designated for the motel," that WEA "provide the financing for the construction of the 
motel and refinancing and improvements of [the Plaintiffs'] water park" and provide 
other services related to the construction of the motel if WEA were permitted to "joint 
venture the [Plaintiffs'] Waterpark and the development and construction of a 50 to 80 
room motel to be located adjacent to the water park and on property presently owned 
by Mr & Mrs Norman " The Plaintiffs did not respond to this proposal (Exhibit D, 
Exhibit G, Norman Depo, pp 89-90 ) 
25 WEA is not a party herein 
26 The Plaintiffs at no time had any agreements with Defendant Larson 
(Exhibit G, Norman Depo, p 91 ) 
27 On or about June 27, 1995, Ann Young and Norman Young assigned to 
James W Winkler their interest in the promissory note and trust deed referenced in 
paragraphs 19 and 20, above (Exhibit E ) 
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28 On May 22, 1998, James W. Winkler purchased a substantial portion of 
the property of the Plaintiffs referred to in paragraph 1, above. No appraisal of the 
property was made at that time. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo., pp. 135-137; Exhibit F.) 
29. The total acreage purchased by James W. Winkler in the transaction 
referred to in paragraph 28, above, was more than six but less than seven acres. 
(Exhibit G, Norman Depo., p. 142-143.) 
30. Defendant Larson was asked by Duane Barney and Greg Page to seek 
financing for the Holiday Inn Project. (Exhibit H, Larson Depo., p. 19.) 
31. Defendant Larson received a commitment from National Acceptance 
Corporation to fund the project but it was never funded. The commitment was to 
provide $8,000,000.00 with respect to the Holiday Inn Project, and another Holiday Inn 
Express project in Park City (Jeremy Ranch). (Exhibit H, Larson Depo., p. 25.J1 
32. Defendants Larson and Arnold had traveled to Phoenix, Arizona, met with 
representatives of National Acceptance Corporation and their attorneys, and paid 
$50,000.00 to National Acceptance Corporation as a fee for the funding commitment. 
(Exhibit H, Larson Depo., p. 27.) 
33. Defendant Larson was never a part of the Moab Land Development Joint 
Venture. (Exhibit H, Larson Depo, p. 42, 59.) 
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34. Defendant Larson obtained the original franchise from Holiday Inn for the 
project, but transferred it to the Joint Venture in 1996. (Exhibit H, Larson Depo, p. 42.) 
35. The promissory note referred to in paragraph 20, above, was signed by 
the Defendant Larson after the note was originally entered into by the other parties at 
the behest of Defendant Arnold. (Exhibit H, Larson Depo, p. 46.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FIF ,T CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS AS AGAINST DEFENDANT LARSON 
BECAUSE HE WAS NOT AT ANY TIME A MEMBER OF THE JOINT VENTURE 
AGREEMENT. 
The First Amended Complaint asserts, as its First Cause of Action, that the 
Defendants are in breach of a Joint Venture Agreement. Paragraph 7 of the First 
Amended Complaint asserts that u[i]n 1995, the Normans were approached by the 
Defendants with a proposal to develop a Holiday Inn Franchise on the subject 
property." Paragraph 42 of the Amended Complaint asserts that "[a]t all relevant times, 
the Membership of the Joint Venture consisted of the plaintiffs [Robert Norman and 
Diane Norman], Duane Barney, Eric Rasmussen, Greg Page, Peter Lanto, Mark Arnold 
and Norman Larson." It requires no citation of authority to demonstrate that an 
individual who is not a member of the joint venture has no liability for any alleged 
breach of the joint venture agreement. 
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The only named defendants in this case are Arnold and Larson, and despite the 
Plaintiffs' extensive discovery in this case, they have not come forward with a scintilla 
of evidence suggesting that Larson was at any time a member of the joint venture. 
Indeed, all of the available evidence is to the contrary. There can be no dispute that 
Larson was not one of the original members of the joint venture, as he did not execute 
the Agreement (Exhibit A.) Paragraph 1.7 of the Agreement provides that "[additional 
Joint Venturers may be added to the Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of 
the then existing Joint Venturers." Plaintiff Larson at no time consented to the addition 
of any new members of the joint venture, and it was always his understanding that the 
original members constituted the entire membership in the joint venture. (Norman 
depo., 27-29; 98.) That testimony is fully consistent with Defendant Larson's 
testimony that he was not a member of the joint venture. (Larson Depo, p. 42, 59.) 
Indeed, at one time, Larson proposed to the Plaintiff that Larson's company, Western 
Empire Advisers, Inc., join with the Plaintiff in a joint venture project related to the real 
estate development project, but the Plaintiff never accepted that proposal. (Exhibit D; 
Norman Depo, pp. 89-90.) 
The leading case in Utah defining the elements essential to a joint venture is 
Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1,2 (Utah 1974). There, the Court held that, to establish 
the existence of a joint venture 
Page 9 
there must be a community of interest in the performance of the common 
purpose, a joint proprietary interest in the subject matter, a mutual right to 
control, a right to share in the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the 
contrary, a duty to share in any losses which may be sustained. 
Notably, as to Defendant Larson, none of these elements are even alleged in the 
Amended Complaint. Nor could they be properly alleged, under the facts of this case 
Larson's only involvement with the joint venture was to seek financing for the 
construction of the project at the behest of Duane Barney and Greg Page. (Larson 
Depo., p. 19.) He clearly had no "joint proprietary interest in the subject matter," no 
"mutual right to control," no "right to share in the profits," and no "duty to share in any 
losses which may be sustained." As a matter of law, therefore, he was not a member of 
the joint venture and assumes no liability for any breach of the joint venture agreement. 
The Plaintiffs, seeking recovery for an alleged breach of the joint venture 
agreement, seek recovery against Larson, who was never a member of the joint 
venture, but the Plaintiffs have failed to bring this action against any of the persons who 
were among the original members of the joint venture. This is simply inexplicable. To 
whatever extent the Plaintiffs believe they may have a cause of action for breach of the 
joint venture agreement, any such cause of action necessarily runs against those who 
were members of the joint venture. Defendant Larson was simply not a such a 
member, nor is there any evidence in the record from which it can properly be 
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concluded that the Plaintiffs were "approached by55 Larson in 1995 with a proposal to 
develop the Holiday Inn property (Complaint, fl 7 ) 
Finally, the Plaintiffs' theory that there was a breach of the joint venture 
agreement is fraught with other difficulties the Plaintiffs simply choose to ignore It is 
clear that any such breach would create obligations belonging to the joint venture, 
which in law is treated as a partnership, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc v 
Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P 2d 266, 269 (Utah Ct App 1995), and 
not to the Plaintiffs individually It is hornbook law that partnership debts and 
obligations must be satisfied by partnership assets to the extent any exist before any 
creditor can seek satisfaction from individual assets McCune & McCune v Mountain 
Bell Telephone, 758 P 2d 914 (Utah 1988) While the Plaintiffs have failed to set forth 
any accounting of the partnership assets, it is very clear that at least one of those 
assets was the property they themselves contributed In some unexplained fashion, 
that property was ultimately sold by the plaintiffs to a third party, evidently without 
obtaining any approval from the other members of the joint venture, let alone from 
Defendant Larson Traditional concepts of partnership law would demand that the 
obligation, if any, resulting from a breach of the joint venture agreement be satisfied 
from the Plaintiffs' own property first. Then, if the property is insufficient to make the 
Plaintiffs' whole, they would be in a position to seek contribution from the other 
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individual members of the joint venture. Because Defendant Larson was not such a 
member, however, they would not, as a matter of law, be able to seek any such 
contribution from him. 
The Court may grant a Motion for Summary Judgment whenever there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c); Conder v. Hunt, 1 P.3d 558, 561 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2000). That is a standard Defendant Larson has amply met in this case. Indeed, 
where, as here, reasonable minds would agree that no substantial evidence supports 
each element of the cause of action, the Court may direct a verdict in favor of the 
Defendant. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Financial, Inc., 974 P.2d 288 (Utah 1999). 
II. THE DEFENDANT LARSON IS NOT LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS FOR ANY 
ALLEGED DEFAULT OF THE TRUST DEED NOTE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 
SUCH DEFAULT AND, IN ANY EVENT, SUCH LIABILITY AS DEFENDANT HAD 
WOULD BE SHARED AMONG THE OTHER SIGNERS OF THE NOTE, INCLUDING 
THE PLAINTIFFS. 
In their Second Cause of Action, the Plaintiffs assert that they somehow sold the 
property which had previously been contributed to the joint venture, that the buyer was 
the successor-in-interest on the promissory note executed by Defendant Larson and 
the members of the joint venture, and that the purchase price of the property was 
"reduced by over $200,000 that was then owing on the Note." They seek damages of 
"not less than" that amount. 
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First, the promissory note is drawn, not in favor of the Plaintiffs, but in favor of 
Ann Young and Norman Young (Exhibit C ) The Plaintiffs have not asserted that they 
were third party beneficiaries under that note or otherwise had any interest in it 
Rather, they allege that they were damaged through an alleged reduction in the sales 
price of their property by the amount of the note The Defendant Larson simply had 
nothing to do with the sale transaction and it is wholly unclear how any reduction in the 
purchase price of the property is somehow attributable to him and him alone Further 
beyond the Plaintiffs' bare allegations, there is simply no evidence in the record 
reflecting that any default on the promissory note ever occurred Nor is there any 
evidence that the purchase price of the subject property was reduced by the amount of 
the promissory note Those allegations of the First Amended Complaint remains mere 
speculation 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated their damages, if any, with 
respect to the note Since Defendant Larson is only one of five obligors on the note 
(the others were Duane R Barney, Peter 0 Lanto, Gregory A Page, and the Plaintiffs 
themselves), any damages attributable to a default would necessarily have to be 
apportioned among the obligors on the note, including the Plaintiffs The Plaintiffs 
advance no theory concerning how such an apportionment should be accomplished 
Since the Plaintiffs' claim does not rest on contract law, it must sound in tort, and the 
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concept of joint and several liability has been abolished in Utah. Sullivan v. Secular 
Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 880 (1993). Thus, the Plaintiffs' second cause of action must 
also fail because they have neglected to join indispensable parties, i.e., the other 
obligors on the note, whose negligence, if any, must be compared with Defendant 
Larson's before any conclusion regarding damages can properly be reached. 
Additionally, because the cause of action belongs, not just to the Plaintiffs, but to the 
other members of the joint venture, the allocation of damages becomes somewhat 
circular, with the members of the joint venture essentially suing themselves. 
Most significantly, the Plaintiffs have failed to identify any duty — sounding in 
contract, in tort, or on any other basis — owed by Defendant Larson to the Plaintiffs 
sufficient to hold him liable for their losses on the sale of their property. Defendant was 
never a member of the joint venture; Defendant did not have any separate contractual 
arrangement with the Plaintiffs; and the Defendant did not participate in the 
negotiations leading up to the sale of the property or the sale itself. Furthermore, on 
the limited occasions when the Defendant Larson communicated with the Plaintiffs at 
all, he did so in the name of his corporation, Western Empire Advisers, Inc. ("WEA"), 
and not as an individual. (Exhibit D.) Yet the Plaintiffs have failed to join WEA as a 
party herein. Under these circumstances, the Plaintiffs' cause of action is fatally 
flawed: baldly stated, they have utterly failed to come forward with any cognizable legal 
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theory properly asserting liability against the Defendant Larson for their alleged losses. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted by the Court. 
DATED this j l J day of November, 2000. 
• ; £2 
James C. Haskins 
/C^^U^-
Attorney for Defendant Larson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment was served 
on the;_=2_±L_ day of November, 2000, by mailing the same in U S Postal Service 
postage paid envelopes as follows: 
Steve Russell, Esq. 
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC. 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Matthew L. Lalli, Esq. 
SNELL&WILMER 
15 South West Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ihomas N. Thbmpsorj 
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Tab 25 
StrVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C. 
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab,Utah 84532 
Telephone: (435) 259-7321 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, 
husband and wife, 
Response to Larson Motion For 
Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson, 
Judge Anderson 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby respond to defendant Norman Larson's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts 
1. Paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 7, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21, 24, 28, 32 are admitted 
2. Regarding paragraph 2, Duane Barney was originally named as a defendant and 
served with the Summons and Complaint. Plaintiffs did not actively pursue their claims against 
Barney because he thereafter filed for bankruptcy protection. 
3. Regarding paragraph 4, Greg Page was originally named as a defendant but was 
not served because the plaintiffs learned his financial obligation regarding the failed joint venture 
had been discharged in bankruptcy. 
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4. Regarding paragraph 6, Peter Lanto was originally named as a defendant, but was 
not served. Plaintiffs intend to file a separate action against Mr. Lanto prior to March 15, 2001. 
5. Paragraph 8 is denied. Eric Rasmussen provided a biography as a member of the 
joint venture and signed the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement dated March 15, 
1995. The plaintiffs did not actively pursue claims against Rasmussen initially because they 
were told by Greg Page that Rasmussen (Page's brother-in-law) was a "straw man" designated to 
hide Page's involvement in the joint venture because he (Page) was then in the middle of a 
divorce action. Plaintiffs intend to file a separate action against Mr. Rasmussen prior to March 
15,2001. 
6. Regarding paragraph 9, see explanation above. 
7. Paragraph 10 is denied. Plaintiffs are unsure of whom, if anyone, proposed that 
the parties enter a joint venture agreement. It is plaintiffs' information and belief that the Moab 
Land Development Joint Venture Agreement dated March 15, was prepared by defendant 
Arnold. 
8. Paragraph 10 is admitted with the qualification that 4-D Development also 
included Duane Barney. 
9. Regarding paragraph 15, the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement 
speaks for itself and should be considered, if at all, only as a complete document. 
10. Paragraph 16 is denied. Specifically, though the agreement was signed by Eric 
Rasmussen, the plaintiffs were told and believed that Greg Page was the actual member of the 
joint venture. With regard to Norman Larson, the plaintiffs were unaware that he had executed 
on behalf of Western Empire Advisors, Inc. (WEA), a Service Agreement that provided him with 
a potential equity interest in the project, that Norman Larson had been given exclusive 
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possession and control of joint venture funds, and that Larson was holding himself out to the 
public as a member of the joint venture See also, the Affidavit of Robert Norman 
11 Regarding paragraph 17, it is true that Robert Norman never expressly consented 
to the addition of joint venturers for the simple reason that he was never consulted or asked 
Defendants Arnold and Larson nevertheless became involved in the joint venture and held 
themselves out to third parties as members of the joint venture When the plaintiffs learned of 
the involvement of Arnold and Larson in the joint venture they acquiesced and thereafter acted in 
reliance on the information and belief that Arnold and Larson were members of the joint venture 
See also, the Affidavit of Robert Norman 
12 Regarding paragraph 20, the promissory note that the plaintiffs signed was in the 
amount of $40,000 The note was subsequently altered to the amount of $160,000 The 
remaining portions of the paragraph are correct 
13 The facts in Paragraph 22 are correct, however, the content is far out of context 
Robert Norman's discussion with Ann Young occurred long after the commencement of the joint 
venture and execution of the Trust Deed and Note Mr Norman took a great deal of trouble to 
find Ann Young after Mark Arnold, acting as counsel, refused to divulge any information about 
her (Young was also Arnold's client), or provide the Normans with any information on the status 
of payments on and requested extensions of the promissory note 
14 Regarding paragraph 23, it is correct that Greg Page was initially the Normans 
principal contact regarding the joint venture However, beginning in August or September, 
1995, Greg Page began to systematically and intentionally ignore and avoid the Normans. 
Thereafter, the Normans relied pnmanly on Mark Arnold for information, whom they 
understood to be counsel for the joint venture 
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15 Regarding paragraph 25 it is true that WEA was not named as a party Norman 
Larson is the president and principal shareholder of WEA It is plaintiffs' contention that 
defendant Larson and WEA are indistinguishable and that WEA should not be considered a 
separate legal entity from defendant Larson (Larson, for example, held the Holiday Inn 
Franchise that was vital to the project individually, and indicated to third parties that he was 
personally an equity partner in the project) 
16 Paragraph 26 is denied The statement is too vague foi a specific response 
Further, when Diane Norman and Robert Norman, Jr met with defendant Larson in his office on 
May 1, 1996, Larson personally promised and agreed that he would pay off the Young note 
whether or not the joint venture project was successful 
17 Paragraph 27 is denied J'm Winkler was assigned the Trust Deed and Note on or 
about August 21,1996 See, Defendant ys Exhibit E 
18 Paragraph 29 is denied Mr Wiunkler purchased just slightly over 7 acres of 
plaintiffs' property 
19 Regarding paragraph 30, plaintiffs are unaware of who contacted defendant 
Larson to seek funding The Service Agreement dated April 28, 1995 for that purpose was 
executed by Norman Larson on behalf of WEA and by Greg Page on behalf of 4-D 
Development 
20 Paragraph 31 is denied Though defendant has documents purporting to show 
such a commitment, it is clear that defendant Larson was either duped by National Acceptance 
Corp, and negligently provided that entity $50,000 in joint venture funds that was never 
recovered, or that Larson negligently failed to complete the requirements to secure the funds on 
behalf of the joint venture 
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21. Paragraph 33 is denied. Moreover, based on his conduct, representations to third 
parties, and documents previously provided to the Court, defendant Larson should be estopped 
from denying that he was part of the joint venture. 
22. Regarding paragraph 34, it is true that defendant Larson acquired held the 
Holiday Inn Franchise for Moab in March, 1995, and continued to hold it individually until 1996. 
At that time he was forced to transfer the Franchise because he had spent the entire $160,000 of 
joint venture funds without securing funding for the project. Defendant Larson did not transfer 
the franchise to the joint venture, but rather to Greg Page and Duane Barney. 
23. Regarding paragraph 35, plaintiffs are unaware of the order that signatures were 
obtained on the promissory note. However, Larson became personally liable on the note at the 
request of its maker Ann Young. Plaintiffs assert on information and belief that Larson's 
obligation on the note was negotiated and obtained considerably in advance of June 27, 1995 
when the plaintiffs signed the note for $40,000. 
Plaintiffs' Additional Facts 
The following are additional facts relevant to defendant Larson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment: 
1. Plaintiffs' additional facts are set forth in the Affidavit of Robert Norman, 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference. 
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Argument 
I. Norman Larson was a Member of a Joint Venture Separate From the 
Moab Land Development Joint Venture That Also Included the Plaintiffs. 
Defendant Larson's Conduct Resulted in Losses That Were Incurred Solely 
and Completely by the Plaintiffs. 
It is undisputed that Norman Larson, or his alter ego Western Empire Advisors, Inc. 
obtained primary control of $160,000 secured by property owned by the plaintiffs. It is 
undisputed that those funds were supposed to be used to further the development of a Holiday 
Inn in Moab, Utah on land owned by the plaintiffs. It is undisputed that those funds were fully 
expended by defendant Larson with no beneficial effect, and that the plaintiffs solely absorbed a 
loss in excess of $200,000. Defendant Larson now asks the Court to excuse his conduct and 
release him from liability on the ground that he was not formally a member of a joint venture, the 
terms of which he violated and ignored, and the existence of which he arguably destroyed. 
The Court should not turn a blind eye to defendant Larson's clear responsibility for 
plaintiffs' losses. Principles of equity and estoppel require that the Court deny Larson's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and have his conduct considered by a jury. 
On March 15, 1995, the plaintiffs executed the Moab Land Development Joint Venture 
Agreement. (MLDJV) On April 28, 1995, defendant Larson executed a "Service Agreement" 
on behalf of his alter ego Western Empire Advisors, Inc. (WEA), to provide financing for the 
MLDJV project in Moab and another Holiday Inn project in Park City. Fni 
I Plaintiffs have previously asserted that Larson and WEA are one and the same, that no 
corporate veil even exists that needs to be pierced. This assertion has not been controverted. 
Moreover, the inclusion or substitution of WEA as a party defendant would cause absolutely no 
prejudice to defendant Larson. The relevant facts are all exactly the same. In fact, all of the 
conduct attributable to WEA is attributable to Norman Larson, personally. The plaintiffs 
requested leave to add WEA as a party defendant, which Motion was denied without an adequate 
factual or legal basis. Further references to Larson and WEA herein are intended to be 
interchangeable and applicable to both. 
6 
Defendant Larson was aware, or should have been aware that this Service Agreement 
which directly contrary to the provisions of the MLDJV Agreement, and would in effect, result 
in its dissolution. It is undisputed that on October 27, 1995, Mark Arnold, acting as counsel for 
the MLDJV, and who was also counsel for Larson, executed a Agreement wherein Arnold and 
WEA purchased any and all interest of Peter Lanto in the two Holiday Inn projects referred to 
above. It is undisputed that Peter Lanto was a member of the MLDJV. In fact, he was a vital 
member. Lanto was to be the builder for the project. Pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, 
Arnold and WEA agreed to indemnify Lanto against any claims arising from the projects, 
including tort claims, and specifically including liability for the $160,000 loan which had come 
under the sole control of Arnold and Larson. Defendant Larson was aware, or should have been 
aware that his control of the $160,000 loan funds was directly contrary to the provisions of the 
MLDJV Agreement, and would in effect, result in its dissolution. 
In fact, as set forth in the Affidavit of Robert Norman fl[9), defendant Larson acted in all 
important respects as though the MLDJV did not exist. (Fn2) 
Fn2 Defendants take the intellectually incoherent position that, simply because they did not 
attempt to obtain the express consent of the Normans to become Members of and, in fact, control 
the joint venture, that they cannot be liable for what plaintiffs have termed a "breach of the jount 
venture agreement." Defendants Larson and Arnold were fully aware of the MLDJV and its 
terms. By their own admission, the defendants were financial and legal professionals supposedly 
acting on behalf of the joint venture. The plaintiffs have ample evidence, most of it undisputed 
that defendants Larson/WEA and Arnold destroyed the joint venture and completely wasted its 
assets. Yet they cannot be held liable for its breach - as a matter of law? Somewhere in that 
argument there occurs a short circuit in the flow of reason and logic. 
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In any event, it cannot be legitimately disputed that the Arnold/WEA buy-out of Lanto's 
interest resulted in the dissolution of the MLDJV. Further, on the same day and also known to 
Larson, Greg Page formally dissolved 4-D Development Corporation, the entity that had 
contracted the Service Agreement with WEA. These undisputed facts were intentionally kept 
secret from the plaintiffs. 
Despite these facts, it is undisputed that defendant Larson maintained full control of the 
funds necessary for the Moab joint venture, and his efforts to fund and complete the project 
continued long after October 27, 1995. In what capacity did Larson continue to maintain full 
control of the loan funds if not a participant, his Service Agreement having necessarily expired 
with the dissolution of 4-D Development? Clearly, a different joint venture which is nothing 
more than "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a single business 
enterprise" existed and was operating with Larson/WEA as an integral member. The undisputed 
proof of Larson's membership in the continuing venture is supplied in his own letter to funding 
source Trust Guarantee Corp., dated November 3, 1995: 
Enclosed are the basic plans and rendering for the Moab Holiday Express. Mark Arnold, 
the attorney, and myself will come to Phoenix with a check when you can confirm a closing date 
for this project and the purchase of the land in Park City. We are very anxious to proceed sine 
we own an equity position in both projects and / have the Holiday Express Franchise. 
Referring to the legal definition of a joint venture: "an association of two or more 
persons" (yes); "to carry on as co-owners" (so says defendant Larson); "of a single business 
enterprise" (definitely). To argue that no question of fact exists for a jury to determine that 
Larson was a member of the new joint venture or caused the destruction of (breached) the 
MLDJV, is the equivalent of maintaining an unqualified belief that the earth is flat. 
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It would be unconscionable for the Court to grant Larson/WEA Summary Judgment 
under these circumstances. If one seeks to take comfort in a strict construction of the law, (i.e., 
affirmative consent of all involved as a prerequisite to becoming a member of a joint venture), 
that party should be first required to show that he played by the rules. It would be 
unconscionable to rule that the Normans' failure to provide such consent precludes a claim 
against Larson when his conduct intentionally kept the facts of his involvement from the 
Normans. One principal of our legal system which should be sacrosanct is that a party will not 
be allowed to benefit from his own misdeeds. In this case, plaintiffs have presented evidence as 
yet uncontroverted, that Larson misappropriated and misused funds that, pursuant to the MLDJV 
agreement, he had no business possessing in the first place. 
Defendant Larson has termed himself a hired professional. Surely he had fiduciary duties 
to someone. It is unconscionable to limit those duties to the MLDJV that he ignored and helped 
destroy. Larson knew perfectly well that Robert and Diane Norman, individually, would be the 
ones to suffer if the Moab Holiday Inn Venture failed. With regard to the other supposed 
Members of the MLDJV: 
a. Larson knew its administrative agent Duane Barney was doing nothing, was in 
fact in prison and that he, Larson, was actually acting in the capacity of administrative agent for 
the MLDJV; 
b. Larson knew that he had also assumed the role of Greg Page as person in charge 
of obtaining funding for the venture; 
c. Larson knew that Eric Rasmussen was a straw man; 
d. Larson knew that he and attorney Arnold had bought out the interest of Peter 
Lanto, the builder for the project; 
e. Larson knew that 4-D Development, the organization that had hired him and was 
to finance, build and manage the Moab Holiday Inn, was dissolved. 
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funds associated with the Moab venture, continued his attempts to fund the venture nnd publicly 
proclaimed his membership and ownership interest in the venture. After October 27, 1995, 
Larson was not only a member of a joint venture to develop a Holiday Inn in Moab that also 
included the plaintiffs, he was clearly the most important member. For this reason Larson should 
be estopped from denying his involvement in the joint venture or objecting to evidence regarding 
1110 u w n v v i i u u c t p i i u i I U w i u u v i x* / , i s y ~>. 
v ^ n r ^ p i n ivy, LSS\J t u v l i i v m u v i i ) Ox tl j w n i t v v i u u i v \ i . u-gv/, LJIXI LL\,y, r-viIiOiU. a.iivu t i i v 
Normans), most definitely not the MLDJV, formally called upon Larson, as a fellow partner, to 
pay back the $178,000 of joint venture funds that had been entrusted to him and lost A 
subsequent letter dated June 18, 1996 states unambiguously that Arnold and Larson are partners 
in the venture See, copies of letter attached And clearly, having been called into account for 
his conduct, Larson's May 9, 1996 joint venture proposal to the Normans {Def. Exh. D) 
highlights several important factors: 
a. Larson had been the most important member of the Moab Holiday Inn venture 
He at least thought he could arrange financing, construction and management if only someone 
was willing to hand him enough land and equity to construct a psuedo impression of power and 
responsibility, 
b. Larson knew perfectly well who had been harmed by his conduct and who would 
individually incur the loss Note that his proposal is offered solely to the Normans, not the joint 
venture or any of its members Obviously, Larson could not even think of making such an offer 
unless he believed that the MLDJV and subsequent unnamed ventures were defunct, or, more 
probably, illusory. 
These facts are not disputed 
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Defendant Larson's Motion can only be described as an attempt to use the legal process 
to perpetuate a wrong. It should not be allowed. The bottom line is this: Robert and Diane 
Norman executed the Moab Land Development Joint Venture in the good faith belief that the 
others involved would abide by its terms and act in their mutual best interests. That did not 
happen. Instead, the members had other and conflicting interests, and brought in individuals 
(Arnold and Larson), whose primary goal was to enrich themselves within the context of the 
MLDJV. The terms of the MLDJV were never followed. Another venture evolved with a 
purpose of trying to develop the Moab Holiday Inn. This subsequent venture included Larson 
and Arnold who had become members secretly and dishonestly. It cannot be disputed however, 
that the business of the venture continued and was thereafter controlled by Larson and Arnold. 
If the defendants' conduct causes the plaintiffs' claims to fail outside the neat confines of 
straight-forward claims and established legal theories of recovery, the defendants should be 
prohibited from seeking protection within such theories. Defendant Larson purposefully entered 
and pursued a business opportunity including the plaintiffs. Larson felt perfectly comfortable 
using the Normans' contribution to the venture and funds secured by their land, in the hope of 
obtaining very substantial personal benefit. Larson knew perfectly well that the failure of his 
efforts would fall squarely and solely on the plaintiffs. This Court should allow the plaintiffs to 
present their case, based on the actual facts. 
This Court should require the defendant to try to prove to a jury that he was not 
purposefully involved in a joint venture to develop a Holiday Inn in Moab. Defendant Larson 
should be the one required to appeal a fair and common sense ruling that people have to accept 
the consequences of their own conduct because the law will not provide that shield for them. 
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FL Defendant Larson Should Be Held Proportionately 
Responsible For the Trust Deed Note as a xMatter of Law. 
Defendant Larson's argument regarding liability under the note underscores the legal and 
logical absurdity of his entire effort to avoid responsibility. If the law can be bent so cynically to 
such a position that no reasonable person could accept, then for honest people like the Normans 
who get taken by "hired professionals," the legal system has no value. 
Norman Larson signed the promissory note as an obligor. The testimony is undisputed 
that the Youngs demanded his signature on the note because he had apparently fooled them into 
believing he was reputable and had the financial means to back the note. Under Larson's logic,, 
the Normans would have been forced to wait, with 18% interest continuing to accumulate, until 
the Youngs or Winkler chose to foreclose, and then go through the time, expense and reduced 
return of a foreclosure sale, before seeking proportionate contribution from him. A creditor with 
less ethics and compassion than Mr. Winkler could simply have waited until the accrued interest 
was greater than the value of the Normans property and then taken it free and clear. Surely the 
law does not require the Normans to be placed in such a helpless and untenable position. 
Larson complains that the Normans have not sued Page, Barney and Lanto for their 
liability under the note, knowing perfectly well why the plaintiffs have not pursued those claims, 
and also having failed to exercise his own right to assert cross-claims against them. The 
plaintiffs, for their part, have lost enough without violating Rule 11 by suing Page and Barney 
who slunk away to the deadbeats' reprieve of Bankruptcy, and Lanto, whose interest and 
responsibility was purchased by the present defendants. Why require the slight of hand of suing 
Lanto who was smart enough to get out of the mess, in order to get at the parties who willingly 
assumed his responsibility? It would be a huge w'aste of time, expense and judicial resources. 
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The Normans were forced to sell their property at a loss because they were first taken 
advantage of and then abandoned by these defendants. To then come into this Court and ask to 
be excused as a matter of law is an intolerable perversion of the concepts of justice and fairness. 
This Court has stated on several occasions that the least the plaintiffs should be entitled to is a 
proportionate recovery from the co-obligors under the note. 
There should be absolutely no question about this. If we are to dispose of all aspects of 
this case as a matter of law, the only fair and reasonable decision the Court can make with 
regard to the note is that Norman Larson is liable for 175th of the loss incurred by the Normans by 
retiring the note ($42,400) as a matter of law. Nor should it require a jury to decide whether 
Larson/WEA is liable for the proportion of Lanto's share of the note which he expressly 
purchased and assumed. So, for reasons stated above, Larson /WEA, should also be tagged for 
50% of the Lanto interest ($21,200) as a matter of law. 
Perhaps it should be for a jury to determine which parties should bear the loss of the 
bankrupt obligors, but the plaintiffs would be willing to accept a ruling, as a matter of law, that 
the bankrupt shares should be split equally as per partnership law, and the loss apportioned: 
Robert & Diane Norman (1/3*) $70,666.67 
Norman Larson {113rd + 1/2 of 1/3) $106,000.00 
Mark Arnold (1/2 of 1/3) $35,333.35 
Such a ruling would wrap up the plaintiffs' promissory note claim fairly and equitably in 
an appealable package that at least apportions the risk of loss in a manner the parties might have 
expected and/or deserve. Unless the Court properly assigns this defendant some of his quite well 
deserved risk of loss, it is likely we will have to endure more arguments like - just because I 
signed that promissory note doesn V mean I %m liable for it - as this case continues. 
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Conclusion 
Defendant Larson's Motion for Summary Judgment should be Denied- Instead the Court 
should rule that, based on his own conduct, defendant Larson is estopped from denying that he 
was a member of a joint venture with the plaintiffs, the purpose of which was to develop a 
Holiday Inn on property owned by the plaintiffs. The Court should further rule that WEA be 
held responsible as a party defendant both because it is the alter ego of Norman Larson, and 
because its inclusion would result in absolutely no prejudice to either party. 
r Dated this day of /) ' ?> //>?^€<L 2000. 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that on the/5 day of Iv'Ji/frnotjC , 2000, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Response to Larson Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed, postage 
prepaid to: 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Norman Larson 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Matthew Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Tab 26 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT NORMAN 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
Grand County) 
Robert Norman, being first duly sworn deposes and states that: 
1. I am a plaintiff in the action Norman v. Arnold, et al, Case No. 9807-
116, pending in the Seventh District Court for Grand County. 
2. I am over 21 years of age and make this Affidavit based upon 
personal knowledge. 
3. On or about March 15, 1995,1 executed a document entitled the Moab 
Land Development Joint Venture Agreement (MLDJV), in conjunction with a plan 
to develop a Holiday Inn on property I owned. 
4. The MLDJV Agreement was also signed by my wife, Duane Barney 
(Administrative Agent), Eric Rasmussen and Peter Lanto (Contractor/Builder). 
5. My wife Diane and I were to be considered as one party for all intents 
and purposes concerning the joint venture. We had no separate interests. 
6. Prior to the execution of the agreement I had dealt with Greg Page. I 
had never met and knew nothing about Eric Rasmussen. When I inquired about 
him, Greg Page explained that Eric Rasmussen was his brother-in-law, and that 
Page had Rasmussen sign the agreement in order to hide his interest in the project 
from his wife who had or was expected to file for divorce. 
7. Greg Page stated that he was the real member of the joint venture and 
would be responsible to obtain financing. I accepted that and thereafter considered 
and treated him as a Member of the joint venture. 
8. In April of 1995, I first met Norman Larson and Mark Arnold at my 
home. I was told that Mark Arnold was an attorney who would represent the joint 
venture or "group." I learned that Norman Larson had some expertise in financial 
matters, though his participation in the joint venture was not made clear. 
9. To my knowledge the provisions of the Moab Land Development 
Joint Venture Agreement were never followed, and were in many respects 
disregarded and/or violated. For example: 
§1.2 Purpose provides that the sole purpose of the joint venture was to 
develop investments on my property. Unknown to me, the other partners were also 
attempting to develop a Holiday Inn in Park City of which I had no knowledge or 
interest. 
§1,6 Term establishes that the Moab Land Development joint venture, 
if it ever existed, terminated not later than March 15, 1996. As a practical matter, 
evidence uncovered in the course of this litigation establishes that the Moab Land 
Development joint venture, terminated on October 27, 1995, with ArnoldAVEA buy-
out of Peter Lanto, the dissolution of 4-D Development, and the return to prison at or 
about ;at time of Administrative Agent Duane Barney. Also, the "LLC to be 
formed' as set forth in §1.5,1.6 and 7.1 was never formed. 
§2.1 Appointment of Administrative Agent provided that Duane 
Barney would act as administrative agent for the joint venture. To my knowledge, 
Mr. Barney never acted in that or any other capacity, and in fact, unknown to me at 
the time, spent most of the period relevant to this case in federal prison. 
§2.2 Duties and Powers of Administrative Agent provides that 
Duane Barney shall manage the assets and invest the funds of the joint venture. 
Discovery in this litigation has disclosed that defendant Norman Larson had sole 
control of the assets of the joint venture and in turn relied on defendant Mark Arnold 
for approval of all joint venture expenditures. 
§2.3 Compensation of Administrative Agent provides that the 
administrative agent shall not receive any fees. Discovery in this litigation revealed 
that Mark Arnold and Norman Larson, acting in the capacity of administrative agent, 
as one of their first acts, paid themselves $8,000 each in fees for securing the 
$160,000 Young loan. 
§5.1 Selection provides that funds of the joint venture will be used 
only for investments approved by an affirmative and unanimous vote of the joint 
venturers. Unknown to me, the other partners were also attempting to develop a 
Holiday Inn in Park City of which I had no knowledge or interest, and used joint 
venture funds for that purpose. 
§8.1 Bank Accounts provides that a bank account shall be opened in 
the name of the joint venture and any checks therefrom signed by the administrative 
agent. In fact, no joint venture account was opened. Instead, the joint venture funds 
were deposited in an account under the sole control and check signing authority of 
Norman Larson. 
§8.4 Entire Agreement provides that the MLDJV agreement embodies 
the entire agreement among the parties with respect to the joint venture. 
10. If I had known or been informed of these violations of the joint venture 
agreement and the truth of what had been done with the Young Loan proceeds, I 
would have immediately terminated my involvement with the joint venture. 
11. Based upon my knowledge and information, much of which was only 
disclosed in the course of this litigation, the joint venture that unsuccessfully 
attempted to develop a Holiday Inn on my property in 1995-1996 was not the Moab 
Land Development Joint Venture, but rather a different, unnamed joint venture or 
other entity operating on completely different terms than as set forth in the MLDJV 
Agreement. 
12. It is my information and belief that Norman Larson was a member of 
that different joint venture, based on the following: 
a. The initial meeting with Norman Larson at my home where I 
understood he had been consulted in some fashion regarding financing for the Moab 
Holiday Inn project. 
b. Norman Larson's involvement was substantiated to my 
satisfaction when his name appeared as a co-obligor on the promissory note secured 
by my property that was the sole asset of the joint venture. This occurred in early 
July, 1995. 
c. My subsequent knowledge that Norman Larson was solely 
responsible for obtaining financing for the Moab Holiday Inn project and would be 
entitled to a 25% equity interest in the project. 
d. On or about April 10, 1996, I received a letter written by Greg 
Page identifying the partners of the then existing joint venture as (the Normans), 
Greg Page, Duane Barney, Mark Arnold and Norman Larson. 
e. My belief that Norman Larson was a member of the joint venture 
attempting to develop a Holiday Inn on my property has been completely 
substantiated by documents obtained during the course of this litigation wherein he 
and others expressly state that he is a partner. 
13. I was never asked to approve or object to the extensive participation of 
Norman Larson in the Moab Holiday Inn project. In fact, I acquiesced, and at no 
time did I object to Norman Larson's involvement as a partner in the project. In fact, 
I took it as a positive development having been given to understand that Norman 
Larson had considerable expertise in obtaining financing for large projects. 
14. It is my information and belief that Mark Arnold was a member of that 
different joint venture, based on the following: 
a. It was my understanding from the start that Mark Arnold was 
counsel for the joint venture. 
b. In December, 1995, I had a conversation with Peter Lanto 
regarding some drawings I had previously provided. At that time, Mr. Lanto 
informed me that Mark Arnold had purchased his interest in the joint venture. 
c. On or about April 10, 1996, I received a letter written by Greg 
Page identifying the partners of the then existing joint venture as (the Normans), 
Greg Page, Duane Barney, Mark Arnold and Norman Larson. 
d. On May 1, 1996 in a meeting in his office, Mark Arnold 
personally and expressly confirmed to my wife and son that he had purchased an 
interest in the joint venture and had been a member since October 27, 1995. 
e. My belief that Mark Arnold was counsel for and a member of the 
joint venture attempting to develop a Holiday Inn on my property has been 
completely substantiated by documents obtained during the course of this litigation 
wherein he and others expressly state that he is a partner. 
15. I was never asked to approve or object to the extensive 
participation of Mark Arnold in the Moab Holiday Inn project. In fact, I 
acquiesced, and at no time did I object to Mark Arnold's involvement as a partner 
in the project. In fact, I thought at the time it would be a very good thing to have 
an attorney as a partner, 
believing he would bring valuable expertise to the venture and act in its best 
interests. 
16. At no time did my wife and I formally transfer our property to the 
Moab Land Development Joint Venture or any other entity. 
17. Since the 18%, $160,000 Young loan was secured by my property, I 
was very concerned regarding the progress of efforts to obtain project financing 
and other matters. 
18. I depended initially upon Greg Page, and then beginning about 
September, 1995, on Mark Arnold for information about the project. 
19. Both Page and Arnold actively ignored and/or avoided me. In the 
course of this litigation, I have discovered that much of the information that was 
provided by Page and Arnold was false. 
20. I was extremely concerned that my property would be foreclosed and 
had Mark Arnold negotiate extensions of the Young note on at least two occasions. 
21. In March, 1996, there was a fire at my waterpark adjacent to the 
proposed Holiday Inn Development. I desperately needed some short term funds for 
expenses to open the Park and requested that some of the funds from the Young loan 
be provided for that purpose. 
22. On or about April 10, 1996, I received the attached letter from Greg 
Page and learned that Norman Larson had been in complete control of the Young 
loan funds and had been assigned the responsibility to obtain financing for the 
project. 
23. On or about May 1, 1996,1 learned that all of the loan funds had been 
expended without beneficial effect. 
24. On May 1, 1996, Mark Arnold as attorney for and member of the joint 
venture promised that he would recover the $50,000 that had been sent to Arizona for 
a financing commitment. 
25. To my knowledge, Mark Arnold subsequently did nothing to recover 
those funds. 
26. On May 1, 1996, Norman Larson promised and agreed that he would 
personally see to it that the Young loan was fully repaid, regardless of whether he 
obtained financing for the Moab Holiday Inn project. 
27. Norman Larson has never paid anything toward the Young loan. 
28. On or about May 9, 1996, I received the joint venture proposal from 
Norman Larson referred to in Fact #24 of his Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
proposal was ridiculous, requiring me to contribute all of the land and equity in my 
waterpark to Larson and unidentified "affiliates" for a l/3rd interest, on the chance 
that Norman Larson would obtain financing for a larger project. The proposal 
contained absolutely no risk for Norman Larson nor any valuable consideration to be 
contributed by him. Given our experience with Mr. Larson to that point, I considered 
the proposal a very poor joke. 
29. By mid-summer, 1996, I had been completely abandoned by my 
"partners" Larson, Page and Barney. The 18% Young loan remained outstanding 
with no reasonable prospect of any development on my property. Mark Arnold 
informed me that the Youngs intended to foreclose on the promissory note, and 
that he had negotiated an assignment of the note to another client, Jim Winkler. 
30. Mark Arnold had the Holiday Inn Franchise transferred to Jim Winkler 
without discussing or offering it to me, and then completely abandoned the project. 
31. At no time did any person or entity involved with the joint venture 
(Norman Larson, Western Empire Advisors, Mark Arnold, Greg Page, Duane 
Barney, Peter Lanto or Eric Rasmussen) provide or offer any assistance in paying off 
the Young loan, and my wife and I were unable to do so ourselves. 
32. I knew that Jim Winkler, at his option, could either foreclose or 
continue to let interest accumulate until I would owe him everything I owned. 
33. Under these circumstances, I had no option other than to try to persuade 
Mr. Winkler to purchase my property. 
34. I had previously done land sales comparisons on nearby properties and 
estimated the value of my property to be approximately $100,000 per acre. The 
ability to control the development of that land, situated immediately adjacent to my 
existing waterpark, made the property worth that much to me or more. 
35. In May, 1998, Mr. Winkler purchased 7 acres, more or less, for 
$420,000. (Approximately $60,000 per acre) From that price he deducted the 
outstanding balance of $212,000 from the original June, 1995 Young loan. I 
absorbed the entire loss without assistance or contribution. 
36. This loss deprived me of my property and the ability to control the 
development of the land adjacent to my existing business. In addition, it resulted 
in extreme financial hardship on myself and my family which continues through 
the date of this Affidavit. 
Dated this / , r day of ^ )
 fh^j, , 2000. 
Robert Norman 
Notary's Verification 
On the fs' day of ^-~f] <^/ __, 2000, personally appeared before me 
Robert Norman who confirmed that the statements set forth in the foregoing 
Affidavit are his own, and are true to the best of his knowledge, information and 
belief. Robert Norman signed the Affidavit in my presence. 
Seal: 
HELEN G. OAVI^  
/ Ad\ -"."Jo-
Oecemoerl2 2001 
L 
<_ • <><K 
Notary Public 
^
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 ORIGINAL 
NUAU LAND DEVELOPMENT 
J01N1 VENTURE AGREEMENT-
Ihis Joint Venture Agreement (the "Agreement") is made and 
entered into by and among those persons whose names are set 
forth on the signature page or pages attached hereto (the 
"Joint Ventures")- I he joint Ventures hereby agree as 
follows: 
WITNESSETH: 
1.1 Name. 
The name of the Joint Venture is Moab Land Development. 
1.2 Purpose -
The Joint Ventures wish to create a Joint Venture solely to 
develop, manage and maintain certain investments (the 
"Investments") Lo be developed from the 8.33 acres north of 
Moab, Ut. (See Schedule * C ) This agreement will be 
superseded by a Limited Liability Company hereafter created. 
1.3 Office. 
The principal office of the Joint Venture shall be located 
at 4770 So. 900 East tt200, SLC, Ut. 84117. 
1.4 Powers. 
The Joint Venture has all powers reasonably necessary or 
incidental to carry out its purpose. 
1.5 Requirements to Conduct Business. 
The Joint Venture will execute and file all certificates, 
and take all other action, which may be required to conduct 
the business of the Joint Venture and the succeeding LLC in 
the necessary counties and state. In the event that the 
Joint Venture is unable to secure a Franchise Agreement with 
any mutually acceptable lodging concern within one (1) year 
after execution of this agreement, this Joint Venture will 
terminate and all commitments and agreements will terminate 
as wel1. 
1.6 Term. 
The term of this Agreement shall commence on the execution 
hereof and shall end on the date of the succeeding LLC 
created, or one (1) year after execution unless terminated 
earlier by agreement of a unanimous interest of the Joint 
Venturers. 
1.7 Additional Joint Ventures. 
Additional Joint Venturers may be added to the Joint Venture 
at any time upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint 
Venturers. 
(ORIGINAL 
Article 11 - Administration of the Joint Venture 
2.1 Appointment of Administrative Agent. 
Duane Barney, will act as the administrative agent (the 
"Administrative Agent'1) of the Joint Venture. The term of 
the agency hereby created shall be for the term of the Joint 
Venture, but subject to termination at any time by an 
affirmative vote of a majority in interest of the Joint 
Venturers. 
2.2 Duties and Powers of Administrative Agent. 
The Administrative Agent shall manage the assets and invest 
the funds of the Joint Venture. Any action of the 
Administrative Agent may be overruled by a vote of a 
majority in interest of the Joint Venturers. 
2.3 Compensation of Administrative Agent. 
The Administrative Agent shall not receive any fees. 
Article 111 - Capital Contributions 
3.1 Capital Contribution. 
Each Joint Venturer shall make a contribution(s) to the 
Joint Venture in cash, property or expertise. The 
percentage ownership for the Hotel Development is shown in 
Schedule A, the percentage ownership for any other projects 
utilizing the remaining land and artesian well is shown in 
Schedule B. In the event additional capital is required to 
finance any project development, the Administrative Agent 
has the right to sell a portion of the development to secure 
the needed capital for such project by an unanimous 
affirmative vote of the Joint Venturers. 
3.2 Voluntary Assessments. 
The Administrative Agent will not call for additional 
capital contributions from the Joint Venturers without a 
unanimous vote. 
Article IV ~ Allocations 
4.1 Allocations 
All profits and losses of the Joint Venture shall be 
allocated among the Joint Venturers in accordance with their 
relative contributions as set forth on Schedules %A' & %S' 
attached hereto. 
''ORIGINAL 
Article V - Developments/Projects 
5.1 Selecti on. 
Development/Projects may be presented to the Joint Venturers 
far consideration by a Joint Venturer, the Administrative 
Agent or a third party. Funds of the Joint Venture will be 
used only for Investments approved by an affirmative and 
unanimous vote of the Joint Venturers. 
Article VI - Distributions 
6.1 Distributions of Investment, 
If an Investment is sold to a bona fide purchaser, the 
proceeds shall be used to pay all sums outstanding in 
connection with the investment, and thereafter, the net 
proceeds (less all expenses of the sale, including closing 
costs, attorney fees, and broker commissions) shall be (1) 
used toward the payment of any other debts and liabilities 
of the Joint Venture, and thereafter (2) distributed to the 
Joint venturers according to their respective interests as 
set forth in Schedule *A' & %B' hereof. 
Article Vll - Formation-
7.1 At Termination. 
Qn termination of this Agreement, all assets of the Joint 
Venture shall be transferred to the succeeding Limited 
Liability Company. 
Article Vlll - Miscellaneous Provisions. 
B.l Bank Accounts. 
All sums received from the Capital Contributions and from 
any distributions from Investments shall be deposited in the 
bank account of the Joint Venture. Checks may be drawn and 
signed by the Administrative Agent. 
8.2 Not a Partnership. 
This Agreement shall not be deemed to create a partnership. 
8.5 Governing Law. 
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
8.4 Entire Agreement. 
This Agreement embodies the entire agreement among the 
parties with'respect to the Joint Venture. All prior 
Agreement, representations, and statements are merged into 
this Agreement. 
^R\G\HA 
8 . 5 S u r v i v a 1 . 
All the representations and covenants contained in this 
Agreement shall Survive Lhe acquisition of the Investment 
(s) and the termination of the Joint Venture and this 
Agreement. 
8.6 Amendments. 
This Agreement may be amended in writing only. All 
amendments must be approved by the Joint Ventures' unanimous 
decision. 
8.7 Counterparts. 
This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of 
which shall be deemed an original. 
0RI61NA 
*jj5,m5-
J o i n t V e n t u r e r s : 
R o b e r t R. Norman S r . 
* v . ssit 4-54-2^1^(4 
/^J^^cc^fU^M^ 
A. Diane Norman 
RRttSZ2-54-3t>H-2. 
ssn 5^-S^-^U) 
Peter,Lanto 
Eric A. Rasniussen 
SStt 
SStt 
Type of Ownership is Individual 
0RIG1NA 
SCHEDULE ' A ' 
JUINT VENTURERS PERCEN TAGE CONTRIBUTION 
Robert R. Norman Sr & 
A. Diane Norman 
(See Exhibit A) 
257. 8-33 Acres 
Duane R. Barney 257, Expertise & 
Consideration 
Peter 0. Lanto 257. Expertise & 
Consideration 
Eric A. Rasmussen 257. Expertise & 
Consideration 
ORIGINAL 
SCHEDULE ' LT 
JOINT VENTURERS PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION 
Robert R. Norman Sr.& 
A. Diane Norman 
Acreage 
407. (See Exhibit A) 
Duane R. Barney 207. Expertise & 
Consideration 
Peter 0. Lanto 207. Expertise & 
Consideration 
Eric A. Rasmussen 207, Expertise & 
Consideration 
GRAPHIC" SCALE 
( LN FTTT ) 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County 
Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C. 
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831) 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Telephone: (435) 259-7321 
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Dfeputv 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Mark E. Arnold & Norman ML Larson. 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Judge Anderson 
Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, move the Court for Partial Summary Judgment 
concerning liability under a Trust Deed Note. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On or about June 27, 1995, a Note secured by a Trust Deed on property owned by 
the plaintiffs was executed in favor of Ann & Norman Young. The Note was in the principal 
amount of $160,000, carried interest at a rate of 18% per annum, and was due on September 27, 
1995. Exhibit L 
2. The note was executed by Robert & Diane Norman, husband and wife, Duane 
Barney, Greg Page, Peter Lanto and defendant Norman Larson. Id 
3. On October 27, 1995, before any payment of principal or interest had been made 
on the note, defendant Mark Arnold and defendant Larson's alter ego company Western Empire 
Advisors, purchased the interest of Peter Lanto, specifically assumed his obligation under the 
note and expressly indemnified him from any liability under the note. Exhibit 2. 
4. The Youngs interest in the note was purchased by Jim Winkler in August, 1996. 
5. Other than partial interest payments to the Youngs by Norman Larson, no obligor 
made any principal or interest payments under the note. 
6. In May, 1998, the Normans paid the note in the context of a sale of the secured 
land to Jim Winkler, and thereby solely incurred a loss of $212,000 which was the then 
outstanding balance of the note. 
7. The obligations of Greg Page and Duane Barney as obligors under the note were 
subsequently discharged in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Argument 
I. Defendant Larson is Personally Liable Under the Note. 
Norman Larson executed the note as a joint and several obligor. It is undisputed that Ann 
and Norman Young specifically required Mark Arnold to secure Larson's obligation because the 
Youngs (not knowing anything about the other obligors) believed that Larson's liability would 
ensure repayment. The testimony of defendant Arnold is instructive. After explaining that he 
prepared the Trust Deed and Note at the request of his client Ann Young, Arnold testified: 
Q. . . . did you direct that a signature block be included for Norman Larson? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And why did you include Norm Larson? 
A. Ann Young knew Norm Larson from I think some dealings that he had with her 
brother-in-law, and I think she felt Norm Larson was a man of some substance, she didn't know 
any of the other people, and I think she may have known Mr. Norman was financially strapped, 
and as a precautionary measure she said, other than the "group," I'd also like Norm Larson's 
signature on (the note). 
Q. Would you agree as an attorney, that everyone who signed this note is responsible 
for its repayment? 
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A I'm not going to give you a legal opinion on that, but I'll tell you what the intent 
was It was to obligate all of them 
Q Well, that's obvious, right? 
A Yes It's very obvious ArnoldDepo at 45-46 
Q Why did you have (Larson) sign the note? Does he have any liability under the 
note for anything? 
A You bet he does. That's why I had htm sign the note. Id. at 145 
Larson himself admits signing the note to provide security for the Youngs 
Q. Do you know why you signed the note? 
A. Mr Arnold asked me to sign the note as additional security for the Youngs 
Q. And you were OK becoming obligated on it? 
A. He was my attorney and I took his recommendation, or requirement, yes sir 
Larson depo. at 47. 
Q How did it come about that you were persuaded or convinced to sign the 
promissory note? 
A Mr Arnold indicated it was additional security for the Youngs, they wanted my 
signature on there 
Q Having signed the note, what do you understand your liability to be on that note? 
A. / think everybody on t/iat note has the same liability. Id. at 78. 
There is no question of fact regarding Larson's liability under the note Nothing more is 
required to establish Larson's liability under the note as a matter of law 
H. Defendant Arnold and Western Empire Advisors are Liable Under the Note as a 
Consequence of their Purchase of Lanto's Interest and Express Indemnification of Lanto 
From Liability Under the Note. 
The original obligors of the Young note anticipated the construction of a Holiday Inn on 
the Normans' property that secured the note Indeed, the $160,000 loan was to be used to 
facilitate and finance the project Peter Lanto was to be the builder of the project On October 
27, 1995, Mark Arnold and WEA purchased "any and all interest" of Peter Lanto in the project 
As part of the transaction, Arnold and WEA expressly assumed and indemnified any subsequent 
liability of Lanto under the note 
Based on previous arguments before this Court, we should expect that Arnold's counsel 
will agree that the terms of the Purchase Agreement, as a fully integrated and completely 
unambiguous document, may not be altered by parol evidence. Mark Arnold, an attorney, in fact 
the attorney representing the obligors involved in the project, prepared the purchase and 
indemnification agreement. Again, Arnold's own testimony tells the story: 
Q. Would you agree that to the extent Peter Lanto is responsible under this note, that 
the purchasers of his interest on October 27, 1995 became responsible? 
A. I believe it obligates Mr. Lanto and all the signators to the lender. Yes. 
Q. That's not the question. The question is: Do you agree that after the Purchase 
Agreement, Exhibit 36, NL 72, was executed, that the persons who acquired his interest also 
acquired his liability under the note? 
A. Same answer. 
Q. Yes? 
A. To the extent there is any liability with the lender. 
Q. That, in fact, was the specific purpose of the Purchase Agreement numbered 
paragraph 2, wasn't it, to transfer that liability? 
A. The specific purpose for the last paragraph was to ensure that Ann Young and the 
lenders were paid back. That was the discussion. ArnoldDepo. at 46-47 
Q. Pete Lanto,he vanishes into thin air. What happened to his liability? 
A. I don't know. But apparently it was assumed by the remaining partners who 
wanted his interest. That's what they wanted. That's what they got. Id. at 146. 
Larson's testimony leaves absolutely no doubt: 
Q. Do you know what happened to (Lanto's) participation in the project? 
A. Yes. It was purchased by Mr. Arnold. Larson depo. at 23. 
A. (Arnold) was going to accumulate legal time and expenses to offset the $8,500 for 
Mr. Lanto's equity position. 
Q. But nevertheless he acquired Mr. Lanto's position? 
A. I don't know if he acquired it or if it was an attempt to acquire it. Id. at 48. 
The foregoing testimony was before the Purchase Agreement was produced, or been seen 
by the plaintiffs or their counsel. The document then surfaced and the deposition continued. 
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Q. Let's clear up one of the issues that was a little bit muddled . . . Turn to (NL) 72 
. . . Document entitled "'Purchase Agreement." Does that clarify the issue in your mind as to 
whether or not Mr. Arnold bought Mr. Lanto's interest in the Moab Express project? 
A. Does it clear up my mind . . . 
Q. Yes. 
A. Arnold and Western Empire bought Lanto 's position. 
Q. Yes? 
A. Yes, that was the intent. Id. at 90. 
Larson knew he was liable both under the note and the Lanto Purchase Agreement and 
actually asked Arnold for a release. 
Q. When you say you were asked to leave (the partnership), was that in writing? 
A. I don't recall that it was in writing. I don't recall seeing a document to that effect. 
The document that I signed was to relieve me of the franchise. With that I could have assumed 
that - and I asked to be relieved from all liability and asked Mr. Arnold to prepare a document to 
that effect. I don't recall him ever doing so. Id. at 125. 
There is no question of fact about the purchase of Lanto's interest and assumption of his 
liability under the note. Nothing more is needed to establish the liability of Arnold and WEA 
under the note in this regard as a matter of law. 
Ill, WEA is the Alter Ego of Defendant Larson. 
WEA is the alter ego of Norman Larson, its president. In the course of the failed project, 
Larson as an individual and WEA as an entity alternately appeared as the same party. For 
example, WEA was hired to obtain financing for the project. However, if WEA secured 
financing Norman Larson was to receive a 25% equity interest in the project. Norman Larson, 
individually, owned the Holiday Inn Franchise, a vital prerequisite to the project. Nowhere in 
the record or any documents associated with this case is there any evidence of WEA acting as a 
corporate entity. All of the conduct attributed to WEA was undertaken solely by Norman 
Larson. No corporate minutes, resolutions or otherwise have been produced to indicate WEA 
acting as an entity separate from Norman Larson. 
* t\ 
Though the Lanto Purchase Agreement names WEA as the purchasing entity, less than a 
week later, Norman Larson stated in writing to a prospective lender that he personally owned an 
equity interest and the Holiday Inn Franchise. Exhibit 3. Subsequent to the purchase of the 
Lanto interest, the other partners in the project unanimously called upon Larson, individually, as 
a partner, to repay the Young loan proceeds that had been in his sole control. Exhibit 4. 
Under these circumstances, the Court should, as a matter of law, rule that WEA is the 
alter ego of Norman Larson and that the two are, for all intents and purposes, the same party. 
Failing that, Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, dictates that this Court should 
exercise its discretion to allow the plaintiffs to amend their Complaint to name Western Empire 
Advisors as a party defendant. Such leave to amend is necessary in the interests of justice and 
can result in no conceivable prejudice to the defendant since it has been fully cognizant of the 
nature of plaintiffs claims since the case was filed. 
IV. It is Unnecessary and Inefficient to Require the Plaintiffs to Obtain a Judgment 
Against Lanto as a Prerequisite For Asserting Their Liability Under the Note, 
Arnold and WEA entered and completed the purchase of Lanto's interest without 
informing the plaintiffs. Arnold and WEA thereafter conducted themselves as partners in the 
project with plaintiffs' acquiescence. The defendants have stated on previous occasions that the 
plaintiffs should be required to establish liability against Lanto as a means of perfecting their 
claim under the indemnification agreement. Such a requirement would be a waste of time, 
money, effort and judicial resources. 
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Lanto's liability as an obligor under the note is established as a matter of law for the same 
reason that Larson's liability is established, i.e., he signed the note. The assumption of liability 
and indemnification of Lanto by Arnold and WEA is clear, unambiguous and further bolstered 
by the fact that it was prepared by an attorney who knew, or should have known exactly what the 
terms meant. 
The Court should rule as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs may seek to recover in 
contribution for Lanto's proportionate share of liability under the note from Arnold and WEA. 
V. The Lack of Foreclosure From a Holder of the Note is Not a Bar 
to Plaintiffs' Claims. 
Defendants have also suggested that the plaintiffs have no right to seek contribution from 
other obligors under the note because the note was not formally declared in default, no holder 
ever commenced foreclosure and/or the note was not collected by an attorney. 
The fact is that the note was almost continuously in default. It was extended twice 
through defendant Arnold at the frantic urging of the plaintiffs who feared foreclosure. The 
plaintiffs were informed that the note was sold to Jim Winkler because the Youngs were 
threatening foreclosure. ("I told (Winkler) the situation, and told him that I thought the Youngs 
were going to foreclose on the property, and that there was a substantial possibility that he could 
come in with Bob Norman and do a hotel if he would take care of that note." Arnold depo. at 
149) By mid-1996, defendants Larson and Arnold had expended the entire $160,000 in loan 
proceeds without advancing the Holiday Inn Project. Eventually, all of the note obligors simply 
abandoned the Normans without paying or offering to pay anything on the note. 
Meanwhile the note, secured solely by the plaintiffs' property remained outstanding and 
accruing interest at 18%, and the Normans, as a direct consequence of the failed venture were 
financially incapable of paying off the note. Under defendants' contention then, and given the 
fact that their property was worth considerably more than the note balance, the Normans would 
be forced to wait indefinitely for the creditor (earning 18%) to decide to foreclose. That position 
as a legal requirement is intolerable. 
Instead, the Normans were forced to take action in order to avoid losing the entire value 
of their property. It is through the Normans' initiative and good fortune that they were able to 
convince Mr. Winkler to purchase the subject property, agreeing that the entire note balance 
would be deducted from he purchase price. This was certainly not a favorable option to the 
Normans, who thereby lost any hope of participating in a potentially lucrative hotel project, as 
well as control over the property immediately adjacent to their existing waterpark. The Normans 
action was one of absolute financial survival, made necessary because the defendants had spent 
the entire loan proceeds and then abandoned the project. 
This Court has previously stated on several occasions that the least the Normans should 
be entitled to is proportionate contribution from other parties liable under the note. The plaintiffs 
hereby request that the Court now make that ruling as a matter of law. 
VI. For Purposes of Proportionate Liability Under the Note, Robert & Diane Norman 
Should be Held to be a Single Party as a Matter of Law. 
Robert & Diane Norman are husband and wife. The appear as separate parties on the 
Trust Deed and Note solely because they were joint owners of the secured property. No 
evidence exists to suggest that they were viewed for any purpose as separate entities or 
individual partners. Indeed, in the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement, Robert & 
Diane Norman are listed jointly with respect to their contribution and equity share. 
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Consequently, the Court should rule as a matter of law that there are 5 parties or shares of 
liability under the note, i.e., Robert & Diane Norman, Duane Barney, Greg Page. Norman Larson 
and Mark Arnold and WEA for Peter Lanto. 
VII. The Liabilty of Page and Barney Under the Note Should Be Divided Proportionately 
By the Non-Immune Parties. 
Since Greg Page and Duane Barney have obtained protection from liability pursuant to 
bankruptcy proceedings, an issue remains as to which parties should be responsible for their 
portion of liability under the note. Defendants claim that the Normans should have intervened in 
the bankruptcy proceedings or otherwise protected themselves. However, since liability under 
the note is joint and several, the defendants could have availed themselves of the same protection 
and/or filed cross-claims against Page and Barney. 
Moreover, several very good reasons exist to hold Arnold and Larson/WEA responsible 
for their fair share of Page and Barney's liability. 
1. On the same day as the Arnold/WEA purchase of Lanto's interest, Greg Page, 
from Arnold's office, sent a letter to Norman Larson dissolving 4-D Development Company. It 
was 4-D that had contracted for Larson's services to obtain funding for the project. 
2. Pursuant to that Service Agreement with Larson, Page had assigned his sole 
responsibility and/or supposed contribution to the project to Norman Larson/WEA 
3. At or about the same time as the Lanto purchase and 4-D dissolution, Mark 
Arnold prepared a General Power of Attorney for Duane Barney in favor of Greg Page. The 
Power of Attorney was necessary since Barney had returned to federal prison for a parole 
violation on a previous fraud conviction. 
»il 
4. The above facts were contemporaneously known to Arnold and Larson, while the 
plaintiffs were completely uniformed. 
5. Despite this knowledge, Arnold and Larson thereafter conducted themselves as 
partners in the Moab Holiday Inn project. 
Based on the foregoing, Arnold and Larson were fully aware that Page had contributed 
nothing and done nothing to advance the project, and that Barney had done nothing and had gone 
to prison. Their eventual abandonment of the project and bankruptcy were entirely foreseeable 
to Arnold and Larson. One the other hand, the Normans were informed by these same defendants 
that the project was on track, progressing and that Page and Barney were fully involved. 
Thus there is ample justification to hold Arnold and Larson/WEA liable for a 
proportionate share of Page and Barney's liability under the note. On the other hand, as it 
presently stands, the Normans have incurred 100% of the loss from the note and there is no 
justification for why they should be liable for contribution of any other obligor. Nevertheless, as 
a means of resolving this dispute, the plaintiffs are willing to be bound by a ruling that they must 
accept a proportionate share of the Page and Barney liability under the note. 
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Conclusion 
Plaintiffs' present Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is concerned solely with 
liability under the Young-Winkler Trust Deed Note. It is axiomatic that liability for the note 
must be the responsibility of its obligors. It is established by undisputed facts and documents 
that the obligation of Peter Lanto as a signatory on the note was purchased and assumed by Mark 
Arnold and WEA. 
Fairness and equity dictate that liability under the note fall as follows: 
Robert & Diane Norman 20% 
Duane Barney 20% 
Greg Page 20% 
Norman Larson 20% 
Mark Arnold (for Pete Lanto) 10% 
WEA (for Pete Lanto) 10% 
Though Page and Barney have obtained bankruptcy relief, their proportionate share of 
liability nevertheless had to be paid and was paid by the Normans. Principles of fairness and 
equity require that the liability of Page and Barney be assumed proportionately by the remaining 
obligors. The total liability assumed by the Normans under the note was $212,000. 
Wherefore, the plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court, as a matter of law based on 
undisputed facts, apportion liability under the note as follows: 
Robert & Diane Norman 331/3% $70,666,67 
Norman Larson 331/3% $70,666.67 
Mark Arnold 16 2/3% $35,333.33 
WEA 16 2/3% $35,333.33 
Request For Oral Argument 
Plaintiffs request that this Motion For Partial Summary Judgment be set for oral 
argument at the conclusion of the briefing. 
Dated this nt»* day of f\)c/^e^ht/Z^ , 200" 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
Mailing Certificate 
This is to certify that on the jc>h day of Ntwenb**^* 2000, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Motion For Partial Summary Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Norman Larson 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Matthew Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
15 West South Temple^ 
Salt Lake 
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James C. Haskins (#1406) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-0234 
Facsimile: (801)539-5210 
Attorneys for Defendant Norman M. Larson 
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CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY_ 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., and DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD, DUANE R. BARNEY, 
PETER LANTO, ERIC A. RASMUSSEN, 
GREGORY A. PAGE, and NORMAN 
M. LARSON, 
Defendants. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT 
LARSON'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Although the Plaintiffs dispute many of the factual allegations in the Defendant 
Larson's Motion for Summary Judgment, their disputations are simply bare allegations 
virtually unsupported by any citation to the record in this case. Instead, they oppose 
the Defendant's motion on the basis of a new affidavit by Plaintiff Robert Norman. 
Unfortunately, however, this new testimony conflicts with the Plaintiffs' own prior 
testimony in his deposition in this case, and is of no assistance to them in opposing the 
Defendant Larson's motion. 
Defendant Larson has demonstrated that the first cause of action in the 
amended complaint must fail because Larson was never a member of the Moab Land 
Development Joint Venture, which membership by Larson is alleged in paragraph 7 of 
the Amended Complaint. Both Plaintiff Norman and Defendant Larson testified that 
Larson was not a member of the joint venture. (Norman Depo., p. 27-29; 98; Larson 
Depo., p. 42, 59.) Nor was Larson's company, Western Empire Advisers, a member of 
the joint venture, despite proposals by the company to become such a member. 
(Exhibit I; Exhibit J, Norman Depo, pp. 89-90.) Now, contrary to the allegations 
contained in the amended complaint, Plaintiff Robert Norman seeks to salvage his case 
by asserting, for the first time, that Norman was a member of some other joint venture 
which attempted to develop the Holiday Inn project. (Norman Affidavit, unpagihated, p. 
2.) There is simply no evidence in the record supporting the existence of this other 
joint venture, and the Plaintiffs have not named the other members of that venture, nor 
have they brought suit against them. Even assuming, arguendo, the existence of such 
an additional entity, the amended complaint nowhere refers to it and does not base any 
cause of action on the conduct of any such additional entity. Where such a potential 
cause of action goes unalleged in a complaint, the complaint is subject to dismissal. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 850 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1993). In any event, if such an 
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additional joint venture existed at all, any damage to the Plaintiff caused by such a joint 
venture would be allocable among all of its members, see Salt Lake Knee & Sports 
Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 
J? 
Ct. App. 1995), and with the exception of Defendant Larson noneihe alleged members 
of the "other" joint venture have even been identified, let alone made defendants in the 
present action. 
Plaintiff Norman supports his allegation that Defendant Larson is a member of 
this "unnamed joint venture" by alleging, in his Affidavit (pages 3 and 4), that: 
1. Larson was consulted regarding financing for the Holiday Inn Project; 
2. Larson's name appeared as a co-obligor on the promissory note secured 
by the Norman's property which had been contributed to the joint venture; 
3. Plaintiff Norman had "subsequent knowledge" that Larson was "solely 
responsible for obtaining financing" and that "he would be entitled to a 
25% equity interest in the project;" 
4. Plaintiff Norman received a letter written by Greg Page identifying parties 
of the "then existing joint venture" as the Plaintiffs, Greg Page, Duane 
Barney, Mark Arnold, and Norman Larson; 
5. Plaintiff Norman believes that Larson was a member of this "other" joint 
venture based upon "documents obtained during the course of this 
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litigation wherein he [Larson] and others expressly state that he is a 
partner." 
The Defendant admits that he was consulted regarding financing on the project, 
but, for the reasons stated below, it is clear that he did not do so as a member of any 
joint venture. The other allegations are without any evidentiary support in the record 
The Plaintiff now contends that he acquiesced in and had no objection to 
Larson's alleged "involvement as a partner in the project." (Norman Affidavit, 
unpaginated, p. 4.) This testimony flies in the face of his testimony at his deposition 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Handing you what has been previously marked as 
Deposition Exhibit-
MR. RUSSELL: Nine. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) -9 , and ask you to take a look at that and tell me if 
you recognize it? 
MR. RUSSELL: This is a letter dated May 9,1996 from Norman Larson to 
you, regarding the joint venture-a joint venture proposal for the 
development of a franchise motel and refinancing of the waterpark 
located in Moab, Utah. 
THE WITNESS [Plaintiff Robert Norman]: I remember the letter, yes. 
(BY MR. HOWE) You recall seeing the letter? 
A. Yes. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you respond to the letter? 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Why didn't you respond to that letter? 
A. What we're talking about a partner, joint venture partner, no reference 
in this letter here to our joint venture partnership. And sticking to the 
subject of our partnership, it sounds like it was going off on a tangent 
somewhere. It just didn't make any sense to me. This proposal, it 
doesn't even fit our agreement that we have in joint venture, operating 
agreement. We have all our rules about the joint venture, we're supposed 
to notify each other and keep each other informed, and this is off on a 
tangent of everything that our agreement calls for, as far as I can tell. 
And I just didn't think it was relevant to even answer it. Too farfetched as 
far as I was concerned. 
Q. Did the proposal seem-aside from whether it would be against the 
spirit of any partnership, did the proposal seem sc jnd to you? 
A. What? 
Q. Did the proposal seem sound to you, to your recollection? 
A. I didn't pay much attention to that aspect of it. I just rejected and 
didn't see any need of pursuing it. I didn't even answer at the time. 
(Exhibit J, Norman Depo, pp. 89-90.) 
Far from acquiesing in Larson's participation in the project, Plaintiff Norman 
actively thwarted such participation by refusing to even respond to Larson's proposals 
for participation in the project. 
The Plaintiff also states that "[o]n or about April 10, 1996, I received a letter 
written by Greg Page identifying the partners of the then existing joint venture as (the 
Normans), Greg Page, Duane Barney, Mark Arnold and Norman Larson." (Norman 
Affidavit, unpaginated, p. 3.) He further suggests that, from the April 10, 1996, letter, 
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he learned uthat Norman Larson had been in complete control of the Young loan funds 
and had been assigned the responsibility to obtain financing for the project." (Norman 
Affidavit, unpaginated, p. 6.) A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit K, and it 
does not expressly identify the partners of any "existing joint venture," nor does it 
suggest that Larson was "in complete control of the Young loan funds." Further, it is 
notable that Plaintiff's testimony in his affidavit about the import of the letter is now 
significantly more pointed than what he offered in his deposition. There, he asserted 
only as follows with respect to the letter: 
THE WITNESS: I remember the letter, but I don't know when I received it, 
what the purpose or what Mr. Page's reason for sending this letter that 
are the details connected with this. He knew what he was asking for, I 
assume, but I don't know what-anything more than that. 
(Exhibit J, Norman Depo, p. 78.) 
Further, in Larson's own deposition, he testified that he never achieved any 
equity position in the joint venture as the result of his failure to obtain the requisite 
financing: 
Q And in the second paragraph, it says that we have decided to 
terminate our agreement with you to find financing for these projects. In 
regards to your share of the partnership — what was you share of the 
partnership? 
A I didn't have a share of the partnership because I hadn't provided 
financing. I wasn't the author of the document. 
(Exhibit L, Larson Depo, p. 107.) At best, therefore, Defendant Larson had only a 
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potential interest in any joint venture regarding the Holiday Inn Project, which potential 
interest never materialized because the Larson was unable to provide the financing for 
the project. 
Plaintiff Norman now insists that "[o]n May 1, 1996, Norman Larson promised 
and agreed that he would personally see to it that the Young loan was fully repaid, 
regardless of whether he obtained financing for the Moab Holiday Inn project." The 
Plaintiff makes no citation to the record in support of this assertion. However, from his 
testimony in his deposition, it is clear that this testimony is hearsay and refers to an 
alleged meeting among Larson, Arnold, Page, Barney, David Longnecker, and Diane 
Norman. (See Exhibit M [Norman Depo. Exh. 23], attached.) Plaintiff Robert Norman 
was not present at the alleged meeting: 
Q. Do you recall the meeting May 1st and 2nd in Salt Lake City, 
regarding the Holiday Inn project? 
A. I remember there [sic] going up there. We had a fire and that's the 
reason why we went up there, to see if they could made some contacts. 
But I wasn't there to — 
Q. You didn't attend the meetings? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Your wife and son, Bob, Jr. attended. Is that correct? 
A. That's right. She wrote this up, wrote this, apparently. I haven't 
read it. 
Page 7 
Q. What did either your wife or your son report back to you, if 
anything, regarding the contents of the meetings on May 1st and 2nd? 
A. The only thing I recall is that they had — they went to see Mr 
Larson during the course of the meeting. But I don't know what took 
place, who was there or anything. 
(Exhibit J, Norman Depo., pp. 83-84.) Given his lack of attendance at the meetings. 
and his own admission that he has no personal knowledge concerning what was said, 
what took place, or who attended the meetings, the proffered "evidence" is clearly 
inadmissible hearsay. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) provides that affidavits submitted in 
summary judgment proceedings "shall be made on personal knowledge," and shall "set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence." In the absence of admissible 
evidence, the Court should reject the Plaintiff's proffer. D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 
P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989). 
The Plaintiffs' assertions that Defendant Larson is somehow liable for their 
losses is simply insufficient to support the causes of action in the Amended Complaint. 
The Plaintiffs now appear to concede, as they must, that the Defendant was not a 
member of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture. But now, for the first time, they 
allege that the Defendant was a member of some other, unidentified joint venture, and 
that as such the Plaintiffs were somehow damaged. The Defendant is entitled to notice 
of what the Plaintiffs claim in the Complaint they filed with the Court, and that notice 
has not been forthcoming. Their various motions to further amend the Complaint have 
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been denied by the Court, and they should not now be heard to raise entirely new 
theories of recovery in a belated effort to defeat the Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment This is particulary true when the Plaintiffs have failed to join indispensable 
oarties to the litigation. Notably, the Defendant Larson at all times acted on behalf of 
Western Empire Advisers, Inc. ("WEA"), which corporation is not a party herein. The 
piatntiff seeks to avoid having to join WEA by asserting that Larson is the mere "alter 
^qo' of the company. Much more is required than this bare assertion, however to 
defeat a motion tor summary judgment. The Plaintiffs have offered virtually no 
evidence. To make a showing that the company is the alter ego of Defendant Larson, 
the Plaintiffs must show that there is such a unity of interest and ownership between 
the corporation and the individual that the separate personalities of the company and 
the individual no longer exist. They must also show that the observance of the 
corporate form would sanction a fraud or promote injustice See, e.g., Norman v. 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). The Plaintiffs have 
offered no evidence whatsoever in support of their claim. 
Similarly, the Plaintiffs offer no evidence to support there outlandlish claims 
concerning Larson's "knowledge." They simply assert what they suggest he knew with 
nc citation to the record in this case. (Plaintiffs' Response, pp. 9-10.) Such 
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unsupported assertions are simply insufficient to survive a motion for summary 
judgement. 
The Plaintiffs also insists that the Defendant "should be held proportionately 
responsible for the trust deed note as a matter of law." The Defendant has already 
addressed this argument in his Motion for Summary Judgment, and will not re-address 
that issue here. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted by the Court. 
DATED this 1st day of December, 2000. 
.. James C. Haskins 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply to Plaintiffs' 
Response to Defendant Larson's Motion for Summary Judgment was served on 
the 1st day of December, 2000, by mailing the same in U.S. Postal Service postage paid 
envelopes as follows: 
Steve Russell, Esq. 
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER, P.C. 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, Utah 84532 
Matthew Lalli, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., and DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARKE. ARNOLD, DUANE R. BARNEY, 
PETER LANTO, ERIC A. RASMUSSEN, 
GREGORY A. PAGE, and NORMAN 
M. LARSON, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
COMES NOW Defendant Norman M. Larson, by and through his undersigned 
counsel, and objects to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Plaintiffs suggest that, as a matter of law, Defendant's Arnold is liable to the 
Plaintiffs for a proportionate share of a promissory note signed by Defendant Arnold 
and others. The Plaintiffs' motion comes only after the Defendant has already moved 
for summary judgment with respect to this very issue, and only after the Plaintiffs' 
response to that motion has been filed with the Court. It is very clear that the Plaintiffs' 
motion is designed to fill in the evidentiary holes in their case pointed out to them in the 
Defendants own motion for summary judgment. As such, the Plaintiff's purported 
"evidence" comes too late and should be rejected by the Court. 
Even if the Plaintiffs' new motion is considered on its merits, however, it is wholly 
unpersuasive and fails to demonstrate why summary judgment should be granted in 
their favor on this issue. 
The fact is that the holders of the note, Ann and Norman Young, never 
foreclosed on the note at all and thus the Defendant incurred no direct liability with 
respect to the note. Nor have the Plaintiffs at any time maintained that they were third-
party beneficiaries under the note. The Plaintiffs maintain, however, that they were 
forced to sell the underlying realty and reduce the selling price by the amount of the 
note. There is simply no credible evidence in the record to support this assertion. Nor 
is there any evidence to show that the sale between the Plaintiffs and Winker was an 
arm's length transaction. If it was not, then the Plaintiffs are unable to support their 
assertion of the amount of damages based on the sale. 
The Plaintiffs also make numerous other unsupported factual allegations, such 
as that Defendant Larson was the alter ego of Western Empire Advisers, Inc ("WEA"). 
They make this bare assertion because they never bothered to join WEA as a party 
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herein and because Larson's activities in connection with the project were undertaken 
on behalf of WEA, a bona fide corporate entity with which he was admittedly 
associated The Plaintiffs also insist that WEA (the alleged but unproven alter ego of 
Defendant Larson) assumed, with Defendant Arnold, the obligation of Peter Lanto 
under the promissory note, and suggest that Arnold and Defendant Larson "expressly 
indemnified [Lanto] from any liability under the note." Plaintiffs' Motion, p. 2 This 
assertion is demonstrably incorrect. Exhibit 2, attached to the Plaintiffs' Motion, is not 
signed by Defendant Larson or by any representative of WEA; rather, it appears to be 
signed by Defendant Arnold as an agent of WEA. There is simply no evidence in the 
record to suggest that Arnold somehow acted as the agent of Larson in this transaction, 
Nor is there any evidence to support the Plaintiffs' assertion that Larson is the aiter-ego 
of WEA. Rather, the aiter-ego theory is a mere afterthought which is nowhere raised in 
the Plaintiffs' pleadings. As noted in the Defendant's Summary Judgment Reply, 
To make a showing that the company is the alter ego of Defendant 
Larson, the Plaintiffs must show that there is such a unity of interest and 
ownership between the corporation and the individual that the separate 
personalities of the company and the individual no longer exist They 
must also show that the observance of the corporate form would sanction 
a fraud or promote injustice. See, e.g., Norman v. Murray First Thrift & 
Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). The Plaintiffs have offered 
no evidence whatsoever in support of their claim. 
(Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 9.) 
The Plaintiffs also assert that their alleged damages are to be computed as the 
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full amount of the promissory note. They arrive at this startling proposition by insisting 
that they volunteered to pay off the note in connection with the sale of the subject 
property to a third party. As the Defendant Larson has tirelessly pointed out, however, 
the Plaintiffs have not at any time asserted in their pleadings or elsewhere that they 
were third party beneficiaries under the note. If they were not, their voluntary decision 
to pay off the note in connection with the sale gives them no right to enforce the terms 
of the note and no cause of action in their favor. See, e. g., Harper v. Great Salt Lake 
Council, Inc., 976 P.2d 1213 (Utah 1999), where the Court held that a purchaser was 
not a third party beneficiary of an agreement and thus had no standing to enforce the 
terms of the agreement. To establish that they were third party beneficiaries under the 
promissory note, the Plaintiffs must show that the parties to the note intended to confer 
separate and distinct benefits upon them. Id. They have not remotely made such a 
showing. See also, Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993); 
Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). More importantly, 
however, they have failed even to raise this issue in any of the pleadings they filed 
While the Plaintiffs correctly point out that Arnold and WEA "expressly assumed 
and indemnified any subsequent liability of Lanto under the note," Plaintiffs' Motion, p. 
3, this is of no help to them, since (a) the note was never foreclosed; (b) they do not 
claim to be, and are not, third party beneficiaries under the note; (c) Lanto is not a party 
Page 4 
herein; and (d) WEA is not a pany herein. Each of these immutable facts is 
independently fatal to their cause of action. 
The Plaintiffs attempt to show that WEA is the alter-ego of the Defendant Larson 
by belatedly asserting that there is no evidence in the record to suggest that WEA ever 
acted as a corporate entity, and that no corporate minutes or resolutions have been 
produced in this litigation. Because such corporate minutes or resolutions have not 
been requested, however, it is unsurprising that they have not been produced. 
But the Plaintiffs are flatly wrong in asserting that WEA never acted as a 
corporate entity. Clearly, it did so when it purported to purchase, with Arnold, the 
interest of Lanto in the Holiday Inn project. (Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 2.) Further, the 
purchase of the franchise was accomplished with a check on the account of Western 
Empire Financial Advisors, Inc., see Exhibit A, attached. Correspondence with Holiday 
Inn Worldwide Corporate Headquarters was written on the letterhead of the 
corporation, see Exhibit B; attached. An income and expense reconciliation for the 
project was prepared on the letterhead of the corporation, see Exhibit C, attached. The 
letter from Gregory Page expressing displeasure with Defendant Larson's financing 
efforts is directed to the offices of Western Empire Advisors, not to the individual 
defendant at his home, see Exhibit D, attached. The letter from the Defendant Larson 
to the Plaintiffs, offering to become a member of the joint venture, is written on Western 
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Empire Advisors, and the proposal is on behalf of that entity, not the Defendant Larson 
see Exhibit E. attached. In short, the Plaintiffs were at all times on notice that Larson s 
participation in securing financing for the project was undertaken by Western Empire 
Advisers, and not by Larson in his individual capacity. 
The Plaintiffs seek to persuade the Court that Larson held himself out as an 
"equity owner" in the Holiday Inn Franchise, citing his letter to Trust Guarantee 
Corporation dated November 3, 1995. (Plaintiffs' Motion, p. 6 ) The letter, however, is 
on the letterhead of Western Empire Advisers, and Larson, who admittedly was 
President of that entity, does not at any time hold himself out as acting for his own 
account and not on behalf of WEA. See Exhibit F, attached. Additionally, however, as 
Larson has acknowledged, the potential 'equity position" never materialized because 
the financing efforts were unsuccessful. (Exhibit G, Larson Depo., p. 107.) 
The Plaintiffs also suggest that the Court should allow yet another amendment to 
the Complaint to permit them to name WEA as a party. The Plaintiffs' other motions to 
add additional parties have all been denied by the Court and, treating their suggestion 
to the Court as an informal motion, the Court should simply not allow the addition of a 
new party defendant at this late date. This is particularly true where the Plaintiffs have 
offered no explanation for the tardiness of their request. See Chadwick v. Nielsen, 
763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah App. 1988). 
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The Plaintiffs aiso suggest that Peter Lanto is not an indispensable party and 
that it should not have been necessary to include him as a Defendant herein. Rule 19 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, inter alia, that a party must be joined if 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the 
dispos.tion of the action in his absence may operate to his prejudice Lanto was an 
original member of the joint venture project and, by a purchase agreement dated 
October 27, 1995, purported to sell that interest to Defendant Arnold and to WEA. One 
consideration for the agreement was that the purchasers agreed "to hold [Lanto] 
harmless from any and all claims arising out of the development of the above-
mentioned projects, including but not limited to tort claims and claims on any notes for 
money's previously borrowed totaling $160,000.00 * See Purchase Agreement, Exhibit 
H. In the instant case, it is notable that the Plaintiffs assert liability against Arnold and 
WEA based upon this provision, but it is clear they do not seek recovery directly on the 
note Rather, their claim is based on the loss allegedly occasioned by their subsequent 
sale of the property. Because that loss is not one directly based upon the note, the 
Plaintiffs may subsequently argue that Lanto is not protected by Defendant Arnold's 
"hold harmless" clause and is thus still liable to them in his own capacity. This is 
precisely the harm that Rule 19 was intended to prevent. Lanto is an indispensable 
pany because, without his presence in this litigation, it is possible that liability may still 
Page 7 
be imposed upon him in subsequent litigation with one cr another of the parties herein, 
A party is "indispensable" and must be joined in litigation uto guard against the entry of 
judgments which might prejudice the rights of such parties in their absence." Cowen & 
Co. V. Atlas Stock Transfer Co , 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah 1984). Lanto is just such a 
party. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs suggest that they may pursue an action based upon the 
promissory note without joining the obligees and despite the fact that the obligees 
never foreclosed on the note. As a general rule, joint obligees are deemed 
indispensable parties in a suit against an obligor. Seftef v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.,2d 
941, 94S (Utah Ct App. 1989), citing Bracken Tie, Lumber & Chip Co. v. McLarty 
Farms, inc., 704 F.2d 585, 586 (11th Cit 1983). If, as the Plaintiffs contend, they are 
seeking recovery on the promissory note itself, then the obligees are plainly 
indispensable parties. If they seek recovery on some other basis (e.g., a claim that 
they are somehow third party beneficiaries under the note), that theory has simply 
never been pleaded and cannot be raised at the eleventh hour-
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For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be denied by the Court 
DATED this 13th day of December, 2000 
, JCZ- r^Al*/^ 
^ - ' ' " . „--"James C. Haskins 
(^ ....-•' Attorney for Defendant Larson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgments/as served on the 13th day of December, 2000, by mailing the 
same in U.S. Postal Service postage paid envelopes addressed as follows 
Steve Russell, Esq. 
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER, P.C. 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab. UT 84532 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Matthew L Lalli, Esq 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 West South Temple. Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, UT84101 
This is further to certify that a copy of the foregoing Objection to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was sensed on December 12, 2000, vis 
facsimile to Mr. Russell at (435) 259-7321; and via facsimile to Mr. Lalli at (435) 257-
1800. 
\Thomas N. Thompson | 
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Matthew L.Lalli (#6105) 
Amy F. Sorenson (#8947) 
SNELL & WILMERL.L.P. 
Gateway Tower West 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR, & DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT MARK E. ARNOLD'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Civil No.: 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") hereby moves this Court 
for an Order granting partial summary judgment on the First and Second Causes of Action of 
plaintiffs Robert and Diane Norman's ("the Normans") Amended Complaint, such that final 
judgment in this action shall award judgment as follows: 
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1. Arnold is not liable to the Normans for breach of contract 
as alleged in the Normans5 First Cause of Action; and 
2. Arnold is not liable to the Normans for default of trust deed 
note as alleged in the Normans' Second Cause of Action. 
This motion is made upon the ground that there are no triable issues of material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to partial summary judgment on the Normans' two remaining 
causes of action as a matter of law. This motion is based upon the memorandum of points and 
authorities, the statement of material undisputed facts, the affidavits and exhibits, all of which 
are concurrently filed and served herewith. 
By agreement of all parties during a telephonic hearing before this Court on December 
12, 2000, Arnold's motion for summary judgment will be heard concurrently with defendant 
Norman Larson's motion for summary judgment, scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on December 15, 
2000. 
DATED th i sy^ / j day of December, 2000 
SNELL & W I L M E R L L P . 
Matthew L. Lalli 
Amy F. Sorenson 
Attorneys for Mark Arnold 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on this _ . day of December, 2000, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be sent by Federal Express or delivered by hand, to. 
Steve Russell, Esq 
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, UT 84532 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
James C Haskins, Esq. 
Haskins & Associates, P.C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Norman M Larson 
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Matthew L Lalli (#6105) 
Amy F Sorenson (#8947) 
SNELL& VVrLMERL.L.P. 
Gateway Tower West 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT MARK E. ARNOLDS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Civil No.: 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") hereby moves this Court for an order granting 
partial summary judgment on the First and Second Causes of Action in plaintiffs Robert and 
Diane Norman's (the "Normans") amended complaint. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a previous motion for partial summary judgment, the Court correctly concluded on the 
law and undisputed facts that Arnold never acted as the personal attorney for the Normans, and 
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therefore never owed them fiduciary duties. The Court accordingly dismissed the third claim in 
the Normans' complaint for breach of fiduciary duty. Because the fourth claim for punitive 
damages was predicated entirely on the fiduciary duty claim, the Court dismissed that as well. 
Since the Court heard and granted the previous summary judgment motion, the parties 
have concluded discovery, prepared for trial, briefed and argued motions in limine and two 
motions to amend the complaint, and indeed began the trial, which unfortunately ended in a 
mistrial because of a juror's nondisclosure. During those arguments, it became clear that the 
Normans lack the factual evidence and legal authority to support even their remaining two claims 
for breach of the joint venture agreement and breach of the trust deed note. Accordingly, and at 
the Court's suggestion, Arnold now moves for summary judgment on these remaining two 
claims. 
The first claim, for breach of the joint venture agreement, (the "Agreement") fails as a 
matter of law because Arnold never became a party to the agreement he is accused of breaching. 
It is undisputed that he never signed the agreement and never assented to be bound by its terms. 
Moreover, Arnold did not become bound by the agreement by becoming a partner in the joint 
venture. To become a partner, both Utah law and the agreement itself require unanimous 
consent of the remaining partners. It is undisputed that the Normans "never" consented to admit 
Arnold to the partnership. Nor is there any evidence that any of the other partners consented to 
admit Arnold to the partnership. Arnold simply could not have breached an agreement to which 
he was never a party, and he is entitled to summary judgment on the Normans' first claim for 
that reason. 
The second claim for breach of the trust deed note fails as a matter of law as well. The 
note was made by six co-obligors - Robert Norman, Diane Norman, Greg Page, Duane Barney, 
Peter Lanto, and Norman Larson - in favor of the Youngs, who loaned the joint venture 
$160,000. Like the joint venture agreement, Arnold is not a signatory on the note and never 
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agreed to be bound by it. The Normans admit this, but contend instead that Arnold became 
liable on the note through the back door. Four months after the note was executed, Arnold and 
Western Empire Advisors entered into a "Purchase Agreement" under which they purported to 
purchase Lanto's interest in the joint venture and to indemnify him against liability on the note. 
The Normans ask the court to overlook basic concepts of privity and standing, and treat Arnold's 
indemnification of Lanto as an indemnification of them. There is no precedent for such a theory, 
of course, because Arnold's duties under the Purchase Agreement run only to Lanto, not the 
Normans, and Lanto's obligations under the note run only to the Youngs, not his co-obligors, the 
Normans. If Lanto were found liable on the note, he could sue Arnold and Western Empire 
Advisors for indemnification, but under no circumstances do the Normans have a cause of action 
against the indemnitor - Arnold and Western Empire Advisors - of one of their co-obligors, 
Lanto. Arnold therefore is entitled to summary judgment on the second claim as well. 
II. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
A, Background. 
1. On March 15, 1995, the Normans, Barney, Lanto, and Rasmussen executed a 
document entitled "Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement" (the "Agreement") A 
true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit l.1 
2. The members of "the group," the original joint venture partners, were Robert and 
Diane Norman, Duane Barney, Pete Lanto, and Greg Page. 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 24:17-25:8, 
true and correct excerpts from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 
3. Each of these individuals had "a different role" to play. Ex. 2, 3/30/00 D. 
Norman Dep. 34:20-23. The Normans were to donate the real property, Page was to "arrange for 
1
 Unless otherwise indicated, the exhibits referred to in diis memorandum are authenticated by the 
Normans' deposition testimony. Deposition excerpts authenticating the exhibits are located immediately 
behind each exhibit 
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financing/' Lanto was to construct the Holiday Inn, and Barney was to oversee the "operation 
and management" of the Holiday Inn once construction was complete Id_ at 34 20-36 1 
4 Page hired Norman Larson to assist in obtaining financing Larson in turn 
introduced the joint venture partners to Mark Arnold, who became the lawyer for the joint 
venture Affidavit of Mark E Arnold ("Arnold Aff'), a true and correct copy of which is filed 
concurrently herewith 
5 The first step toward development was to obtain short-term financing to purchase 
two things the Holiday Inn Franchise for 540,000 and another larger sum of money to cover 
miscellaneous up-front costs and to use as seed money to obtain a construction loan Ex 2, D 
Norman Dep 59 24-60 5, see also 3/30/00 B Norman Dep 61 2-7, true and correct excerpts 
from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 3 Arnold introduced the joint venture partners to Ann 
and Norman Young, who would provide this short-term financing Arnold Aff, ^ 7, Ex 3, 
3/30/00 B Norman Dep 32 13-19 
6. The Youngs agreed to make a short-term loan for $160,000, payable in 90 days, at 
18 percent interest and with loan fees totaling 12 points Arnold Aff, U 7 A true and correct 
copy of the promissory note is attached hereto as Exhibit 4 
7 The Normans, Page, Barney, Lanto, and Larson all signed the promissory note, 
Arnold did not See Am Compl, ^ 18, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 5 
8. The Normans agreed to pledge their property as collateral, and signed a deed of 
trust in the Youngs' favor Arnold Aff, p A true and correct copy of the deed of trust is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 6 The loan proceeds were placed into a trust account owned by 
Larson, and Larson was the only person with signature authority Id. 
9 On October 27, 1995, pursuant to a "Purchase Agreement," Lanto purported to 
sell his interest in the joint venture to Mark Arnold and Western Empire Advisors, a company 
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ownedby Larson, for $8,500. Ex 3, 3/30/00 B Norman Dep. 6422-66:13. The Purchase 
Agreement does not mention or identify the Normans in any way. A true and correct copy of the 
purported purchase agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 7. 
10. The purchase agreement provides that "[i]n consideration of Seller selling his 
interest, Purchaser agrees to hold Seller harmless from any and all claims arising out of the 
development of [the Moab Holiday Inn project], including but not limited to tort claims and 
claims on any notes for moneys previously borrowed totaling $160,000." See Ex. 7, f^ 2. 
11. Larson obtained the Holiday Inn franchise and over the next year Page and Larson 
attempted to obtain financing, but to no avail. 8/25/99 B. Norman Dep. 52:13-23, true and 
correct excerpts from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 8; Arnold Aff. ^ 9. Although Arnold 
persuaded the Youngs to extend the promissory note several times, when Larson's financing 
efforts failed, foreclosure on the note was imminent. Arnold Aff. ^ 9; Ex. 2, 3/30/00 D. Norman 
Dep. 65:5-18. 
12. In an effort to help the joint venture avoid foreclosure, Arnold introduced them to 
Jim Winkler, who purchased the property from the Normans and paid off the Young note. Ex. 3, 
3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 71:14-73:4. At the closing on Winkler's purchase, $212,000 of the 
sales proceeds was paid to the Youngs for release of their trust deed. Arnold Aff, ^ 10. 
B. The Normans Did Not Consent to Arnold's Admission as a Partner. 
13. The Agreement provided that "[additional Joint Venturers may be added to the 
Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint Venturers" Ex. 1 
(emphasis added). 
14. Mr. Norman has twice testified that u[n]obody asked [him] about" Arnold 
becoming a member of the joint venture, and that he never consented to Arnold's admission: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli]. . . . You never gave your consent for Mark 
Arnold to become an owner in the hotel part? 
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\ [By Mr Norman] Nobody asked me about that 
Q Okay So because nobody asked you, you therefore never 
consented, right9 
A Right 
Ex 3, 3/30/00 B Norman Dep 71 7-13 
Q [By Mr Howe] Did you ever give your consent for any other 
individual to become a member of the joint venture? 
A [By Mr Norman] The answer is no 
Ex 8, 8/25/99 B Norman Dep 28 23-29 3 
15 Diane Norman also testified that she never consented to Arnold becoming a joint 
venture partner 
Q [By Mr Lalli] Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold 
becoming a partner7 
A [By Mrs Norman] Never 
Q Okay Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold purchasing 
Lanto's interest9 
A Never 
Ex 2, 3/30/00 D Norman Dep 95 13-18 
n i . ARGUMENT 
The judgment sought in a motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law " Utah R Civ P 56(c) Under this standard, as 
6 
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demonstrated below, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on the Normans' First and Second 
Causes of Action. 
A. Arnold Is Not Liable for Breach of the Joint Venture Agreement Because 
He Did Not Become a Joint Venture Partner As a Matter of Law. 
In the first cause of action, the Normans contend that Arnold breached the Agreement in 
a number of ways. As a predicate to establish liability for breach of the Agreement, however, the 
Normans first must prove that Arnold became a party to the Agreement and voluntarily assumed 
the rights and obligations under the Agreement. See, e.g., Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375, 
1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (observing that mutual assent of parties to a contract is "essential" to 
create binding contract); Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) ("[a] binding contract 
can only exist where there has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be 
bound by its terms.") The undisputed facts negate this fundamental element of the Normans' 
breach of contract claim, and conclusively demonstrate that Arnold was not a party to the 
Agreement and never became a partner in the joint venture. 
It is undisputed that Arnold never signed the Agreement or assented to its terms. The 
face of the Agreement itself demonstrates that Arnold is not a signatory. .See Ex. 1. Neither is 
there any evidence that Arnold signed or assented to any amendment to the Agreement. Thus, 
there is no evidence on which the Normans can base a claim that Arnold expressly became a 
party to the Agreement. 
Even if Arnold had signed the Agreement or intended to become a partner in the joint 
venture, the undisputed facts further demonstrate that Arnold was not a partner as a matter of 
law. In Utah, "subject to any agreement between them . . . [n]o person can become a member of 
a partnership without the consent of all the partners." Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-15(7) (supp. 
1999); see also 59A Am.Jur.2d §§ 109, PARTNERSHIP ("[N]o person can become a member of a 
partnership without the consent of all partners.") In Folsom v. Fernstrom, 134 P. 1021, 1024 
7 
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(Utah 1913) the Utah Supreme Court upheld a verdict for the plaintiff finding that the defendant 
had not become a member of the plaintiffs failed real estate partnership because there was 
insufficient evidence that the plaintiff had consented to the defendant's admission to the 
partnership. In so doing, the supreme court observed that "[o]f course [defendant] could not 
become a member of the partnership without the consent of both [the plaintiff] and [the co-
defendant], the original members of the firm." Fo[som, 134 P. at 1024. 
Here, the Agreement specifically provides that "[additional Joint Venturers may be 
added to the Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint 
Venturers." Ex. 1, Article 1.7 (emphasis added). Mr. Norman has twice testified that "[n]obody 
asked [him] about" Arnold becoming a member of the joint venture, and that he never consented 
to Arnold's admission. Def's Statement Undisputed Material Facts ^ 14. Likewise, Diane 
Norman testified that she "never" consented to Arnold's admission as a joint venture partner. Id 
at ^ 15. In addition, the Normans' breach of contract claim itself specifically acknowledges that 
if Arnold became a joint venture partner, he did so "contrary to [the Joint Venture Agreements] 
provisions." Ex. 5, ffij 31(e), 43(e). 
It is undisputed that the Normans did not consent to Arnold becoming a joint venture 
partner. Moreover, the Normans have adduced no evidence that the other joint venture partners 
consented, even if the Normans did. As a result, the Agreement and Utah Code § 48-1-15(7) 
provide that Arnold cannot claim membership in the joint venture, and cannot have any rights or 
obligations whatsoever under the Agreement. It is black-letter law that Arnold cannot breach a 
contract - the Agreement - to which he was never a party, for an obligation he never undertook. 
See, e.g., Soule v. Weatherbv, 118 P. 833, 834 (Utah 1911) ("[i]n the obligation assumed by the 
defendant is found his duty, and his failure to comply with the duty constitutes the breach"); 
Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962). 
8 
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As a result, the Normans' claim for breach of the Agreement against Arnold fails as a 
matter of law. 
B. The Normans' Claim for Default of Trust Deed Note Fails Because Arnold 
Did Not Become Liable to the Normans Under the Trust Deed Note. 
In their second cause of action, the Normans claim that Arnold became liable to them 
under the trust deed and promissory note because ^defendant Arnold purchased and/or acquired 
the position of defendant Lanto" in the joint venture. Ex. 5, Am. Compl., 1{ 48. Furthermore, 
because the note provides for ujoint and several liability," the Normans claim that any obligor on 
the note - except themselves - is therefore liable for the foil amount of the note plus interest, a 
number allegedly in excess of $200,000. Id at ffij 51-52. In order to establish such a claim, the 
Normans must prove that (1) Arnold became obligated to the Normans under the trust deed note; 
(2) that the trust deed note was called due and went into default; and (3) that Arnold was 
obligated to and failed to pay part or all of the amounts due under the trust deed note. See, e.g., 
Grossen v. Dewitt 982 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (appellants defaulted on promissory 
note and trust deed where they failed to pay principal and interest installments, property taxes, 
and fire insurance on the property as required by the trust deed and note.) As shown below, the 
Normans cannot establish the first element of their claim as a matter of law. 
In the first place, the promissory note was made in June 1995. It was signed by Robert 
and Diane Norman, Page, Barney, Lanto, and Larson. The note is payable to the Youngs, who 
loaned the $160,000 to the joint venture. It is undisputed that Arnold did not sign the promissory 
note and therefore cannot be liable as a signatory. See Ex. 5, Am. Compl., % 18. 
Acknowledging that Arnold is not directly liable on the note, the Normans claim that 
Arnold became obligated on the note indirectly when he and Western Empire Advisors entered 
into the Purchase Agreement some four months later. The Purchase Agreement, however, does 
not make Arnold liable to the Youngs, as holders of the note. And it certainly does not make 
9 
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Arnold liable to the Normans, who are co-obligors on the note. Rather, the Purchase Agreement 
provides that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors "agree[d] to hold Seller [i e , Lanto] 
harmless from any and all claims . . . on any notes for moneys previously borrowed totaling 
$160,000." Ex. 7. Thus, assuming the Purchase Agreement is enforceable at all, at most it 
creates a duty in Arnold and Western Empire Advisors to indemnify Lanto, for Lanto \s liability 
under the promissory note. If Lanto were ever found to be liable to the Youngs under the note, 
therefore, he may have a claim against Arnold and Western Empire Advisors for 
indemnification. Absolutely nothing in the Purchase Agreement or the law establishes any 
contractual privity or contractual rights and obligations between Arnold and the Normans. *kIt is 
axiomatic in the law of contract that a person not in » rivity cannot sue on a contract." Shire Dev 
v. Frontier Invs.. 799 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Nor can the Normans establish that they are intended third party beneficiaries of the 
Purchase Agreement. Miller v. Martineau & Co., 983 P.2d 1107, 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In 
order "to have enforceable rights under the contracts," the Normans must "establish that [they] 
[were] intended beneficiarfies] of one or more of those contracts." Id Moreover, "the intent of 
the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit [on a third party] must be clear." 
American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Inc.. 903 P.2d 11182, 1188 (Utah 
1996). Thus, third parties who benefit "only incidentally from the performance of a contract 
[have] no right to recover." Miller, 983 P.2d at 1114-15, quoting Broadwater v. Old Republic 
Sur, 854 P.2d 527, 537 (Utah 1993). Here, far from being "clear" on this point, the Purchase 
Agreement nowhere indicates that the Normans were its "intended beneficiaries." In fact, the 
Purchase Agreement does not mention the Normans at all. Ex. 7. There is no evidence outside 
the Purchase Agreement to suggest that the Normans were intended third party beneficiaries 
either. In short, the Normans cannot establish that they were intended third-party beneficiaries of 
the Lanto purchase agreement. As a result, they have no means of asserting Lanto's purported 
10 
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rights of indemnification against Arnold and Western Empire Advisors The Normans' second 
cause of action fails as a matter of law 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Normans' complaint attempts to assert claims for breach of the Agreement against 
Arnold and Larson, who never became partners in the joint venture. It seeks repayment in full of 
an obligation the Normans are partially liable for themselves from Arnold, who never signed the 
promissory note or otherwise agreed to be liable with or for them for that debt. As matters of 
law, neither of these claims may proceed. Accordingly, Arnold respectfully requests that the 
Court enter summary judgment in his favor on the First and Second Causes of Action in the 
Normans' complaint. 
DATED this /2- day of December, 2000. 
S N E L L & W I L M E R L L . P 
Matthew L. Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on this /2s day of December, 2000, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be sent by Federal Express or hand-delivered to: 
Steve Russell, Esq. 
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, UT 84532 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
James C. Haskins, Esq. 
Haskins & Associates, P.C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Norman M. Larson 
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CLERK OF THE COURT 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICUL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK E. ARNOLD 
Civil No.: 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
: ss. 
SORENSA\SLC\l 29438 
Mark E. Arnold, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a real estate and land use lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Utah 
and a defendant in the above-entitled action. I am competent in every respect to make this 
affidavit, and do so on the basis of my personal knowledge. 
2. I am a partner at the law firm of Arnold & Wiggins, L.C. Neither my law firm 
nor I have ever provided legal services of any kind to Robert or Diane Norman individually. 
3. Neither my law firm nor I have ever received payment for legal services of any 
kind from Robert or Diane Norman individually. 
4. I am not a signatory to the March 15, 1995 joint venture agreement at issue in this 
action. 
5. I never sought nor received the consent of the joint venture partners to become a 
partner of the Moab Land Development joint venture. 
6. In 1995, Norman Larson introduced me to Greg Page and Duane Barney, who 
were partners in the Moab joint venture. Subsequently, I performed various tasks for the joint 
venture. 
7. I introduced the joint venture partners to Ann and Norman Young. The Youngs 
provided the joint venture with initial financing in the form of a short-term loan for $160,000, 
payable in 90 days, at 18 percent interest and with loan fees totaling 12 points. 
8. As collateral for the short-term financing, the Normans agreed to pledge the 8.33 
acres of property they had previously contributed to the joint venture, and signed a deed of trust 
on the property in the Young's favor. The loan proceeds were placed into a trust account owned 
by Larson, and only Larson had signature authority. 
SORENSA\SLCM 29438 
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9. Larson obtained the Holiday Inn franchise and over the next year Page and Larson 
attempted to obtain financing, but were unsuccessful. I persuaded the Youngs to extend the 
promissory note several times. When Larson's financing efforts failed, I believed that 
foreclosure proceedings were imminent. 
10. In an effort to help the joint venture avoid foreclosure, I introduced the Normans 
to Jim Winkler, who purchased the property from them and paid off the Young note. 
DATED this _5^_ day of May, 2000. 
Mark E. Arnold 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to this ^ £ _ day of May, 2000. 
2 - 1 ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KAREN A. BUTTON 
111 East Broadway #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Commission Expires 
June 10, 2000 
C^C^i^j^ I^>CJL^A (yy^j 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
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I hereby certify on this /I day of December, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Steve Russell, Esq. 
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, UT 84532 
James C. Haskins 
Haskins & Associates 
357 South 200 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Tab 31 
Matthew L.Lalli (#6105) 
Amy F. Sorenson (#8947) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
Gateway Tower West 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE 1 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Civil No.: 9807-116 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") respectfully submits this memorandum in 
opposition to plaintiffs Robert and Diane Norman's (the "Normans") motion for partial 
summary j udgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In their motion for partial summary judgment, the Normans argue that, by virtue of 
signing an October 27, 1995 Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement"), Arnold and 
defendant Norman Larson's company, Western Empire Advisors, "specifically assumed" Pete 
Lanto's liability as a co-obligor on a June 1995 promissory note. Norman Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment ("Norman Motion") at 2. They conclude that Arnold and Western Empire 
Advisors therefore are liable to the Normans on the note as a matter of law. IcL Convenient as 
this argument is for the Normans, the Purchase Agreement in no way accomplishes such a feat. 
In fact, as Arnold's motion for summary judgment demonstrates, the Purchase Agreement at 
most creates a duty in Arnold and Western Empire Advisors to indemnify Lanto for his liability 
under the note to the Youngs. See, ej*., Arnold Motion for Summary Judgment ("Arnold 
Motion") at 11. The Purchase Agreement creates no obligation for Arnold to pay any money to 
the Youngs, who were holders of the note, and it certainly creates no obligation for Arnold to 
indemnify the Normans, who were co-obligors on the note. 
Despite making such an untenable legal argument, the Normans do not cite even one case 
on which they might base their claims to judgment "as a matter of law." Instead, they have 
chosen to set forth irrelevant deposition testimony and to recycle arguments already fully briefed 
and ruled upon by this Court in Arnold's favor. The Normans' motion should be denied on its 
face, and also for the reasons cited in Arnold's renewed motion for summary judgment, which is 
incorporated by this reference. 
II. RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In support of their motion, the Normans set forth seven paragraphs of "facts." However, 
only the first three facts indicate their source. See Norman Motion at 1-2. Accordingly, Arnold 
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generally objects to "facts" four through seven as completely lacking in foundation, and further 
specifically responds to the Normans' Statement of Facts as follows:1 
2. Disputed that the note was signed by "Robert and Diane Norman, husband and 
wife." Norman Motion at 1. The note was indeed signed by Robert Norman, Diane Norman, 
Greg Page, Duane Barney, and Larson, as the Normans state, but nothing on the face of the 
document itself indicates that the Normans signed it in any other than their individual capacities. 
6/00 Promissory Note, Norman Motion, Exhibit 1. 
3. Disputed that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors "specifically assumed 
[Lanto's] obligation under the note," by virtue of signing the Purchase Agreement, as the 
Normans claim. Norman Motion at 1-2. In fact, the Purchase Agreement provides only that 
Arnold and Western Empire Advisors are to "hold Seller [Lanto] harmless from any and all 
claims arising out of the development of the above-mentioned projects, including . . . claims on 
any notes for moneys previously borrowed totaling $160,000." 10/27/95 Purchase Agreement, 
Norman Motion, Exhibit 2. The Normans' claim that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors 
somehow replaced Lanto as a signator on the note by virtue of signing the Purchase Agreement 
has no basis in law or fact. 
6. Disputed that the Normans "incurred a loss of $212,000" in the sale of the 
property to Jim Winkler to retire the note. Norman Motion at 2. In fact, other than this very sale 
to Winkler, no evidence of the property's fair market value has yet been introduced in this action 
at all. However, the precise value of the property - the security for the note - is not material to 
determining Arnold's liability on a note which he did not sign, as shown below. 
1
 Arnold's numbering corresponds to the numbering used in the Normans' motion for summary judgment. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Purchase Agreement Does Not Create Any Rights in the Normans As a 
Matter of Law. 
Despite the undisputed fact that neither Arnold nor Western Empire Advisors signed the 
note, the Normans claim that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors nevertheless are liable as c o -
obligors to the Normans "as a consequence of their purchase of Lanto's interest and express 
indemnification of Lanto from liability under the note." Norman Motion at 3. Contrary to the 
plain language of the Purchase Agreement, the Normans claim that Arnold and Western Empire 
Advisors "expressly assumed and indemnified any subsequent liability of Lanto under the note" 
somehow making Arnold and Western Empire Advisors liable to the Normans, rather than to 
Lanto, or even to the Youngs. Id. The Normans' interpretation of the Purchase Agreement is 
wrong. 
The Purchase Agreement provides that "Purchaser [Arnold and Western Empire 
Advisors] agrees to hold Seller [Lanto] harmless from any and all claims arising out of the 
development of the above-mentioned projects, including . . . claims on any notes for moneys 
previously borrowed totaling $160,000." See Norman Motion, Exhibit 2; Arnold Motion at f 9. 
The Purchase Agreement does not mention or identify the Normans, and Arnold and Western 
Empire Advisors nowhere agree to "expressly assume . . .any subsequent liability of Lanto under 
the note," within the document, as the Normans claim. Norman Motion at 3. At most, the 
Purchase Agreement creates in Arnold and Western Empire Advisors a duty to indemnify Lanto, 
for Lanto's liability under the promissory note to Ann and Norman Young, the note's obligees. 
See Norman Motion, Exhibits 1 and 2. Thus, if Lanto were found to be liable to the Youngs 
under the note, he may have a claim against Arnold and Western Empire Advisors for 
indemnification. Nothing in the law, or in the Purchase Agreement itself, renders Arnold and 
Western Empire Advisors liable to any of the note's other co-obligors besides Lanto. The 
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Normans cite no caselaw or language in the Purchase Agreement which would allow the Court to 
so find. 
Instead, the Normans set forth excerpts from Arnold's and Larson's depositions, claiming 
that this testimony "establishes] the liability of Arnold and [Western Empire Advisors] as a 
matter of law." Norman Motion at 4-5. More likely, the Normans are trying to create a question 
of fact where none exists, because none of the testimony cited supports such a conclusion. For 
example, the Normans quote Arnold's consistent response to Mr. Russell's repeated questions 
about whether "the purchasers of [Lanto's] interest" became liable on the promissory note, 
apparently as evidence that Arnold believed he became liable on the note through the Purchase 
Agreement. The testimony they quote, however, supports the exact opposite conclusion: "I 
believe [the Purchase Agreement] obligates Mr. Lanto and all signators to the lender." Norman 
Motion at 4. This was so, Arnold explains, in order to "ensure that Ann Young and the lenders 
were paid back." Id, Arnold's testimony that the Purchase Agreement continued to "obligate 
Mr. Lanto and all signators" on the note to the Youngs is entirely consistent with the language of 
the agreement itself, which describes only a duty of indemnification. Indeed, if Arnold and 
Western Empire Advisors had "assumed" Lanto's obligation on the note, as the Normans claim, 
indemnification of Lanto would not be necessary at all. 
The Normans then relate equally inapposite portions from Larson's deposition, 
apparently setting forth Larson's understanding that the "intent" behind the Purchase Agreement 
was for Arnold and Western Empire Advisors to acquire Lanto's partnership interest in the joint 
venture. Norman Motion at 5. Setting aside the testimony's obvious lack of foundation, 
Larson's statement goes only to whether Arnold ever became a partner, and the Normans have 
not moved for summary judgment on that claim. Larson's alleged belief that Arnold bought an 
interest in the partnership has no bearing on Arnold's liability as a co-obligor on a note which he 
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did not sign. Moreover, even if the partnership claim were at issue here, the testimony would be 
equally useless, because in order to prevail on a breach of partnership agreement claim, the 
Normans must establish that all of the joint venturers consented to Arnold's admission, and they 
have repeatedly testified that they "never" did so. See Arnold Motion at TfiJ 13-15; see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-1-15(7) (supp. 1999). 
The Purchase Agreement, if anything, is a contract between Arnold, Western Empire 
Advisors, and Lanto. At most, it creates a right of indemnification running from Arnold and 
Western Empire Advisors to Lanto. That it somehow could render Arnold a co-obligor with the 
Normans on the note to the Youngs - or worse, that it could render Arnold liable to the Normans 
themselves - is a legal and logical impossibility. The Normans' motion for summary judgment 
on this basis should be denied, and Arnold's granted. 
B. Even If Lanto's Right of Indemnification Somehow Could Run to the 
Normans, the Court Cannot Adjudicate Lanto's Liability Without His 
Presence. 
The Normans next claim that, without Lanto's presence in court and "as a matter of law," 
the Court somehow can find Lanto liable to the Normans, and then pass that "proportionate share 
of liability" directly on to Arnold and Western Empire Advisors. Norman Motion at 7. 
According to the Normans, Lanto is necessarily liable to them (apparently, in an amount of their 
counsel's choosing) simply because "he signed the note." Id. After having assessed Lanto's 
liability in this manner, the Normans contend that the Court can pass that liability on to Arnold 
and Western Empire Advisors by virtue of the Purchase Agreement. The infirmities in this 
argument are numerous and profound. 
As shown above, Arnold did not "assume" Lanto's liability on the note by signing the 
Purchase Agreement. At most, he agreed to indemnify Lanto, necessarily indicating that Lanto 
would not be released under the note. It does not follow that this right of indemnification 
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somehow translates into co-obligor liability to the Normans on the note. The Normans are 
strangers to the Purchase Agreement, and they cite no authority which would allow the Court to 
"rule as a matter of law" that they may recover direc'ly from Arnold and Western Empire 
Advisors for Lanto's share of liability under the note. Norman Motion at 7. 
In addition, it is elementary that no court can adjudge the liability of a party in his 
absence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110-11 (1969). Instead, 
"[t]he consistent constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to adjudicate a personal 
claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant...." Id. Not only 
can the Court not transform Lanto's arguable right of indemnification from Arnold into liability 
to the Normans, but the Normans' insistence that the Court can do so without securing Lanto's 
presence in court is nothing less than unconstitutional. 
Finally, Arnold has successfully opposed this very argument in his previous opposition to 
the Normans' "Motion Regarding Lanto Interest." There, like here, the Normans sought to have 
the Court rule that "Arnold and/or [Western Empire Advisors] should be held liable to the 
plaintiffs in contribution for the share of the Young note representing Lanto's interest," without 
the "inconvenience" of securing Lanto's presence. Motion Regarding Lanto Interest ("Lanto 
Motion") at 4. Thus, the Court already has rejected the Normans' concerns for "judicial 
resources" once, denying their "Motion Regarding Lanto Interest" on October 10, 2000. The 
Normans' concerns for judicial efficiency are curious in light of their willingness to resubmit 
losing arguments to this Court. 
C. The Normans' Arbitrary "Contribution" Analysis Is Unsupported by Law 
and Not Capable of Resolution on Summary Judgment 
The Normans' last three arguments attempt to persuade the Court that it should rule, as a 
matter of law, that (i) the Normans are entitled to "proportionate contribution" from their co-
obligors on the note; (ii) for purposes of assessing this "proportionate liability," the Normans 
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should be considered to be a single party; and (iii) that, in addition to whatever the Normans 
would assess them individually, Arnold and Western Empire Advisors should bear Page and 
Barney's liability under the note exclusively. Norman Motion at 7-10. As throughout the 
memorandum, each of these points is bereft of legal authority or citation to the record, and seems 
only to represent whatever arbitrary outcome the Normans feel they should receive. Three 
further points dispense with what is left of the Normans' contribution argument entirely. 
First, (he Normans' complaint does not contain any cause of action for "contribution," 
proportionate or otherwise, only a claim for "default of trust deed note." See Am. Compl., fflf 
45-52. The Normans already sought leave to amend their complaint to include a contribution 
claim. See, e.g., Proposed Amended Complaint at fflj 38-49, 54-55. After the parties fully 
briefed and argued the Normans' motion to amend, the Court refused to allow them leave to do 
so. The Normans' "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" is really yet another thinly disguised 
motion to amend. 
Second, in order to prevail on this claim for "default" of the note against Arnold, the 
Normans must show that (1) Arnold became obligated to the Normans under the trust deed note; 
(2) that the trust deed note was called due and went into default; and (3) that Arnold was 
obligated and failed to pay part or all of the amounts due under the trust deed note. See, e.g., 
Grossen v. Dewitt 982 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Regardless of the Normans' 
undisputed inability to show that the note was in fact foreclosed upon, they cannot meet the first 
element. Arnold was not and never became a co-obligor on the note. Accordingly, any attempt 
to recover from him - whether for default or for contribution - is necessarily futile as a matter of 
law, and Arnold seeks summary judgment on this basis. 
Finally, even if the Normans' default claim were found to be, in effect, an action for 
contribution, such a claim would not present undisputed issues of material fact sufficient to allow 
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this Court to apportion liability under the note as a matter of law. The note, secured by property 
contributed to the joint venture in order to "facilitate and finance the [joint venture] project," 
would be a partnership loss, necessitating a partnership accounting. An accounting by definition 
requires the assessment of both partnership losses and gains, fact-finding that is entrusted to the 
jury. In addition, the only partnership gain here seems to be the Normans' sale of the property 
(undisputedly donated to the joint venture) for more than $400,000. The Normans' arbitrary 
"contribution" assessment ignores this entirely. Presumably, any accounting of partnership gains 
and losses would be hotly contested by the Normans and the other partners, and as such would be 
inappropriate for resolution through summary judgment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in Arnold's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Arnold respectfully requests that the Normans' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
be denied. 
DATED this / ^ day of December, 2000. 
S N E L L & W I L M E R L L . P . 
Matthew L. Lalli 
Attorney for Mark Arnold 
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FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH 
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman, 
husband and wife, 
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Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson. 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' Objection to 
Proposed Orders 
Civil No. 9807-116 
Judge Anderson 
On December 15, 2000, the Court heard oral argument on the parties' cross-motions for 
summary judgment, at the conclusion of which, defendants' motions were granted and plaintiffs' 
motion denied. Counsel for defendant Larson has filed a Proposed Order from which this 
objection is taken. (Defendant's cover letter for the Proposed Order is dated 1/3/01 and was 
received by plaintiffs counsel on 1/6/01. It indicates that the Proposed Order may be submitted 
for signing by the Court on 1/8/01. This is incorrect. Under Rule 4-501, Operation of the 
Courts, plaintiffs should have until at least 1/11/01 to file objections to the proposed order.) 
The proposed order is not accompanied by findings of fact or conclusions of law, and is 
completely deficient and insufficient as a matter of law to support the Court's rulings. 
Background 
This case went to trial in January, 2000, but a mistrial was declared due to the failure of a 
prospective juror to disclose a prior felony conviction The trial was rescheduled to commence 
on January 15, 2001 The plaintiffs have previously stated their intent to appeal the Court's prior 
ruling granting defendant Arnold's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim against 
him for professional liability In October, the Court invited all parties to submit motions for 
summary judgment on the remaining trial issues so that those could be decided and the entire 
case made ready for one appeal 
Legal Requirement For Summary Judgment 
While proceeding in this fashion may be convenient, it works a gross distortion of the 
rules of civil procedure Rule 56, which goes unacknowledged in defendant's proposed order, 
requires that a moving party must establish that there are no material facts in dispute and that the 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law Neither of these prerequisites were established 
by either defendant, and no attempt has been made to even pretend that they were The 
plaintiffs, on the other hand submitted undisputed facts which should have resulted in a ruling 
granting their motion for summary judgment as a matter of law 
Plaintiffs9 First Cause of Action 
Plaintiffs' first cause of action was that defendants Arnold and Larson caused the failure 
of a joint venture resulting in losses suffered solely by the plaintiffs in excess of $200,000 
Defendants' sole defense to this claim is that they could not be responsible for the failure of the 
joint venture because they were never members of the joint venture Defendants' sole basis for 
the claim that they were not part of the joint venture was the fact that the plaintiffs did not 
affirmatively consent to their participation. 
In order to grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim, it was 
necessary for the court to ignore, not just some of the facts, but all of the facts and documentary 
evidence that detailed defendants' extensive participation in the joint venture. See, e.g., exhibits 
and deposition abstracts submitted in conjunction with plaintiffs9 motion and in response 
to defendants' motions. Plaintiffs' extensive recitation of facts both in conjunction with the 
subject motions is not and cannot be disputed. Consequently, the facts simply are not addressed 
in defendant's proposed order. However, the implication, necessarily contained in an order 
granting summary judgment, that there are no material facts in dispute as to whether these 
defendants participated in a joint venture with the plaintiffs is absurd. 
Plaintiffs undisputed facts establish, among other things, that: 
1. Defendants Arnold and Larson had sole possession and control over the only 
assets of the joint venture, to wit: loan funds secured by plaintiffs' property and the Holiday Inn 
Franchise which was owned by defendant Larson individually. Defendants' Deposition 
Testimony/ 
2. On October 27, 1995, the defendants purchased all right and interest of joint 
venture partner Peter Lanto. It is this transaction to which defendants claim the plaintiffs did not 
affirmatively consent. However, defendants' own testimony establishes that they relied on other 
partners, Page and Barney, to inform the Normans regarding joint venture business. Therefore, 
the defendants would have had to presume that the plaintiffs knew they had become partners. Id. 
3. From and after, October 27, 1995, the defendants held themselves out to the 
public as partners in the Moab Holiday Inn joint venture. In written documentation in the record 
the defendants refer to themselves as partners and are referred to by others in the venture as 
partners See, e.g., letters dated November 3, 1995 and April 10, 1996, attached as exhibits 
D & F to defendant Larson's response to plaintiffs' Motion. 
4 The plaintiffs have maintained from the start that they became aware and 
approved of the participation of Arnold and Larson in the venture Defendants made no attempt 
to counter the Affidavit of Robert Norman dated November 15, 2000, and filed in association 
with these subject motions, that details these facts 
5 The plaintiffs provided undisputed proof that defendants Arnold and Larson were 
directly responsible for the dissolution of the original Moab Land Development Joint Venture 
(l e by taking control of its funds, purchasing the interest of its builder, etc ), but there is no 
question that a joint venture including Arnold and Larson thereafter continued in operation 
The truly ironic aspect to defendants' escape hatch for plaintiffs' first cause of action 
(that the plaintiffs did not affirmatively consent to their becoming partners in the venture) is the 
undisputed fact that the defendants intentionally and dishonestly concealed the transaction from 
them, having stolen the money from the loan proceeds to purchase their interest in the venture1 
And the truth of the matter as stated in Robert Norman's deposition and made a part of the record 
is that the plaintiffs did not give their express consent, only because no one asked them Robert 
Norman Deposition at 28-29. 
The plaintiffs made numerous requests of the Court to invoke equitable doctnnes such as 
estoppel and unclean hands The Court never directly addressed these requests, despite the 
overwhelming assemblage of facts that would support a ruling that the defendants be estopped 
from denying their participation in the joint venture 
Lven if the Court were unwilling to do so, plaintiffs contend that a jury should have been 
allowed to hear the evidence and determine for themselves whether the defendants were 
members of the joint venture. 
Defendant's proposed order states, 
"The Court . . . finds that the plaintiffs' First Cause of Action, for alleged breach of a 
joint venture agreement, fails as to defendant Arnold and defendant Larson for the reason 
that neither Arnold nor Larson were at any time members of the joint venture and thus 
owed no duties to other members of that joint venture for any alleged breach of the joint 
venture agreement." 
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs object to the proposed order because it is incorrect 
and fails to demonstrate that there are no material facts in dispute, or that defendants are entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. The reality on both requirements for summary judgment is quite 
to the contrary. 
Plaintiffs5 Second Cause of Action 
The plaintiffs second cause of action is for liability under a promissory note secured by 
plaintiffs' property for loan proceeds to be used by the joint venture. Again, defendant's 
proposed order lacks any basis for its validity under Rule 56, and agaia, in order to grant 
defendants' motion the Court must not only ignore the facts of the case, but also defendants' own 
testimony and their independent assumption of liability under the note. 
It is undisputed that defendant Larson was a co-obligor, jointly and severally liable under 
the note. See, the Note. 
It is undisputed that defendant Arnold assumed the liability of Peter Lanto under the note, 
and, as an attorney, drafted an agreement wherein he personally indemnified Lanto to liability 
under the note. Purchase Agreement, dated October 27,1995. 
Defendant Arnold, us Larson's attorney testified that Larson was liable under the note. 
Memo in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3. 
Defendant Larson testified that it was the intent of the purchase agreement with Lanto 
that Arnold and his company became liable under the note. Id. 
The record before the Court contains a demand from the joint venturers (including 
Arnold) to Larson that he repay the loan proceeds. Letters of April 10, 1996 and June 18, 
1996. 
Robert Norman's testimony and affidavit are undisputed that defendant Larson gave him 
his personal promise that Larson would be responsible to repay the Young loan regardless of the 
success of the Holiday Inn venture. Norman Affidavit at %26. 
With regard to this cause of action, defendant's proposed order states: 
"The Court finds that the Second Cause of Action for alleged default of a trust 
deed note, fails as to Defendant Arnold because he was not at any time an obligor on the 
trust deed note and thus owed no duty with respect to any alleged default of the note, and 
fails as to defendant Larson because, while he was an obligor on the trust deed note, any 
duty he undertook with respect to that note ran only to persons who are not parties herein, 
and he had no duty to the plaintiffs with respect to that note." 
Defendants again take an incredible route to safety as a matter of law. That is, having 
duped, lied to, taken advantage of and abandoned the plaintiffs to a huge loss resulting from their 
conduct, the defendants had no duty to the Normans because the Normans were forced to sell 
their property to pay off the note and save themselves. The defense that Larson's duty ran only 
to Arnold's clients the Youngs and that Arnold's duty ran only to Lanto is convoluted, devoid of 
reason and fails to consider the plain fact that it was defendants' conduct that forced the plaintiffs 
to take the course of action they did. (The record would support the conclusion by a jury that 
defendant Arnold actively prevented his clients the Youngs from foreclosing by having the note 
transferred to another client.) 
Under defendants' reasoning, it would have been impossible for them to be liable for the 
note under any circumstances (and attorney Arnold may well have considered this when he set 
the Normans up) because, even if Arnold's clients had foreclosed, the sale of the Normans' 
property would have been sufficient to pay off the note. Indeed, in making its ruling the Court 
appeared to accept that theory and went so far as to blame the victims, stating it was a bad deal 
from the start and the Normans never should have trusted the other partners. 
Also, apparently, the Court must have found that defendant Larson's personal promise to 
make sure the loan was repaid created no duty and is not a matter worthy of the jury's 
consideration. 
If the plaintiffs' eventual recourse in the involuntary sale of their own property to pay the 
note was knowing and fully informed, there might be some basis to rule that the defendants owed 
them no duty. But under the facts of this case, to find there are no material facts in dispute and 
that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, is wrong. The Normans were told 
and expected that their partners would equally share the risks involved in the venture. When 
they found Norman Larson's name on the promissory note, they were told he was added for their 
protection, that Larson was the guy who would make sure the loan was repaid. 
No duty?! Larson and Arnold had no duty to disclose they had spent half the loan 
proceeds before the note was even signed? 
Arnold had no duty to disclose that almost all the money was gone before the due date of 
the note (September 27, 1995), and he and Larson had not even made an interest payment? 
Arnold, the attorney, had no duty to disclose that, if they managed to spend the loan 
proceeds without accomplishing anything, it was likely that the Normans would have no recourse 
regardless of foreclosure? 
Arnold, the attor \\ who arranged the loan for a fee of $16,000, who controlled the 
funds, who assumed a position as co-obligor, who was counsel for the joint venture, had no duty 
to inform the Normans that the other obligors really weren't taking on any responsibility or 
potential liability? 
Th result of this ruling and defendant's proposed order is so grossly unfair that it cannot 
be justified as a matter of law. No jury in the world would come to the conclusion that 
defendants Arnold and Larson have no duty or liability in this case. 
The Court previously granted defendant Arnold's motion for summary judgment against 
plaintiffs' claim that he had professional liability in his undisputed role as counsel for the joint 
venture. The Court was concerned that holding an attorney liable to individual members of a 
joint venture would place the attorney in a confusing and conflicting position. It's perfectly 
obvious that no such confusion existed in this case, and the suggestion that Arnold had no duty to 
these specific people under these specific circumstances is pretty amazing. But then to 
subsequently rule that Arnold has no duty running to the Normans despite a contract assuming 
liability creates a situation that greatly imperils the well being of innocent people. Because the 
combined effect of these rulings condones and allows attorneys to use their skill and knowledge 
of the law to both enrich themselves and take advantage of others without consequence. 
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs object to the proposed order regarding the second 
cause of action because it is incorrect and fails to demonstrate that there are no material facts in 
dispute, or that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The ruling represents a 
manifest injustice. 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
As stated above, the facts and documentary evidence are not in dispute. Defendants have 
not even bothered to try. Plaintiffs requested summary judgment on their second cause of action 
dividing liability between the parties consistent with the facts and in a manner which common 
sense and fairness dictate. All that was necessary for the Court to reach this decision was a 
ruling that the defendants would not be allowed to hide behind their own wrongful and dishonest 
conduct; that they would be estopped from denying their involvement in the joint venture; that 
they would be required to bear the proportionate responsibility for losses under the note which 
they voluntarily assumed, and for which the Normans had every right to rely upon. 
These ruling were well within the Court's equitable powers and in no way an abuse of 
discretion. The case would then have a result consistent with, rather than flying in the face of 
the undisputed facts. Moreover, the decision would be consistent with the reasonable and actual 
expectation of the parties. The defendants knew what they were doing. The acted intentionally 
in the hope of massive personal benefit. The Court should rule, consistent with the undisputed 
facts, that the defendants are responsible for their proportionate share of the Normans' losses as a 
matter of law. 
Defendant's proposed order regarding the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment provides no comment regarding the facts or any legal justification, and plaintiffs object 
to that aspect of the proposed order as well. 
Dated this $ * day of .2001. 
Steve Russell 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
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